HPY, Inc. v. Electric Power Authority

Decision Date15 April 1993
Docket NumberNo. 92-2370,92-2370
Citation991 F.2d 786
PartiesNOTICE: First Circuit Local Rule 36.2(b)6 states unpublished opinions may be cited only in related cases. HPY, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ELECTRIC POWER AUTHORITY, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

Francisco J. Amundaray-Rodriguez, Mirta E. Rodriguez-Mora, Attorney, Department of Justice, Adrian Mercado and Mercado & Soto on brief for appellant.

Reina Colon De Rodriguez, Acting Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Carlos Lugo Fiol, Assistant Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Arturo Trias, Miguel R. Garay Auban, Pedro Santiago-Torres, Jorge Marrero Narvaez, and Trias, Acevedo & Otero on brief for appellees.

Before Cyr, Circuit Judge, Boudin, Circuit Judge, and Burns, Senior District Judge. *

Per Curiam.

HPY, Inc., brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against three public authorities in Puerto Rico, certain of their officials, and John Does 1 through 1,000. The agencies are the Electric Power Authority, the Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority and the Rural Housing Administration. The heart of the complaint was the following allegation:

On or about 1985, squatters, without valid title or authorization from the plaintiff started massive land invasions on said properties [belonging to plaintiff]. The squatters, also Defendants of [sic] this suit, encouraged and abetted by the other Defendants, proceeded to construct or build shacks and houses on Plaintiff's properties.

This, said the complaint, comprised a deprivation of property rights "without due process and without due compensation."

The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In opposing the motion, HPY offered a few more factual allegations. Specifically, it alleged that squatters had occupied its land and that some or all of the named defendants had encouraged the invasion and abetted the squatters by supplying public facilities like power to the squatters and even constructing or assisting the squatters to construct shacks. The district court ultimately dismissed the complaint, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim, observing that "we are as likely to squeeze blood from a stone as we are to squeeze any more facts from this complaint...." HPY appeals. 1

We affirm the district court. Section 1983 creates a claim for injuries done by anyone who "acting under color of" state law deprives the victim of any "rights, privileges, or immunities" protected under the Constitution. The original complaint did not explain what the named defendants had done under color of state law, but we will take the complaint on this appeal as illuminated by HPY's oppositions to the motions to dismiss. Even in this posture, and allowing HPY the benefits of liberal pleading rules, 5 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1219 (1990), we cannot see how HPY can premise a claim under section 1983 upon the facts alleged.

We will assume arguendo that the color of state law requirement is met as to the named defendants (since they are governmental entities and officials) and that HPY's property has been physically occupied and its value diminished. But if the actions of the named defendants are not authorized by local law or regulation, then there is no...

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