LeBlanc v. B.G.T. Corp., 92-2366

• Decision Date: 07 April 1993
• Docket Number: No. 92-2366,92-2366
• Citation: 992 F.2d 394
• Parties: , 61 USLW 2729 Leonard J. LeBLANC, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. B.G.T. CORPORATION, Defendant, Appellee. . Heard
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Page 394

992 F.2d 394

1994 A.M.C. 291, 61 USLW 2729

Leonard J. LeBLANC, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. B.G.T. CORPORATION, Defendant, Appellee.

No. 92-2366.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Heard April 7, 1993.

Decided May 14, 1993.

Joseph G. Abromovitz, with whom John G. Balzer and Abromovitz & Leahy, P.C., Boston, MA, were on brief, for appellant.

Richard H. Pettingell with whom Debra A. Joyce and Morrison, Mahoney & Miller, Boston, MA, were on brief, for appellee.

Before SELYA, Circuit Judge, FRIEDMAN, ^* Senior Circuit Judge, and CYR, Circuit Judge.

SELYA, Circuit Judge.

We must answer today a question of first impression in this circuit and, of late, in the courts of appeals: Does a person's status as a seaman in service of a ship necessarily end immediately upon termination of employment, thereby extinguishing a right to maintenance and cure which might otherwise be available under general maritime law? We think not. Because the court below applied a contrary rule, we vacate the judgment and remand for further development of the record.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff-appellant Leonard J. LeBlanc worked as an engineer aboard the F/V RESOLUTE, a commercial fishing boat owned by defendant-appellee B.G.T. Corporation. ¹ The RESOLUTE set out from Fairhaven, Massachusetts on September 25, 1991. Shortly after its departure, the vessel broke down and returned to port for minor repairs. It then headed back to sea with a rehabilitated winch and renewed hopes, but, it appears, against the winds of fortune. The crew's efforts produced few fish.

Appellant grew uneasy in the face of disappointed expectations. Since his remuneration would reflect both the value of the catch and the expense of the voyage, he sought to truncate what had become a relatively unproductive and costly trip. His importunings placed him at loggerheads with the captain and a heated confrontation ensued. Although the parties vigorously debate the exact content of this war of words--appellant may or may not have been cashiered then and there--it is undisputed that the RESOLUTE turned back, arriving in New Bedford during the night of October 9. The following morning, the crew dislodged the catch. The RESOLUTE then made the five-minute journey to her dock in Fairhaven. Throughout, appellant continued to perform the ship's work.

Once the vessel docked, appellant, assisted by a fellow crew member, Peter Lynch, began unloading his gear. During this process, or shortly thereafter, the captain approached and gave appellant his "per." ² Another argument erupted. In the course of this brouhaha, the captain either told or reminded appellant that he was fired and, at any rate, ordered him to remove his belongings from the boat. Ten to fifteen minutes later, appellant slipped while descending the stairs to the engine room and broke his right foot.

It remains unclear exactly what transpired in the brief interval between the second imbroglio and the accident. The parties agree that appellant removed some additional gear that he routinely kept aboard the RESOLUTE between voyages; but they disagree as to exactly how he accomplished this feat, i.e., whether he exited the vessel during the unloading process or, instead, stayed on board and handed his possessions over the side to Lynch. The record is similarly obscure concerning whether appellant succeeded in removing all his gear prior to injuring himself or, instead, as he claimed at trial, had yet to retrieve his boots from the engine room.

Following the mishap, appellant received maintenance checks for a period of time. As soon as the employer's attorney got wind of the accident and suggested that appellant, when injured, was no longer in the ship's service, the flow of funds stopped. Appellant then sued, including in his complaint a count for maintenance and cure under general maritime law. That count was tried by mutual consent before a magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (1988). After a two-day trial, the magistrate denied recovery for maintenance and cure. LeBlanc appeals. ³

II. ANALYSIS

The magistrate reasoned that appellant was not entitled to maintenance and cure because, as a matter of law, that remedy cannot attach after termination of employment. Since this was a bench trial in an admiralty case, the magistrate's findings of fact are reviewable only for clear error. See, e.g., DiMillo v. Sheepscot Pilots, Inc., 870 F.2d 746, 749 (1st Cir.1989); Clauson v. Smith, 823 F.2d 660, 661 (1st Cir.1987). However, appellant does not claim that the magistrate misperceived the facts, but, rather, that she applied an incorrect legal standard. We consider this claim of legal error de novo. See Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 750, 757 (1st Cir.1992); Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 972 F.2d 453, 457 (1st Cir.1992).

A

Before addressing the merits of the appeal, we limn the seascape against which it arises. From time immemorial, the law of the sea has required shipowners to ensure the maintenance and cure of seamen who fall ill or become injured while in service of the ship. See, e.g., 1B Ellen M. Flynn et al., Benedict on Admiralty §§ 41-42 (6th ed. 1993) (finding the requirement extant in the Laws of Oleron and other ancient admiralty codes). The duty to provide maintenance and cure is today a firmly entrenched accouterment of general maritime law. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724, 726, 63 S.Ct 930, 931-32, 87 L.Ed. 1107 (1943); The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175, 23 S.Ct. 483, 521, 47 L.Ed. 760 (1903).

The term "maintenance and cure" refers to the provision of, or payment for, food and lodging ("maintenance") as well as any necessary health-care expenses ("cure") incurred during the period of recovery from an injury or malady. See, e.g., Aguilar, 318 U.S. at 730, 63 S.Ct. at 933-34; Calmar Steamship Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 528, 58 S.Ct. 651, 653, 82 L.Ed. 993 (1938). As the label implies, the right is curative in nature and is thus to be distinguished from other admiralty rights, such as the right to recover lost wages or the right to recover for a shipowner's negligence, which are compensatory. See Aguilar, 318 U.S. at 730, 63 S.Ct. at 933-34. The right to maintenance and cure attaches largely without regard to fault; a seaman may forfeit his entitlement only by engaging in gross misconduct. See, e.g., Calmar, 303 U.S. at 527-29, 58 S.Ct. at 652-54. And, moreover, once the right to maintenance and cure has attached, the injured employee's entitlement continues, even after termination of service, until he is "so far cured as possible." Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511, 518, 69 S.Ct. 707, 710-11, 93 L.Ed. 850 (1949); accord Clauson, 823 F.2d at 661 n. 1.

Developed though the doctrine may be in some respects, its scope has never been precisely delineated. While it is common ground that the right is available only to a "seaman" who is "in service of the ship" at the time an injury or illness eventuates, see Aguilar, 318 U.S. at 732, 63 S.Ct. at 934-35; Osceola, 189 U.S. at 175, 23 S.Ct. at 487, the meaning of these imbricated terms has evolved piecemeal over many decades and attempts at further refinement typically have been imbued with the factual residuum of particular cases. See, e.g., McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 348-53, 355-56, 111 S.Ct. 807, 814-16, 818, 112 L.Ed.2d 866 (1991); Senko v. LaCrosse Dredging Corp., 352 U.S. 370, 374, 77 S.Ct. 415, 417-18, 1 L.Ed.2d 404 (1957). ⁴ Thus, there are lingering questions as to the exact manner in which the right to maintenance and cure interfaces with the employment relationship. It is, for example, still unsettled whether the right to maintenance and cure is coterminous with, and a contractual attribute of, employed status, or, instead, whether the right retains a measure of independent force. See 2 Martin J. Norris, The Law of Seamen § 26:10 (4th ed. 1985) (collecting cases).

The instant case requires us to explore these uncharted waters, for B.G.T. contends, and the magistrate apparently believed, that termination of employment, in and of itself, necessarily and always prevents subsequent attachment of a right to maintenance and cure. We reject this thesis, concluding that the right to maintenance and cure stems from the employer-employee relationship but is not in all circumstances completely coextensive with it. As we explain below, a number of different considerations undergird this conclusion.

B

One pylon upon which our holding rests is an appreciation of the historical purpose of maintenance and cure. A common thread running through the reported cases, some of them centuries old, is that maintenance and cure must always be viewed as an alleviatory remedy. Seamen should receive it because the nature of their employment necessitates their exposure to the peculiar hazards of seafaring life while at the same time leaving them utterly dependent on the ship, which serves as the very framework for their existence. See, e.g., Farrell, 336 U.S. at 514-16, 69 S.Ct. at 708-09; Aguilar, 318 U.S. at 731-34, 63 S.Ct. at 934-36; Harden v. Gordon, 11 F.Cas. 480, 483 (C.C.D.Me.1823) (No. 6,047) (Story, J.); see also Wilander, 498 U.S. at 354, 111 S.Ct. at 817 (stating that a seaman's remedies grow out of "his peculiar relationship to the vessel, and ... the special hazards" of seafaring) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Because it was feared that without the right to maintenance and cure as an inducement few might willingly devote themselves to a way of life that would both render them at risk and leave them friendless in the face of the assumed risk, see Calmar, 303 U.S. at 528, 58 S.Ct. at 653; see also Macedo v. F/V Paul & Michelle, 868 F.2d 519, 521 (1st Cir.1989) ("The obligation for maintenance and cure arose, historically, from the irresponsible behavior of shipowners who set disabled seamen ashore at foreign ports to shift for...