Josey v. John R. Hollingsworth Corp., 92-1341

Citation996 F.2d 632
Decision Date21 June 1993
Docket NumberNo. 92-1341,92-1341
Parties62 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 221, 61 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 42,325 Ted JOSEY, Appellant, v. JOHN R. HOLLINGSWORTH CORPORATION, Appellee.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit)

Kingsley A. Jarvis (argued), Norristown, PA, for appellant.

Paul R. Lewis (argued) and Jonathan D. Levitan, Kleinbard, Bell & Brecker, Philadelphia, PA, for appellee.

Before: MANSMANN and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges and RODRIGUEZ, District Judge. *

OPINION OF THE COURT

RODRIGUEZ, District Judge.

Ted Josey filed this suit against his former employer, the John R. Hollingsworth Corporation, alleging he was discharged because of his race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Josey is appealing an order of the district court granting summary judgment for Hollingsworth.

I.

Josey, who is African American, began working for Hollingsworth in 1976. He was promoted to supervisor of the company's second shift in 1978 because of his reputation as an eager and intelligent employee, and remained in that position until elevated to Assistant Manager of Quality Assurance in 1987.

Hollingsworth, which produces electrical equipment for the military, started as a family-owned business. In 1982, the Hollingsworth family selected 13 "key and trusted" employees, all caucasian, and sold them the company. Josey was not offered the opportunity to buy shares at that time, nor were twelve caucasian employees who had been with the company longer than he. The company requires that shareholders wishing to dispose of their shares sell them back to the company. The shares are not resold once redeemed.

In December 1986, Josey became interested in replacing Robert Kirby, the Manager of Quality Assurance, who had made known his plans to retire. Kirby was one of the original 13 shareholders. Ray White, a shareholder and Vice President of Hollingsworth, promoted Josey to Assistant Manager of Quality Assurance in the spring of 1987. The vice president instructed Kirby to train Josey to succeed him in the manager's position. Josey alleges he was the only African American manager to work in an office position at Hollingsworth in its 30-year history.

Josey's promotion caused resentment among some of the company's managers and employees. Kirby appeared displeased with the move, and refused to train Josey. Les Horvath, a shareholder who had sought to replace Kirby, was also unhappy with the company's decision. The record indicates that Kirby thought Horvath should be his successor.

Josey believed that Kirby's ill will toward him was racially motivated. Before the promotion, Kirby remarked to him that one's job could not be significant if it could be filled by a black person. Once Josey was promoted, Kirby told employees that he had Josey cutting out paper dolls as part of his training. Vice President White, who acknowledged that Kirby would be a problem during the transition, imposed a training schedule on him. Kirby followed the schedule for only two weeks.

Hollingsworth employees indicated to Josey that they believed he was promoted only because he was African American. Josey received anonymous notes in his office which said, "Nigger get out," and "Can't you read nigger?" In February 1988, Vice President White terminated a manager suspected of leaving the notes, but cited economic concerns as the basis for the dismissal.

That month, Josey, frustrated with the treatment he was receiving, requested an unpaid leave of absence until Kirby retired. Kirby originally planned to retire in March 1988. Vice President White denied Josey's request. Josey asserts that in March or April 1988, the company's board of directors adopted a policy of giving job preferences to shareholder employees when layoffs occur. The company has neither indicated the date it adopted this policy, nor refuted Josey's contention that it was in March or April 1988. The record indicates that only seven of the original 13 shareholders still held shares in 1988--three of whom were Kirby, Horvath, and Vice President White.

In May 1988, Kirby announced he was postponing his retirement indefinitely. That month, Vice President White discharged Josey citing economic concerns, and stating there was no need to retain Josey since Kirby was staying indefinitely. He claimed there was no other position in which the company could use Josey at the salary it was paying him. Josey found other employment after Hollingsworth terminated him.

When Josey was dismissed, he learned that the company planned to replace him as Assistant Manager of Quality Assurance with Horvath, despite the fact Horvath was paid a higher salary. Josey's successor as second shift supervisor, who had less experience than Josey, but is caucasian, remained with the company even after the elimination of the second shift.

In the summer of 1988, Kirby announced he would retire at the end of the year. In August 1988, the company designated Horvath, whose engineering position was being eliminated, as Kirby's replacement. Kirby retired on December 31, 1988, and Horvath took his position. Horvath retired in early 1991.

At one time, Hollingsworth employed as many as 450 people, but by 1988 had reduced its work force to approximately 175 employees. The company hired new employees after Josey's dismissal, but did not recall Josey. The company maintains that Josey never contacted it about employment after his termination. Hollingsworth states that its policy is to hire only unemployed people to fill open positions because the future of the company is uncertain.

II.

Josey filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) which was dismissed on December 11, 1989. The EEOC denied the claim on review, and issued a right to sue letter on May 10, 1991. Josey filed this Title VII action on July 18, 1991.

The district court granted summary judgment for Hollingsworth on April 9, 1992. It found that Josey failed to meet his evidentiary burden once the company proffered a legitimate reason for his dismissal. The court analyzed several issues in the case and concluded that there were no material questions of fact which should be resolved at trial.

First, the district court stated that it was undisputed that Vice President White was the sole decision-maker, and, relying heavily on Josey's deposition testimony, found that White acted without racial prejudice. It therefore determined that the company's explanation that it dismissed Josey for economic reasons was not merely pretextual.

Second, the court accepted Hollingsworth's explanation that it adopted its policy to retain shareholders to protect those with a direct financial interest in the company. It did not determine when the policy was adopted or who was responsible for its adoption. Third, the district court found that Kirby extended his retirement date indefinitely due to financial concerns caused by his wife's illness. Fourth, the court decided that the people who subjected Josey to racially derogatory remarks and notes were not involved in the decision to discharge him. The district court described Josey's criticism of the company's handling of the incidents as "nitpicking," and inconsistent with his testimony that he believed Vice President White was not motivated by racial prejudice.

Fifth, the court determined that White's handling of Kirby negated any inference of discrimination that arose from Kirby's behavior. The court found that White "continued to closely monitor the situation," but also acknowledged that White was unaware that Kirby abandoned the training schedule after two weeks. Finally, the district court rejected Josey's disparate impact claim because he raised it after the close of discovery. The court held that the new claim would prejudice Hollingsworth because it would have different burdens and defenses under a disparate impact theory.

Josey appealed the district court's summary judgment order. This court has jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

III.

When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this court will apply the same test the district court should have used. Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893, 896 (3d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 483 U.S. 1052, 108 S.Ct. 26, 97 L.Ed.2d 815 (1987). Entry of summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

Summary judgment is precluded if a disputed fact exists which might affect the outcome of the suit under the controlling substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute regarding a material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. The standard for summary judgment will be the same for cases where the judge sits as finder of fact. Healy v. New York Life Ins. Co., 860 F.2d 1209, 1219 n. 3 (3d Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1098, 109 S.Ct. 2449, 104 L.Ed.2d 1004 (1989).

The moving party has the initial burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once the moving party has satisfied this requirement, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to present evidence that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553; Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Any inference to be drawn from facts contained in depositions and exhibits must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962).

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the judge's...

To continue reading

Request your trial
396 cases
  • Roman v. Cornell University
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York
    • June 30, 1999
    ...of other ethnicities, this is a valid, non-discriminatory reason for discharging the work study students. See Josey v. John R. Hollingsworth Corp., 996 F.2d 632, 639 (3d Cir.1993). Plaintiff next points to an incident whereby Poux allegedly failed to provide her with a timely letter of spon......
  • Momah v. Albert Einstein Medical Center, CIVIL ACTION NO. 94-CV-7043 (E.D. Pa. 10/__/1997)
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    • October 1, 1997
    ...case by showing that non-members of the protected class were treated more favorably than he or she was. Josey v. John R. Hollingsworth Corp., 996 F.2d 632, 638 (3rd Cir. 1993); Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 522 (3rd Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 826, 114 S......
  • Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Dept.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit)
    • May 11, 1999
    ...at the ACPD, as it was described by both female and male officers. See Hurley, 933 F.Supp. at 411; see also Josey v. John R. Hollingsworth Corp., 996 F.2d 632 (3d Cir.1993) (holding that employees' remarks and racially derogatory notes sent by unidentified people were circumstantial evidenc......
  • Abrams v. Lightolier Inc.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit)
    • March 24, 1995
    ...has discriminated against other members of his protected class or other protected categories of persons"); cf. Josey v. John Hollingsworth Corp., 996 F.2d 632, 641 (3d Cir.1993) (noting that atmosphere in which a company makes its employment decision can be circumstantial evidence of discri......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
4 books & journal articles
  • Summary Judgment Practice and Procedure
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Litigating Employment Discrimination Cases. Volume 1-2 Volume 2 - Practice
    • May 1, 2023
    ..., 72 F.3d 326 (3rd Cir. 1995); Abrams v. Lightolier, Inc ., 50 F.3d 1204, 1214 (3rd Cir. 1995); Josey v. John R. Hollingsworth Corp ., 996 F.2d 632, 641 (3rd Cir. 1993); Cline v. Roadway Express., Inc ., 689 F.2d 488 (4th Cir. 1982). In Mangold , the employer made the argument that the rema......
  • Final trial preparation
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Preparing for Trial in Federal Court
    • May 4, 2010
    ...discriminatory or retaliatory motives. Wells v. New Cherokee Corp. , 58 F.3d 233 (6th Cir. 1995); Josey v. John R. Hollingsworth Corp. , 996 F.2d 632 (3rd Cir. 1993). In Shager v. Upjohn Co. , 913 F.2d 393, 405 (7th Cir. 1990), an influential case on this issue, the employer was found liabl......
  • Race and national origin discrimination
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Federal Employment Jury Instructions - Volume I
    • April 30, 2014
    ...is rarely carried out pursuant to a formal vote of a corporation’s board of directors.” Josey v. John R. Hollingsworth Corp. , 996 F.2d 632, 641 (1993) (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson , 477 U.S. 57, 75 (1986)). Fifth: To determine whether an employment relationship exists within the me......
  • Table of Cases
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Preparing for Trial in Federal Court
    • May 4, 2010
    ...(Miss.1990), From 6-15 Jordan v. Multnomah County , 815 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1987), Form 7-46 Josey v. John R. Hollingsworth Corp., 996 F.2d 632 (3rd Cir. 1993), Form 11-03 Jourdan v. Jabe , 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991), §7:86 Joynor v. Berman Leasing Co. , 398 F.2d 875, 878 (5th ......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT