Loggins v. Delo, s. 92-3406

• Decision Date: 21 July 1993
• Docket Number: Nos. 92-3406,92-3409 and 92-3608,s. 92-3406
• Citation: 999 F.2d 364
• Parties: Lobester James LOGGINS, Appellee, v. Paul K. DELO, individually and in his official capacity as Superintendent of the Potosi Correctional Center; Debbie Holman, individually and in her official capacity as Mailroom Supervisor at the Potosi Correctional Center; Ben Davis, individually and in his official capacity as a Corrections Officer of the Potosi Correctional Center; Bill Rodgers, individually and in his official capacity as a Corrections Officer of the Potosi Correctional Center; Rhonda Pash, individually and in her official capacity as a Corrections Officer of the Potosi Correctional Center, Appellants, (Two Cases). Lobester James LOGGINS, Appellant, v. Paul K. DELO, individually and in his official capacity as Superintendent of the Potosi Correctional Center; Debbie Holman, individually and in her official capacity as Mailroom Supervisor at the Potosi Correctional Center; Ben Davis, individually and in his official capacity as a Corrections Officer of the Potosi Correctional Center; Bill Rodgers, individually and in his official capacity as a Corrections Officer of the Potosi Correctional Center; Rhonda Pash, individually and in her official capacity as a Corrections Officer of the Potosi Correctional Center, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 364

999 F.2d 364

Lobester James LOGGINS, Appellee, v. Paul K. DELO, individually and in his official capacity as

Superintendent of the Potosi Correctional Center; Debbie

Holman, individually and in her official capacity as

Mailroom Supervisor at the Potosi Correctional Center; Ben

Davis, individually and in his official capacity as a

Corrections Officer of the Potosi Correctional Center; Bill

Rodgers, individually and in his official capacity as a

Corrections Officer of the Potosi Correctional Center;

Rhonda Pash, individually and in her official capacity as a

Corrections Officer of the Potosi Correctional Center,

Appellants, (Two Cases).

Lobester James LOGGINS, Appellant, v. Paul K. DELO, individually and in his official capacity as

Superintendent of the Potosi Correctional Center; Debbie

Holman, individually and in her official capacity as

Mailroom Supervisor at the Potosi Correctional Center; Ben

Davis, individually and in his official capacity as a

Corrections Officer of the Potosi Correctional Center; Bill

Rodgers, individually and in his official capacity as a

Corrections Officer of the Potosi Correctional Center;

Rhonda Pash, individually and in her official capacity as a

Corrections Officer of the Potosi Correctional Center, Appellees.

Nos. 92-3406, 92-3409 and 92-3608.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

Submitted May 12, 1993.

Decided July 21, 1993.

Denise L. Thomas, St. Louis, MO, argued (Nelson L. Mitten, on the brief), for appellants.

Randall Kahn, St. Louis, MO, argued, for appellee.

Before BOWMAN, Circuit Judge, HENLEY, Senior Circuit Judge, and MAGILL, Circuit Judge.

HENLEY, Senior Circuit Judge.

Paul K. Delo, Debbie Holman, Ben Davis, Bill Rodgers and Rhonda Pash (collectively referred to as "prison officials") appeal from a judgment of the district court ¹ entered in favor of Lobester James Loggins, a Missouri inmate, in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action and a judgment awarding attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. In his cross-appeal, Loggins challenges the amount of the fee award. We affirm.

In May 1989, Loggins placed a letter addressed to his brother in the outgoing prison mail. Pursuant to prison procedure, Holman, a mail room clerk, opened the letter, which in part stated that "[t]here's a beetled eye'd bit-- back here who enjoys reading people's mail." The letter went on to state that the "bit--" was a "dyke" and "[wa]s hoping to read a letter someone wrote to their wife talking dirty sh--, so she could go in the bathroom and masturbate." The last two letters of "bit--" and "sh--" were blackened out.

Holman believed that the letter violated Divisional Rule 21, which prohibited an inmate from "using abusive or obscene language ... or making a written statement, intended to annoy, offend or threaten." Holman filed a conduct violation report based on the contents of the letter. Loggins was found guilty of violating Rule 21 and was sentenced to ten days disciplinary detention.

Loggins filed a section 1983 action, alleging that the disciplinary action based on the language in the letter addressed to his brother violated his first and fourteenth amendment rights. He then filed a motion for summary judgment, relying on Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974). In Martinez, the Supreme Court recognized that "the legitimate governmental interest in the order and security of penal institutions justifies the imposition of certain restrictions on inmate correspondence[,]" id. at 412-13, 94 S.Ct. at 1811, but held that "the limitation of First Amendment freedoms must be no greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest involved." Id. at 413, 94 S.Ct. at 1811. The Court indicated that prison officials could censor outgoing mail that contained contraband or evidence of other illegal activity. Id. The Court, however, stated that "[p]rison officials may not censor inmate correspondence simply to eliminate unflattering or unwelcome opinions or factually inaccurate statements." Id. The Court invalidated regulations that precluded inmates from sending letters that " 'unduly complain' or 'magnify grievances,' ... and matter deemed 'defamatory' or 'otherwise inappropriate[,]' " because the officials had "failed to show that these broad restrictions on prisoner mail were in any way necessary to furtherance of a governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression." Id. at 415, 94 S.Ct. at 1812.

The prison officials also moved for summary judgment. They argued that they were entitled to a qualified immunity because the disciplinary action did not violate any clearly established constitutional right. They relied on Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 109 S.Ct. 1874, 104 L.Ed.2d 459 (1989), and Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987). In Abbott, the Supreme Court upheld a prison regulation that permitted "prison officials to reject incoming publications found to be detrimental to institutional security" because the regulation was reasonably related to prison security. 490 U.S. at 403, 109 S.Ct. at 1876 (footnote omitted). In Turner, the Court upheld a regulation barring inmate-to-inmate correspondence under a reasonableness standard. 482 U.S. at 91, 107 S.Ct. at 2262. The officials also relied on Gibbs v. King, 779 F.2d 1040, 1045 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1117, 106 S.Ct. 1975, 90 L.Ed.2d 659 (1986), wherein the court upheld a disciplinary action based on a verbal remark to a prison guard in violation of a prison rule prohibiting insults. As to the merits, the officials argued that disciplinary action was proper under Martinez because the derogatory comments in Loggins' letter evidenced a disrespect for authority.

The case was referred to a magistrate judge. The magistrate judge recommended that the officials' request for qualified immunity be denied. The magistrate judge believed that "Martinez clearly established that inmates could not be disciplined for merely insulting or derogatory comments made in outgoing mail." The magistrate judge noted that Abbott and Turner did not overrule Martinez, but only limited its rationale to "regulations concerning outgoing correspondence." Abbott, 490 U.S. at 413, 109 S.Ct. at 1881. In Abbott, the Court explained that "outgoing personal correspondence from prisoners--did not, by its very nature, pose a threat to prison order and security." Id. at 411, 109 S.Ct. at 1880 (footnote omitted). The magistrate judge distinguished Gibbs because it involved a verbal insult directed toward a prison employee and suggested that Rule 21 would be valid "as applied to oral statements, or ... writings which are not a part of outgoing mail." Noting that the parties did not dispute any issue of material fact, the magistrate judge also recommended that Loggins' motion for summary judgment on liability be granted.

On de novo review, the district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation. The court agreed that the disciplinary action violated Martinez, noting there was no indication of how the language in Loggins' letter threatened prison security. The court emphasized that the facial validity of Rule 21 was not before the court and that its decision would not preclude disciplinary actions based on an inmate's use of insulting language in other situations.

The officials appealed the denial of qualified immunity. See Duckworth v. Ford, 995 F.2d 858, 861 (8th Cir.1993) ("denial of a claim of qualified immunity is immediately appealable"). We affirmed the denial and remanded for further proceedings. Loggins v. Delo, 985 F.2d 565 (8th Cir.1991) (unpublished per curiam). In the opinion, we noted that the magistrate judge had indicated that Rule 21 was valid "as applied to oral and written statements directed toward prison officials or other inmates." Slip op. at 4.

On remand the officials moved for reconsideration of the district court's grant of Loggins' motion for summary judgment on liability. They asserted that in light of this court's opinion there was an issue of disputed fact as to whether the insulting language in the letter was directed to Holman. The court denied the motion and thereafter conducted a jury trial on damages. The jury awarded Loggins $102.50 in actual damages. The district court also ordered expungement of the conduct violation. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the court awarded Loggins $25,000.00 as a reasonable attorney's fee.

On appeal the prison officials first argue that the district court erred in refusing to reconsider its order granting Loggins' motion for summary judgment. They assert that our previous opinion suggested that an inmate could be disciplined if insulting language in outgoing correspondence was "directed toward" a prison official and contend that summary judgment was inappropriate because there is a disputed issue of fact whether Loggins' language was directed toward Holman.

We disagree. Despite some ambiguity in our previous opinion, we did not mean to suggest that the prison officials could have disciplined Loggins on the basis of the language contained in the letter addressed to his brother. Our use of "directed toward" was in reference to the magistrate judge's belief that Rule 21 was valid "as applied to oral statements, or ... writings which are not a part of outgoing mail." As the district court made clear, Loggins did not challenge the facial validity of Rule 21, and the question whether an inmate could be disciplined for insulting language directed toward a prison employee or another inmate orally or in a writing circulated within the prison was not before the court.

We also agree with the district court that as a matter of law because the language in Loggins' letter to his brother did not implicate security concerns, the disciplinary action violated Martinez. By focusing on the degree of risk involved, the district court properly analyzed the claim under...