Henderson v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 080411 FED11, 10-13286

Docket Nº:10-13286
Opinion Judge:PER CURIAM.
Party Name:SHERRANCE HENDERSON, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., Defendant-Appellee.
Judge Panel:Before TJOFLAT, EDMONDSON and CARNES, Circuit Judges.
Case Date:August 04, 2011
Court:United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

SHERRANCE HENDERSON, Plaintiff - Appellant,


JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 10-13286

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit

August 4, 2011


Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia D.C. Docket No. 1:09-cv-03384-MHS

Before TJOFLAT, EDMONDSON and CARNES, Circuit Judges.


Sherrance Henderson, proceeding pro se, appeals the dismissal of her complaint, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). She also appeals the denial of her motion for "stay of leave to amend, " construed by the district court as a motion for leave to amend the complaint if the court dismissed Henderson's action. No reversible error has been shown; we affirm.

Henderson filed a complaint against Defendant JP Morgan Chase Bank ("Chase"), alleging that Chase discriminated against her based on race in connection with a home loan. Henderson alleged that she applied for, and was pre-qualified for, a home loan. After she located a home, Chase began presenting varying loan options which did not reflect the loan terms that formed the basis of the pre-qualification, including higher interest rates and additional loan terms. After Henderson provided Chase with certain requested financial information, Chase told Henderson that she needed to buy an annuity to generate income because Chase did not consider the interest generated by one of her existing investments to be income. Henderson purchased the annuity. At closing, Henderson's lawyer told her that Chase's loan terms and conduct were improper. So, Henderson rejected the loan terms; and Chase later denied the loan application. Henderson paid cash for the home. In 13 separate counts, Henderson raised claims under (1) the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3605; (2) civil rights provisions, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1985; (3) the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691; and (4) provisions of Georgia law.

The district court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation that the complaint be dismissed, on all counts, for failure to state a claim.1 We review de novo a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Redland Co., Inc. v. Bank of Am. Corp., 568 F.3d 1232, 1234 (11th Cir. 2009).

On appeal, Henderson argues that the district court imposed a heightened pleading standard on her complaint that was inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). In Twombly, the Supreme Court addressed the previously accepted standard governing "a complaint's survival, " and rejected that standard in favor of a plausibility standard. 127 S.Ct. at 1969; see also Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1953 (using the Twombly standard to analyze the complaint at issue and validating that standard as "the pleading standard for 'all civil actions'"). This standard says that to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must file a complaint containing fact allegations that are plausible on their face: a claim has "facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference" that defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949.

A complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss need not contain detailed factual allegations, but "a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of [her] entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1964-65 (citations, quotations, and alteration omitted). We recognize the Twombly standard as controlling. See James River Ins. Co. v. Ground Down Eng'g Inc., 540 F.3d 1270, 1274 (11th Cir. 2008) (stating that a...

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