Moore v. State of Ind.
| Decision Date | 20 July 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 91-2776,91-2776 |
| Parties | Keith C. MOORE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE OF INDIANA, Indiana Department of Corrections and Thomas D. Richards, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Charles M. Russell, Indianapolis, IN (argued), for Keith C. Moore.
Wayne E. Uhl, Deputy Atty. Gen., John Thomas Roy (argued), Federal Litigation, Indianapolis, IN, for State of Ind.
Arthur T. Perry, Deputy Atty. Gen., John Thomas Roy, Federal Litigation, Indianapolis, IN, for Indiana Dept. of Corrections and Thomas D. Richards.
Before CUMMINGS and KANNE, Circuit Judges, and MIHM, Chief District Judge. *
The plaintiff appeals the district court's denial of his motion requesting leave to file an amended complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). Finding that the plaintiff's proposed amended complaint could not withstand a motion to dismiss based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, we affirm.
While confined at Indiana State Farm (ISF) in the summer of 1986, the plaintiff, Keith C. Moore, sustained injuries in an automobile accident; later that year, he was transferred to the Indiana Youth Center (IYC). On May 3, 1988, he filed in the district court a request for a writ of habeas corpus ordering that his "good time" be restored by the defendants--the State of Indiana, the Indiana Department of Correction, IYC Superintendent Thomas D. Richards, and the Indiana Attorney General. The petition alleged that, in retaliation for his filing a damages claim related to injuries he suffered in the traffic accident, the defendants extended, without due process, his period of incarceration and unlawfully denied him medical treatment. On May 17, 1988, a United States magistrate issued, sua sponte, an order stating that the habeas corpus petition was better construed as a claim alleging retaliation for the exercise of a constitutionally protected right, a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As only the Attorney General had been served the habeas corpus petition, on May 23, 1988, the plaintiff complied with the magistrate's direction to serve all the defendants.
The defendants responded with a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. On July 21, 1988, the plaintiff filed a motion in opposition to the defendants' motion to dismiss and a separate Rule 15 motion for leave to file an amended complaint. In so doing, the plaintiff did not submit a proposed amended complaint or describe the specific contents of the amended complaint he sought to file.
With the exception of the plaintiff's October 20, 1988, motion for a jury trial, no significant action in the case occurred over the next twenty-five months. On August 28 1990, the magistrate issued an order directing the plaintiff to report on the status of his incarceration, to tender his proposed amended complaint, and to file a statement of the issues presented by the proposed amended complaint. The plaintiff submitted the requested materials on September 18, 1990, including a proposed amended complaint that dropped the Attorney General as a defendant and named for the first time an additional thirteen defendants. Consistent with the change from a habeas corpus proceeding to a § 1983 claim, while the original complaint requested only the restoration of "good time," the proposed amended complaint contained an additional claim for damages against each of the defendants, in both their official and individual capacities. The original defendants countered by filing a motion in opposition to the plaintiff's request to amend his complaint.
On January 23, 1991, the district court denied the plaintiff's habeas corpus request for the restoration of good time as moot in light of the plaintiff's release from incarceration. The district court also denied the plaintiff's request to amend his complaint, holding that such an amendment would be futile since the statute of limitations had expired with regard to the thirteen putative defendants. The court found the amended complaint's claim for damages against the original defendants equally as futile because the Eleventh Amendment bars suit against the state entities and the Superintendent in his official capacity, and the plaintiff failed to properly allege a cause of action against Superintendent Richards in his individual capacity. As a result, the court dismissed the case. The plaintiff appeals the denial of his motion to amend his complaint and the resulting dismissal of his case, but concedes that the district court properly denied his claim for habeas corpus relief as moot.
We review a district court's denial of a motion for leave to amend for abuse of discretion. Perrian v. O'Grady, 958 F.2d 192, 194 (7th Cir.1992). Although Rule 15(a) generally permits the plaintiff to amend his complaint once as a matter of course before a responsive pleading is served, here, the plaintiff's requested amendment required leave from the court because it sought to assert claims against additional defendants. Williams v. United States Postal Service, 873 F.2d 1069, 1072 n. 2 (7th Cir.1989); La Batt v. Twomey, 513 F.2d 641, 651 n. 9 (7th Cir.1975). While Rule 15(a) states that "leave shall be freely given when justice so requires," the court should not allow the plaintiff to amend his complaint when to do so would be futile. Villa v. City of Chicago, 924 F.2d 629, 632 (7th Cir.1991) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 183, 83 S.Ct. 227, 230, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962)); Williams, 873 F.2d at 1072. We, as did the district court, view the plaintiff's efforts to amend his complaint as futile because each of the claims for damages contained in the proposed amended complaint could not withstand a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
The plaintiff's proposed amended complaint removed the Attorney General as a defendant and added damages claims against the three remaining original defendants: the State of Indiana, the Indiana Department of Corrections, and Superintendent Richards in his official capacity. In the absence of the state's consent or a valid Congressional override, the Eleventh Amendment prohibits a suit in federal court "in which the State or one of its agencies or departments is named as the defendant." Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S.Ct. 900, 908, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984). See also Kroll v. Board of Trustees of University of Illinois, 934 F.2d 904, 907 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 377, 116 L.Ed.2d 329 (1991). "This bar remains in effect when State officials are sued for damages in their official capacities." Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 3107, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985) (citing Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 90, 102 S.Ct. 2325, 2328, 72 L.Ed.2d 694 (1982); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 1355, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974)). See also Meadows v. State of Indiana, 854 F.2d 1068, 1069 (7th Cir.1988). As the State of Indiana has not consented to this suit and Congress did not override this immunity through the enactment of § 1983, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 1145, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979), the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction with regard to any damage claims against the State of Indiana, the Indiana Department of Corrections, and Superintendent Richards in his official capacity.
The proposed amended complaint seeks to add a separate claim for damages against Superintendent Richards in his individual capacity, an action outside the scope of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Nonetheless, a valid § 1983 claim for damages against a state supervisory official in his individual capacity requires "a showing of direct responsibility for the improper action." Wolf-Lillie v. Sonquist, 699 F.2d 864, 869 (7th Cir.1983). In other words, "an individual cannot be held liable in a § 1983 action unless he caused or participated in an alleged constitutional deprivation." Id. See also Rascon v. Hardiman, 803 F.2d 269, 273-74 (7th Cir.1986) (). The plaintiff has not directed us in either his brief or at oral argument to any allegation in the proposed amended complaint that involves Superintendent Richard's participation in or direct responsibility for a constitutional deprivation. 1 Hence, even accepting the well-pleaded factual allegations as true, no set of facts consistent with those allegations would impose liability upon Superintendent Richards in his individual capacity, as required to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 2232, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984); Perkins v. Silverstein, 939 F.2d 463, 466 (7th Cir.1991).
The proposed amended complaint seeks to assert, for the first time, damages claims against the Commissioner of the Indiana Department of Correction, the Superintendent of Indiana State Farm, and eleven other individuals, who apparently are either correctional officers or employees at ISF or IYC. All the defendants are sued in both their individual and official capacities. For reasons set forth above, the Eleventh Amendment would bar the claims for damages against the defendants in their official capacities, leaving us to decide only whether the individual capacity claims could survive a motion to dismiss.
The district court found that the statute of limitations would bar these claims, which allege the deprivation of the plaintiff's...
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