U.S. v. Mezzanatto

Decision Date07 July 1993
Docket NumberNo. 92-50261,92-50261
Citation998 F.2d 1452
Parties37 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 296 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Gary MEZZANATTO, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Mark R. Lippman, La Jolla, CA, for defendant-appellant.

Shane P. Harrigan, Asst. U.S. Atty., San Diego, CA, for plaintiff-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California.

Before: WALLACE, Chief Judge, SNEED and HALL, Circuit Judges.

SNEED, Circuit Judge:

Appellant challenges the district court's ruling allowing the prosecution to introduce statements he made during failed plea negotiations for impeachment purposes. We reverse the appellant's conviction and remand for a new trial.

I. FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

Appellant Gary Mezzanatto was charged with possession of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). At Mezzanatto's request, the government held a plea bargaining meeting with him. Before the start of this meeting, the prosecutor informed Mezzanatto that any statements he made during the meeting could be used to impeach any inconsistent testimony he offered at trial, if the case proceeded that far. Mezzanatto agreed to this, and the meeting began. The parties did not reach an agreement.

At trial, Mezzanatto offered testimony that was inconsistent with statements he made during the negotiations. The government introduced the prior statements to impeach Mezzanatto. The appellant objected, but the court overruled the objections and allowed the statements for impeachment.

The jury found Mezzanatto guilty, and the district court imposed a 170 month prison term to be followed by five years of supervised release.

II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

The district court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Whether plea negotiation statements may be introduced to impeach a defendant and whether a defendant may waive the prohibition against the introduction of plea negotiations statements are questions of law and of statutory interpretation, and therefore, we review these issues de novo. See Anderson v. United States, 966 F.2d 487, 489 (9th Cir.1992).

III. DISCUSSION
A. Issues on Appeal.

This appeal involves Federal Rule of Evidence 410 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(6). Rule 11(e)(6) is nearly identical in form and is identical in substance to Rule 410. Rule 410 reads:

Inadmissibility of Pleas, Plea Discussions, and Related Statements

Except as otherwise provided in this rule, evidence of the following is not, in any civil or criminal proceeding, admissible against the defendant who made the plea or was a participant in the plea discussions:

(1) a plea of guilty which was later withdrawn;

(2) a plea of nolo contendere;

(3) any statement made in the course of any proceedings under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or comparable state procedure regarding either of the foregoing pleas; or

(4) any statement made in the course of plea discussions with an attorney for the prosecuting authority which do not result in a plea of guilty or which result in a plea of guilty later withdrawn.

However, such a statement is admissible (i) in any proceeding wherein another statement made in the course of the same plea or plea discussions has been introduced and the statement ought in fairness be considered contemporaneously with it, or (ii) in a criminal proceeding for perjury or false statement if the statement was made by the defendant under oath, on the record and in the presence of counsel.

Before reaching the primary issue this case presents, whether a defendant may waive the prohibition against the introduction of statements made during plea negotiations, we examine the scope of the two rules.

B. The Scope of the Rules.

Federal Rule of Evidence 410 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(6) are quite clear that statements made in the course of plea discussions are generally not admissible at trial. In only two instances are plea negotiation statements admissible. The first is an exception to prevent selective admission of plea negotiation statements. If a defendant introduces a statement made during plea negotiations, the prosecution may introduce other relevant plea negotiation statements so that the jury receives a full account of the issue presented. The only other exception allows for the admission of certain plea negotiation statements in a separate proceeding against the defendant for perjury. This exception is designed to permit punishment of defendants who take the stand and testify contrary to their plea negotiation statements. These two exceptions to an otherwise absolute rule do not include the use of such statements for impeachment.

The legislative history of these Rules is quite clear that plea negotiation statements are not admissible to impeach a defendant. A version of Rule 410, which never became effective, did allow plea negotiation statements to be introduced for impeachment, but this language was ultimately rejected. S.Rep. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7057; H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 414, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 713, 714; see also Fed.R.Evid. 410 (1974); Pub.L. 94-149, 89 Stat. 805 (1975). Congress unmistakably did not want statements made during plea negotiations to be used to impeach defendants. Detailing this history concerning impeachment, the Second Circuit said, "We regard this legislative history as demonstrating Congress' explicit intention to preclude use of statements made in plea negotiations for impeachment purposes." United States v. Lawson, 683 F.2d 688, 692-93 (2d Cir.1982); accord United States v. Martinez, 536 F.2d 1107, 1108 (5th Cir.1976).

Commentators offer no disagreement. See, e.g., Charles A. Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., 23 Federal Practice and Procedure § 5349 (1980); David W. Louisell & Christopher B. Mueller, 2 Federal Evidence § 188 (1985). No one argues that Congress did not mean what it said.

This brings us to the issue to which Congress did not speak. Can the defendant waive the protection of these rules?

C. The Protection Against the Admission of Statements Made During Plea Negotiations Cannot Be Waived.

The issue of waiver of the protection of Rules 410 and 11(e)(6) is one of first impression. 1 The government contends that this rule may be waived by a defendant, and it argues that Mezzanatto knowingly and intelligently waived this protection. Mezzanatto insists that the prohibition in Rules 410 and 11(e)(6) may not be waived. We agree with the appellant.

The importance of the prohibition against the admission of plea negotiation statements is best understood in the broader context of the criminal justice system. Plea bargains are an important and useful part of our criminal justice system. 2 They allow criminal cases to be resolved in a quick and cost-effective manner while maintaining the just administration necessary to the criminal justice system. Rules 410 and 11(e)(6) were designed to promote plea agreements by encouraging frank discussion in negotiations because such unrestrained candor promotes effective plea bargaining. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 11 adv. comm. note (1979), reprinted in 18 U.S.C.App. (1988).

For instance, prosecutors of those engaged in criminal conspiracies desire the fullest cooperation of those accused of participation therein. Frequently only by such cooperation can the organizers of the conspiracy, the higher-ups, be identified and prosecuted. Rules 11(e)(6) and 410 aid in obtaining this cooperation. A lesser member of the conspiracy will more freely provide useful information to the prosecutors if he knows that none of his statements in plea bargaining sessions can be used against him.

Moreover, full cooperation may enhance the prospects of a better plea bargain from the prosecutor. In a sense, most defendants who enter plea bargaining do so with the prospect of exchanging information about other offenses or defendants for a lesser punishment for themselves. The rules at issue here permit the plea bargainer to maximize what he has "to sell" with the ability to withdraw from the bargain proposed by the prosecutor without being harmed by any of his statements made in the course of an aborted plea bargaining session.

To allow waiver of these rules would be contrary to all that Congress intended to achieve. If these rules were subject to waiver, candid and effective plea bargaining could be severely injured. As the Eighth Circuit aptly explained, "[m]eaningful dialogue between the parties would, as a practical matter, be impossible if either party had to assume the risk that plea offers would be admissible in evidence." United States v. Verdoorn, 528 F.2d 103, 107 (8th Cir.1976). Waiver of the protections of Rules 410 and 11(e)(6) could easily have a chilling effect on the entire plea bargaining process. See Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold H. Israel, 2 Criminal Procedure § 20.2, at 611 (1984).

The government, not unreasonably, argues that since defendants can waive other statutory and constitutional rights, they should be able to waive Rules 410 and 11(e)(6). 3 They rely on Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 107 S.Ct. 1187, 94 L.Ed.2d 405 (1987), and United States v. Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d 318 (9th Cir.1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1488, 117 L.Ed.2d 629 (1992), to support this argument. Neither these cases nor the analogy support the existence of a waiver power for these Rules.

In Newton, Mr. Rumery relinquished his personal right to pursue a civil remedy against the town of Newton, New Hampshire, which had arrested him, in exchange for a dismissal of all criminal charges against him. 480 U.S. at 390, 107 S.Ct. at 1190. The issue before the Court was whether such a "release-dismissal" agreement should be considered...

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9 cases
  • United States v. Mezzanatto
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • January 18, 1995
    ...the plea discussion, and he has never complained that he entered into the waiver agreement at issue unknowingly or involuntarily. Pp. __. 998 F.2d 1452, THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and O'CONNOR, SCALIA, KENNEDY, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined......
  • Pitt v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • September 23, 2003
    ...of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(6), reasoning that the defendant could not waive the protections of those rules. United States v. Mezzanatto, 998 F.2d 1452, 1454-56 (9th Cir.1993). The Supreme Court reversed. The Court held that a federal criminal defendant's agreement to waive the exclusionary......
  • People v. Stevens
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Michigan
    • April 25, 2000
    ...taking the view that Congress must have meant to preclude waiver agreements such as that made in this case. United States v. Mezzanatto, 998 F.2d 1452, 1454-1456 (C.A.9, 1993). The U.S. Supreme Court rejected that view, relying on the principle that there is a "presumption of waivability" w......
  • State v. Pitt, 99, September Term, 2003.
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • February 1, 2006
    ...410 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(6), Congress intended to preclude waiver agreements, United States v. Mezzanatto, 998 F.2d 1452, 1454-1456 (9th Cir. 1993), the Supreme Court issued the writ of certiorari to review that decision. Reversing, the Court held, "absent some affir......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
2 books & journal articles
  • The Use of Plea Statement Waivers in Pretrial Agreements
    • United States
    • Military Law Review No. 217, September 2013
    • September 1, 2013
    ...134 See generally Easterbrook, supra note 81; Easterbrook, supra note 93; Rasmussen, supra note 12. 135 See United States v. Mezzanatto, 998 F.2d 1452, 1458 (9th Cir. 1993) (Wallace, C.J., dissenting) (“Given the mutual benefits achieved through plea bargaining, should we expect the governm......
  • Evidence - Marc T. Treadwell
    • United States
    • Mercer University School of Law Mercer Law Reviews No. 47-3, March 1996
    • Invalid date
    ...at 1300 n.4. 42. Id. 43. Fed. R. Evm. 410(4). 44. 115 S. Ct. 797 (1995). 45. Id. at 800. 46. Id. 47. Id. 48. Id. 49. Id. at 800-01. 50. 998 F.2d 1452,1456 (9th Cir. 1993), cert, granted, 114 S. Ct. 1536 (1994), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 797 (1995). 51. 998 F.2d at 1454. 52. 115 S. Ct. at 803, 806. ......

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