State of Nevada v. Dist. Ct.

Citation116 Nev. 127,994 P.2d 692
Decision Date02 February 2000
Docket Number No. 32940, No. 32937, No. 32936, No. 32941., No. 32938, No. 32939
PartiesThe STATE OF NEVADA, Petitioner, v. The EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF the STATE OF NEVADA, In and For the COUNTY OF CLARK, and The Honorable Joseph T. Bonaventure, District Judge, Respondents, and Timothy John Hedland, Real Party in Interest. The State of Nevada, Petitioner, v. The Eighth Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada, in and for the County of Clark, and The Honorable Joseph T. Bonaventure, District Judge, Respondents, and Steven Henry, Real Party in Interest. The State of Nevada, Petitioner, v. The Eighth Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada, in and for the County of Clark, and The Honorable Joseph S. Pavlikowski, District Judge, Respondents, and Ryan David Melvin, Real Party in Interest. The State of Nevada, Petitioner, v. The Eighth Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada, in and for the County of Clark, and The Honorable Michael L. Douglas, District Judge, Respondents, and Jerry Edmond Miley, Real Party in Interest. The State of Nevada, Petitioner, v. The Eighth Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada, in and for the County of Clark, and The Honorable Joseph S. Pavlikowski, District Judge, Respondents, and Dean Thomas Miller, Real Party in Interest. The State of Nevada, Petitioner, v. The Eighth Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada, in and for the County of Clark, and The Honorable Joseph T. Bonaventure, District Judge, Respondents, and Reginald Ragsdale, Real Party in Interest.
CourtSupreme Court of Nevada

Frankie Sue Del Papa, Attorney General, Carson City; Stewart L. Bell, District Attorney, and Owen Porterfield and Bruce Nelson, Deputy District Attorneys, Clark County, for Petitioners.

John Glenn Watkins, Las Vegas, for Real Parties in Interest.

BEFORE ROSE, C.J., YOUNG and AGOSTI, JJ.

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

The state charged each of the real parties in interest with driving under the influence pursuant to NRS 484.379(1) and at least one traffic code infraction under NRS chapter 484 or a Clark County Ordinance. In each case, the real party in interest appeared in justice's court and asked to plead guilty to the traffic code infraction. The justices' courts accepted the guilty pleas over the state's objections and immediately imposed sentence. Each real party in interest then moved to dismiss the DUI charge on the theory that conviction of that charge would be redundant to the conviction for the traffic code infraction pursuant to this court's decisions in Albitre v. State, 103 Nev. 281, 738 P.2d 1307 (1987) and Donahue v. City of Sparks, 111 Nev. 1281, 903 P.2d 225 (1995). The justices' courts granted the motions. On appeal, the district courts affirmed the justices' courts' orders. The state filed the instant petitions for writs of mandamus challenging the lower courts' decisions.1

These petitions ask this court to determine whether conviction for a charge of driving under the influence in violation of NRS 484.379(1) would be redundant to conviction for a general traffic code infraction. We conclude that such convictions would not necessarily be redundant.

FACTS

Docket No. 32936 (Hedland)

The state charged real party in interest Timothy John Hedland by criminal complaint with two misdemeanor offenses: driving and/or being in actual physical control while under the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of NRS 484.379(1) (count I) and failure to maintain travel lane in violation of NRS 484.305 (count II). On May 21, 1997, the justice's court, Judge Pro Tem Swanson, accepted Hedland's offer to plead guilty to count II, over the state's objection, and ordered Hedland to pay a fine. Hedland thereafter filed a motion to dismiss count I. The state opposed the motion. On November 3, 1997, the justice's court, Judge Smith, granted the motion. On appeal to the district court, Judge Bonaventure affirmed the justice's court's order, concluding that the charges were redundant because they arose from the same traffic incident and, therefore, Hedland could not be convicted of both charges.

Docket No. 32937 (Henry)

The state charged real party in interest Steven Henry by criminal complaint with two misdemeanor charges: driving and/or being in actual physical control while under the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of NRS 484.379(1) (count I) and failure to use due care by failing to decrease speed when driving on wet pavement in violation of NRS 484.363 (count II). On January 16, 1997, the justice's court, Judge Smith, accepted Henry's offer to plead guilty to count II and imposed a fine.2 Thereafter, Henry filed a motion to dismiss count I. The state opposed the motion. On April 23, 1997, the justice's court granted the motion, concluding that the state necessarily had to prove count II to prove count I. On appeal to district court, Judge Bonaventure affirmed the justice's court's order, concluding that the charges were redundant.

Docket No. 32938 (Melvin)

The state charged real party in interest Ryan David Melvin by criminal complaint with three misdemeanor charges: driving and/or being in actual physical control while under the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of NRS 484.379(1) (count I), basic speeding in violation of NRS 484.361 (count II), and improper lane change in violation of NRS 484.305(1) (count III). On January 30, 1997, Judge Pro Tem Swanson accepted Melvin's offer to plead guilty to counts II and III, over the state's objection, and assessed a fine. Thereafter, Melvin filed a motion to dismiss count I. The state opposed the motion. On June 4, 1997, Judge Abbatangelo granted the motion without explanation. On appeal to district court, Judge Pavlikowski affirmed the justice's court's order, concluding that the charges were redundant because they were based on the same act of driving.

Docket No. 32939 (Miley)

The state charged real party in interest Jerry Edmond Miley by criminal complaint with two misdemeanor charges: driving and/or being in actual physical control while under the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of NRS 484.379(1) (count I) and failure to yield right of way in violation of NRS 484.317 (count II). On February 3, 1997, the justice's court, Judge Lippis, accepted Miley's offer to plead guilty to count II, over the state's objection, and ordered Miley to pay a fine. Thereafter, Miley filed a motion to dismiss count I. The state opposed the motion. On October 23, 1997, Judge Lippis granted the motion, concluding that the charges arose from the same course of action. On appeal to district court, Judge Michael L. Douglas affirmed the justice's court's order, concluding that conviction of the DUI charge would be redundant because both charges arose from the same traffic incident.

Docket No. 32940 (Miller)

The state charged real party in interest Dean Thomas Miller by criminal complaint with two misdemeanor charges: driving and/or being in actual physical control while under the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of NRS 484.379(1) (count I) and unlawful manner of driving for driving through an intersection in a right-turn-only lane in violation of NRS 484.377 and Clark County Ordinance 14.24.010 (count II).3 On January 30, 1997, Judge Pro Tem Swanson accepted Miller's offer to plead guilty to count II, over the state's objection, and ordered Miller to pay a fine. Thereafter, Miller filed a motion to dismiss count I. On April 24, 1997, the justice's court, Judge Abbatangelo, granted the motion. On appeal to district court, Judge Pavlikowski affirmed the justice's court's order, concluding that the charges were redundant because they arose from the same act of driving.

Docket No. 32941 (Ragsdale)

The state charged real party in interest Reginald Ragsdale by criminal complaint with two misdemeanor charges: driving and/or being in actual physical control while under the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of NRS 484.379(1) (count I) and failure to yield right of way in violation of NRS 484.315 and Clark County Ordinance 14.32.070 (count II). On May 21, 1997, Judge Pro Tem Swanson accepted Ragsdale's offer to plead guilty to count II, over the state's objection, and ordered Ragsdale to pay a fine. Thereafter, Ragsdale filed a motion to dismiss count I. The state opposed the motion. On November 3, 1997, the justice's court, Judge Smith, granted the motion. On appeal to district court, Judge Bonaventure affirmed the justice's court's order, concluding that the charges were redundant because they arose from the same traffic incident.

DISCUSSION

Intervention by way of extraordinary relief

The Nevada Constitution grants this court the "power to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto, and habeas corpus." Nev. Const. art. 6, § 4. The power to issue such writs is part of this court's original jurisdiction; it is not merely auxiliary to our appellate jurisdiction. State of Nevada v. McCullough, 3 Nev. 202, 214-16 (1867).

A writ of mandamus is available to compel the performance of an act that the law requires as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station. NRS 34.160. Although this court has stated that a writ of mandamus does not lie to correct errors where action has been taken by the inferior tribunal,4 we have utilized mandamus to control an arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion, see Round Hill Gen. Imp. Dist. v. Newman, 97 Nev. 601, 637 P.2d 534 (1981)

. A writ of mandamus generally will not issue, however, if the petitioner has a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. See NRS 34.170. Further, mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, and it is within the discretion of this court to determine if a petition will be considered. See Poulos v. District Court, 98 Nev. 453, 455, 652 P.2d 1177, 1178 (1982).

This court has generally declined to entertain petitions for review of a lower c...

To continue reading

Request your trial
66 cases
  • Anderson v. Neven
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • September 11, 2020
    ...petition for cert. filed , 81 U.S.L.W. (U.S. Mar. 5, 2013) (No. 12-9118); see also State of Nevada v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court , 116 Nev. 127, 135 & 136 n. 7, 994 P.2d 692, 697 & n. 7 (2000) (DUI and "traffic code infractions occurring during the same driving episode" each require proof ......
  • State v. Dist. Ct.
    • United States
    • Nevada Supreme Court
    • June 9, 2005
    ...Nev. 155, 175-76, 787 P.2d 805, 819 (1990). 10. Hickey, 105 Nev. at 731, 782 P.2d at 1338. 11. See, e.g., State of Nevada v. Dist. Ct., 116 Nev. 127, 133, 994 P.2d 692, 696 (2000); Goicoechea v. District Court, 96 Nev. 287, 289-90, 607 P.2d 1140, 1141 12. State v. Haberstroh, 119 Nev. 173, ......
  • United States v. Wendfeldt
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Nevada
    • November 7, 2014
    ...484B.223(1) ] is that the driver changed a direct course of travel without giving the proper signal.” Nevada v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 116 Nev. 127, 994 P.2d 692, 699 (2000).4 Beckman, an en banc decision of the Nevada Supreme Court, based its reasoning largely on an exhaustive analys......
  • City of Las Vegas v. Dist. Ct.
    • United States
    • Nevada Supreme Court
    • December 20, 2002
    ...conduct so as to enable a person of ordinary intelligence to understand what conduct was forbidden." 3. State of Nevada v. Dist. Ct., 116 Nev. 127, 134, 994 P.2d 692, 696-97 (2000). 4. See also NRS 34.020(3) (permitting this court's review by certiorari where the district court has ruled on......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT