Turri v. I.N.S., 91-9525
Decision Date | 09 July 1993 |
Docket Number | No. 91-9525,91-9525 |
Citation | 997 F.2d 1306 |
Parties | Maria Miriam TURRI, Petitioner, v. IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Respondent. . Filed |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
Daniel M. Kowalski, Denver, CO, for petitioner.
Stuart M. Gerson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Civil Div., Robert Kendall, Jr., Asst. Director, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Div., Anne C. Arries, Atty., U.S. Dept. of Justice, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Div., Washington, DC, for respondent.
Before MOORE and BRORBY, Circuit Judges, and VAN BEBBER, * District Judge.
Petitioner seeks review of two decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals, 1 the first of which found petitioner deportable and denied her request for a suspension of deportation pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) on the ground that she had not established she would suffer "extreme hardship" if deported. The second decision denied petitioner's motions to reopen the proceedings and to reconsider her request for suspension of deportation. We have jurisdiction to review the Board's decisions under 8 U.S.C. § 1105a, and we reverse and remand for further consideration.
Petitioner came to the United States from Italy in 1976 at the age of twenty-seven on a nonimmigrant student visa to pursue graduate work. In connection with her studies at the University of Denver Graduate School of Social Work, petitioner was instrumental in establishing and running the Denver branch of an international program that brings people to the United States to work and observe American techniques, mostly in the social sciences.
Although she has remained in the United States solely on the basis of her student visas, petitioner has not pursued any studies since December of 1986. Instead, she has continued her work with the international program and has developed a thriving free-lance business teaching Italian language and culture courses, translating documents, and assisting business people seeking to enter markets in Italy. Petitioner is highly regarded in the Denver community, as evidenced by the 105 people who attended her deportation hearing and the many people who submitted letters or affidavits in support of petitioner's application for suspension and her motions to reconsider and to reopen. Although petitioner's business has been profitable and well received by the community, it has not been sanctioned by the INS.
In 1989, petitioner essentially turned herself in to the INS in the hopes that she could obtain a suspension from deportation, the only avenue she believed available to secure more permanent residence in the United States. The Attorney General has discretion, under 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1), to suspend the deportation of an otherwise deportable alien who has been physically present in the United States for at least seven years, has been a person of good moral character during those seven years, and "is a person whose deportation would, in the opinion of the Attorney General, result in extreme hardship to the alien or to his spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence." At issue in this case is whether petitioner's deportation would result in extreme hardship to her, as petitioner has no family in the United States.
Petitioner has the burden of proving her eligibility for suspension of deportation. See Hernandez-Cordero v. United States INS, 819 F.2d 558, 560 (5th Cir.1987) (en banc). The first two requirements, seven years' continuous residence and good moral character, are factual questions that we review for substantial evidence. Id.; Amezquita-Soto v. INS, 708 F.2d 898, 902 (3d Cir.1983). These requirements are not at issue here. The third requirement, that deportation would result in extreme hardship, is a discretionary matter that we review only for an abuse of discretion. 2 Hernandez-Cordero, 819 F.2d at 560; Amezquita-Soto, 708 F.2d at 902-03 & n. 11.
Our review of the Board's determination on extreme hardship is limited. See Hernandez-Cordero, 819 F.2d at 562 ( )(quoting Ramos v. INS, 695 F.2d 181, 185 (5th Cir.1983)). So long as the Board considers all the relevant factors, this court cannot second-guess the weight, if any, to be given any factor. See, e.g., Sanchez v. United States INS, 755 F.2d 1158, 1161 (5th Cir.1985).
Nonetheless, "we may still scrutinize the [Board's] decision for procedural regularity." Hernandez-Cordero, 819 F.2d at 563; see also Ravancho v. INS, 658 F.2d 169, 176 (3d Cir.1981). One of the procedural requirements this and other circuits have recognized is that the Board must actually consider all factors relevant to a particular alien's claim of hardship. See Becerra-Jimenez v. INS, 829 F.2d 996, 1000 (10th Cir.1987); Carrete-Michel v. INS, 749 F.2d 490, 493 (8th Cir.1984); Ravancho, 658 F.2d at 175; Santana-Figueroa v. INS, 644 F.2d 1354, 1356 (9th Cir.1981); cf. Diaz-Resendez v. INS, 960 F.2d 493, 495 (5th Cir.1992) ( ).
No single factor is dispositive of extreme hardship; the Board must evaluate the cumulative effect of all the relevant factors in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship. See Hernandez-Cordero, 819 F.2d at 563; Bueno-Carrillo v. Landon, 682 F.2d 143, 146 n. 3 (7th Cir.1982); Ravancho, 658 F.2d at 175; Santana-Figueroa, 644 F.2d at 1356. Failure to actually consider all the relevant factors constitutes an abuse of discretion. See Ravancho, 658 F.2d at 175; Santana-Figueroa, 644 F.2d at 1356; cf. Diaz-Resendez, 960 F.2d at 495 ( ). Therefore, the Board must articulate its reasons for denying relief sufficiently for us, as the reviewing court, to be able to see that the Board considered all the relevant factors.
In her petition for review, petitioner asserts that the Board failed to actually consider all the evidence relating to her assistance to, and position in, the community; the difficulty of finding housing and employment in Italy; and the psychological trauma petitioner would suffer if she returned to Italy and her family in light of her history of being abused by her father and having problematic relations with her family. We agree that the Board did not sufficiently articulate its reasons for denying relief to establish that it actually considered all the relevant evidence.
In its initial opinion denying petitioner's application for suspension, the Board stated:
In determining whether deportation will cause an alien to suffer extreme hardship, the following factors are taken into consideration: age of the subject; family ties in the United States and abroad; length of residence in the United States; condition of health; conditions in the country to which an alien is returnable, both economic and political; financial status, including business and occupation; the possibility of other means of adjustment of status; whether of special assistance to the United States or community; immigration history; and position in the community. See Matter of Anderson, 16 I & N Dec. 596 (BIA 1978).
In the next paragraph, the Board said: "We have carefully reviewed the record in this case, and have concluded that all of the factors presented, considered in their entirety, do not constitute extreme hardship within the meaning of the Act." Id. Thereafter, the Board specifically discussed petitioner's ability to obtain employment in Italy and her problematic family relations, but never discussed whether petitioner was of special assistance to the community, her position in the community, or her financial status, including her business, 3 even though petitioner submitted extensive evidence relevant to these factors.
The circuits do not agree about what constitutes sufficient articulation of the Board's reasons for denying relief. Compare Saldana v. INS, 762 F.2d 824, 827 (9th Cir.1985) (, )amended, 785 F.2d 650 (9th Cir.1986), and Zavala-Bonilla v. INS, 730 F.2d 562, 568 (9th Cir.1984) ( ) with Vergara-Molina v. INS, 956 F.2d 682, 685 (7th Cir.1992) ( ) and Hernandez-Cordero, 819 F.2d at 563 ( ). But see Diaz-Resendez, 960 F.2d at 497 ( ).
In Becerra-Jimenez v. INS, 829 F.2d at 1000, we followed the general standards set forth in Osuchukwu v. INS, 744 F.2d 1136, 1143 (5th Cir.1984), and Villanueva-Franco v. INS, 802 F.2d 327, 330 (9th Cir.1986), in determining that the Board adequately articulated its reasons for finding the alien deportable and denying him voluntary departure.
In Osuchukwu, the court noted:
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