Hill v. Lockhart

• Citation: 992 F.2d 801
• Decision Date: 05 May 1993
• Docket Number: No. 92-2349,92-2349
• Parties: Steven Douglas HILL; Mark S. Cambiano, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. A.L. LOCKHART, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)

Page 801

992 F.2d 801

Steven Douglas HILL; Mark S. Cambiano, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. A.L. LOCKHART, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 92-2349.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Feb. 17, 1993.

Decided May 5, 1993.

Mark S. Cambiano, Morrilton, AR, argued, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Jack Gillean, Little Rock, AR, argued, for defendant-appellee.

Before McMILLIAN, MAGILL, and LOKEN, Circuit Judges.

LOKEN, Circuit Judge.

On March 30, 1992, the district court ¹ dissolved a stay of Steven Douglas Hill's execution after the denial of his petition for federal habeas corpus relief. On April 21, Hill filed a second habeas petition with a request that a new attorney, Mark S. Cambiano, be appointed to represent the indigent Hill. On May 1, the district court appointed Cambiano, specifically stating that the appointment was effective April 21. Hill's second habeas petition was summarily denied, and he was executed by the State of Arkansas on May 7, 1992. Cambiano then requested an award of attorney's fees and expenses in the amount of $25,207.93. The district court awarded $4,491.99, and Cambiano appeals. We affirm.

The Anti-Drug Abuse Amendments Act of 1988 permits the award of increased attorneys fees and expenses in federal capital cases. Pub.L. 100-690, Title VII, § 7001, 102 Stat. 4387, 4393-94, codified at 21 U.S.C. § 848(q). The statute expressly applies to attorneys, such as Cambiano, appointed to represent petitioners seeking federal habeas relief from a state-imposed death sentence. § 848(q)(4)(B). Attorneys governed by § 848(q) are to be compensated at a rate and in an amount that is " 'reasonably necessary' to ensure competent representation." ² In re Berger, 498 U.S. 233, 235, 111 S.Ct. 628, 629, 112 L.Ed.2d 710 (1991). See § 848(q)(10); § 602(A) of the Judicial Conference's Guidelines for Administration of Criminal Justice Act (Apr. 1990).

In Berger, the Supreme Court approved the general approach of the Judicial Conference Guidelines, placed a limit of $5,000 on compensation to be paid for services before that Court, and stated that it will not conduct a case-by-case review of counsel fee requests under § 848(q)(10). On the other hand, for services rendered by appointed counsel in capital cases before this court, we have continued to approve compensation requests under § 848(q) on a case-by-case basis. See Simmons v. Lockhart, 931 F.2d 1226, 1232-33 (8th Cir.1991). For services performed in the district courts, those courts are best able to determine what fee awards are reasonably necessary to ensure that capital defendants receive competent representation. Because of disparities in the markets for legal services throughout the circuit, we conclude that it would frustrate the congressional purpose if we either imposed uniform circuit compensation standards or readily substituted our judgment for that of the district court. The "reasonably necessary" determination under § 848(q)(10) is best left to the district courts' discretion. See, e.g., H.J. Inc. v. Flygt Corp., 925 F.2d 257, 259-60 (8th Cir.1991); Lucero v. City of Trinidad, 815 F.2d 1384, 1386 (10th Cir.1987).

The district court reduced Cambiano's requested hourly rate of compensation from $150 to $85; denied compensation for all services prior to April 21, the effective date of his appointment; denied fees and expenses for services rendered after April 21 in seeking clemency from Arkansas officials; and denied fees and expenses for time spent on issues that the court concluded were not proper subjects for a federal habeas corpus proceeding. We will not disturb the district court's decision to award fees at $85 per hour, a rate within the Judicial Conference Guidelines range of $75 to $125 per hour. Because other appointed counsel had effectively represented Hill throughout his initial federal habeas proceeding, the district court was well within its discretion in limiting Cambiano's compensation to work performed after his effective date of appointment, and in excluding work on issues that were not proper subjects for federal habeas relief.

Cambiano argues that the district court erred in denying compensation for his services in assisting Hill's request for clemency from the state. This raises an issue of law. The statute expressly provides that, "each attorney so appointed shall represent the defendant ... in such ... proceedings for executive or other clemency as may be available to the defendant," § 848(q)(8), and that attorneys are entitled to compensation for services "reasonably necessary to carry out the requirements of paragraphs (4) through (9)," § 848(q)(10). Given these statutory directives, it is not enough to deny compensation, as the district court did, because the clemency proceeding was "not relevant in any way to the habeas petition." The issue is more complex than that.

The Eleventh Circuit faced a similar issue in In re Lindsey, 875 F.2d 1502 (11th Cir.1989), in which appointed counsel seeking federal habeas relief for unexhausted claims argued that § 848(q)(8) authorized compensation for the pursuit of relief in state court. The court first rejected that contention because the failure to exhaust meant that no compensation-authorizing proceeding had yet been initiated under § 848(q)(4)(B). Alternatively, the court held that the references to judicial, competency, and clemency proceedings in § 848(q)(8) do not encompass "any proceedings convened under the authority of a State." The court explained:

Acceptance of Lindsey's view of a state prisoner's rights under subsection 848(q)[ (8) ] would have the practical effect of supplanting state-court systems for the appointment of counsel in collateral review cases.... Like Lindsey, other state inmates ... would ignore the exhaustion requirement and, before seeking state remedies, futilely file...