Diaz v. Stevenson, 032416 FED9, 15-15409
|Party Name:||ENRIQUE DIAZ, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. J. STEVENSON; et al., Defendants-Appellees.|
|Judge Panel:||Before: GOODWIN, LEAVY, and CHRISTEN Circuit Judges.|
|Case Date:||March 24, 2016|
|Court:||United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit|
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Submitted March 15, 2016 [**]
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California No. 5:13-cv-04575-BLF Beth Labson Freeman, District Judge, Presiding
California state prisoner Enrique Diaz appeals pro se from the district court's judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging due process violations arising out of his disciplinary hearing. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 1989). We may affirm on any ground supported by the record. Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Diaz's due process claim because Diaz failed to allege facts sufficient to show that the disciplinary board's findings were not supported by some evidence. See Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985) (requirements of due process are satisfied if "some evidence" supports the disciplinary decision); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-70 (1974) (setting forth due process requirements for prison disciplinary proceedings).
To the extent that Diaz alleged that he did not receive notice of the charge prior to his placement in administrative segregation, dismissal was proper because Diaz failed to allege facts sufficient to show that defendants failed to provide him with proper notice of the charge against him. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 476 & n.8 (1983) (due process requirements for placement in administrative segregation), abrogated in part on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995).
We reject Diaz's contentions that the district court erred in not providing Rand notice because the district court may consider documents that the complaint necessarily relies on without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment where the authenticity of the documents are not contested. See Lee v. County. of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001).
[*] This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
[**] The panel unanimously concludes...
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