Vanderbilt v. Collins
| Citation | 994 F.2d 189 |
| Decision Date | 17 June 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 91-4793,91-4793 |
| Parties | Jim VANDERBILT, Petitioner-Appellee, v. James A. COLLINS, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, Respondent-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit) |
William C. Zapalac, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dan Morales, Atty. Gen., Robert S. Walt, Asst. Atty. Gen., Austin, TX, for respondent-appellant.
Steven C. Losch, Brooklyn, NY (court-appointed), for Vanderbilt.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.
Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, KING and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
The State of Texas appeals the grant of a writ of habeas corpus vacating the death sentence imposed on Jim Vanderbilt and barring the reimposition of a death sentence at any subsequent sentencing proceeding. For the reasons assigned, we affirm in part and vacate in part.
On April 1, 1975, Vanderbilt, a former police officer, kidnapped Katina Moyer, a 16-year-old girl, while she was in her car waiting to pick up her schoolteacher mother. At gunpoint he handcuffed Moyer and took her to his home, intending to rape her. Noticing that Moyer was looking around the house intently, as if trying to memorize everything she could about his house, he put her in her auto and drove to a secluded spot outside Amarillo where he fatally shot her in the head with his .357 pistol. He left her body where it fell and drove to the outskirts of Amarillo where he abandoned her car on the highway with the blinkers flashing and hitched a ride back into town.
In May, 1975 prior to the first trial, Vanderbilt's counsel requested that Vanderbilt be examined by a psychiatrist. Counsel had advised against the examination, but Vanderbilt insisted. The motion requesting the examination did not specify the purposes. The court granted the motion, but required that the results be released to the state. We find no written order for the examination in the record of the first trial. Vanderbilt was examined over the course of two days by Drs. Kracke and Klein, working under the supervision of Dr. Kenneth McTague. Dr. McTague summarized their examinations in a letter informing the court of their conclusion that Vanderbilt was sane and competent to stand trial.
The district court described the evidence at trial as follows:
From the circumstantial evidence introduced at trial, the jury could reasonably find that the applicant and the deceased victim, Moyer, left the applicant's house in her automobile, on the evening of her death, at approximately 4:30 p.m.; and that they drove north on the Dumas Expressway out of the city of Amarillo. Further, they could have found that the applicant abandoned Moyer's car along the Dumas Expressway, south of where Moyer was found shot, at approximately 6:00 p.m.
In addition, experts testified at trial that Moyer had bruises on her wrists which could have been caused by handcuffs, and that the bullet with which she was killed was a .38 or .357 luballoy, or copper-coated bullet. Other testimony showed that the applicant possessed handcuffs with traces of blood of the same type as Moyer's on the inside of one of the cuffs.
In addition, the state introduced the testimony of two police officers who heard Vanderbilt make an oral confession on the night of his arrest. Officer Davis testified that Officer Boydston's account was similar. Also according to Officer Davis, Vanderbilt stated that after killing Moyer he removed the handcuffs, drove to the outskirts of Amarillo, abandoned her car on the highway with its blinkers on, and then was picked up by a passing motorist. Upon returning to town he went home, got his car, and drove around "looking for another girl."
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals overturned the conviction for trial error related to the exclusion of evidence on the issue of the voluntariness of Vanderbilt's confessions; 3 the appellate court did not address Vanderbilt's claim alleging insufficient evidence of future dangerousness to support the death sentence. 4 The appellate court stated, however:
[W]e note that the State introduced no evidence at the punishment stage of the trial. In the event of a re-trial, we call attention to the recent case of Warren v. State, 562 S.W.2d 474, on sufficiency of the evidence to support an affirmative finding to special issue No. 2 of Art. 37.071, V.A.C.C.P. 5
Vanderbilt was retried, and was again convicted and sentenced to death. The only new evidence presented during the second trial's guilt phase was the testimony of Jerre Kris Tucker. She testified that she had been sexually molested by Vanderbilt on March 27, 1975. On that evening she had just gotten into her car in a shopping mall parking lot after work when he opened the driver's door of her car, produced a pistol, and demanded that she move over. Vanderbilt got in the car, handcuffed her, drove to a secluded construction area which was not occupied at that time of night, and sexually molested her. He then released her a few blocks from the abduction site and returned her auto to the mall parking lot.
During the second penalty phase, the state introduced five witnesses who testified to Vanderbilt's bad reputation in the community for being peaceful and law-abiding: four police officers and Jerre Tucker. The state also introduced the testimony of Dr. McTague regarding Vanderbilt's future dangerousness. Defense counsel was not informed that the state planned to have McTague testify regarding Vanderbilt's future dangerousness until he was called. There is also conflicting testimony regarding whether Vanderbilt was given any Miranda-type warnings before the examination, and if any were given, the extent of the warnings. It is undisputed, however, that neither Vanderbilt nor his counsel was informed that results of the examination could be used on the issue of Vanderbilt's future dangerousness.
Following the second conviction, the appeals therefrom, 6 and exhaustion of state habeas proceedings, Vanderbilt filed a petition for federal habeas corpus relief. He raised challenges to the use of Dr. McTague's testimony during the penalty phase of the second trial as violative of his fifth and sixth amendment rights, and double jeopardy challenges asserting that the evidence in both the guilt and penalty phases of the first trial was legally insufficient. The district court partially granted the writ and vacated the death sentence, after conducting an evidentiary hearing and finding that the psychiatrist's testimony during the second penalty phase violated Vanderbilt's fifth and sixth amendment rights under Estelle v. Smith. 7
The state moved for reconsideration, asking that the order vacating the death sentence be made conditional upon allowing the state the opportunity to commute the sentence or retry the penalty phase. In addition, Vanderbilt moved for reconsideration of his double jeopardy challenges. Upon reconsideration, following the dictates of then-existing circuit precedent, the district court engaged in a painstaking review of the sufficiency of the evidence at the first trial and found that there was insufficient evidence of future dangerousness presented during the first penalty phase. As a result, the district court found that the death sentence following the second trial was imposed in violation of the double jeopardy clause. The state timely appealed.
In Burks v. United States, 8 the Supreme Court held that the double jeopardy clause prevents a retrial once a reviewing court determines that the evidence at the first trial was insufficient. 9 As the Court noted, "[t]he Double Jeopardy Clause forbids a second trial for the purpose of affording the prosecution another opportunity to supply evidence which it failed to muster in the first proceeding." 10
Under Bullington v. Missouri, 11 the double jeopardy clause applies to capital sentencing proceedings. Burks interacts...
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