Baker v. McNeil, 081711 FED11, 09-14438

Docket Nº:09-14438
Opinion Judge:PER CURIAM.
Party Name:TYRONE BAKER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. WALTER MCNEIL, Respondent-Appellee.
Judge Panel:Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, TJOFLAT and FAY, Circuit Judges.
Case Date:August 17, 2011
Court:United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
 
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TYRONE BAKER, Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

WALTER MCNEIL, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 09-14438

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit

August 17, 2011

DO NOT PUBLISH

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida D. C. Docket No. 08-00337-CV-5-RH-AK.

Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, TJOFLAT and FAY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

The Supreme Court granted a petition for writ of certiorari and vacated our judgment in Baker v. McNeil, 369 F.App'x 997 (11th Cir. 2010), vacated Baker v. Buss, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1715 (2011), and remanded the case to us for further consideration in light of Wall v. Kholi, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1278 (2011). We directed the parties to file simultaneous briefs discussing the effect, if any, of the decision in Wall v. Kholi on the outcome of this case. The case is once again ripe for decision.

I.

Appellant Tyrone Baker ("Baker"), a Florida state prisoner proceeding pro se, appealed the district court's order dismissing his habeas corpus petition, brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court found the petition barred by the one-year statute of limitations of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). The district court issued a certificate of appealability ("COA") on the following issue: whether a state-court motion for discretionary sentence reduction is an application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Based on our precedent in Alexander v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 523 F.3d 1291, 1297–98 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that a Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(c) motion is not a tolling motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)), we affirmed the district court's judgment. In Alexander, we noted that a Rule 3.800(c) motion "assumes that the sentence sought to be modified or reduced is legal and functions effectively as a procedure for a petitioner to request leniency from the sentencing court based on mitigating circumstances." 523 F.3d at 1295. A tolling motion must contain some form of legal analysis. Id. at 1297. Therefore, we concluded that a Rule 3.800(c) motion that was only a plea for leniency, but not an attack on the constitutionality or legal correctness of the sentence, was not a tolling motion. Id. at 1297-99. We later clarified that a state court...

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