995 F.2d 157 (9th Cir. 1993), 92-10517, United States v. Bellucci

Docket Nº:92-10517.
Citation:995 F.2d 157
Party Name:UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Peter BELLUCCI, Defendant-Appellant.
Case Date:June 04, 1993
Court:United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Page 157

995 F.2d 157 (9th Cir. 1993)

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,


Peter BELLUCCI, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 92-10517.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit

June 4, 1993

Submitted May 25, 1993.[*]

Page 158

Daniel J. Broderick, Asst. Federal Public Defender, Sacramento, CA, for defendant-appellant.

Donald W. Searles, Asst. U.S. Atty., Sacramento, CA, for plaintiff-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California.

Before HUG, WIGGINS and THOMPSON, Circuit Judges.


Peter Bellucci appeals his conviction upon a jury verdict of making false statements to a financial institution, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014. Bellucci claims there was insufficient evidence that he knowingly made false statements to a bank because he personally made no statements to a bank, and he did not knowingly cause false statements to be made

Page 159

to a bank. He also argues that his Sixth Amendment rights under the Confrontation Clause were violated when the district court permitted the government to use hearsay evidence to establish the federally insured status of the bank, an element of the offense.


There is no dispute that the statements contained in Bellucci's loan application were false, and that he knew the information was false. The critical question is whether there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Bellucci "was responsible in whole or in part for the fact that the [loan application] set forth false material information." United States v. Olano, 934 F.2d 1425, 1435 (9th Cir.1991), rev'd on other grounds, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993).

Section 1014's proscription of knowing misrepresentation "reach[es] a defendant's knowledge of the statement's presentation to banks generally[,] as distinguished from a particular bank." United States v. Lentz, 524 F.2d 69, 71 (5th Cir.1975). The defendant need not make the false statements directly to a bank to be convicted under the statute, nor need the defendant know which particular institution was involved; it is enough that he knew the false statements were to be presented to a bank. United States v. Thompson, 811 F.2d 841, 844 (5th Cir.1987); United States v. Bowman, 783 F.2d 1192, 1199 (5th Cir.1986). We view the evidence presented and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the verdicts. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 469, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942).

The evidence shows that Ms. Martello left the loan application packages with Bellucci, who partially filled in one and supplied financial schedules from which Ms. Martello filled in the remainder of one application and most of the second. Bellucci signed the applications, just below a statement that read:

The undersigned applies for the loan indicated in this application ..., and represents ... that all statements made in this application are true and are made for the purpose of obtaining the loan.... The original or a copy of this...

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