Hunt v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 052914 FED9, 11-15947

Docket Nº:11-15947
Party Name:WILLIAM PAIGE HUNT, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. WELLS FARGO BANK, NA, Defendant-Appellee.
Judge Panel:Before: CLIFTON, BEA, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
Case Date:May 29, 2014
Court:United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

WILLIAM PAIGE HUNT, Plaintiff - Appellant,


WELLS FARGO BANK, NA, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 11-15947

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit

May 29, 2014


          Submitted May 13, 2014 [**]

         Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Phyllis J. Hamilton, District Judge, Presiding D.C. No. 4:10-cv-04438-PJH

          Before: CLIFTON, BEA, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.

          MEMORANDUM [*]

         William Paige Hunt appeals pro se from the district court's judgment dismissing his action arising from foreclosure proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005). We may affirm on any ground supported by the record, Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2008), and we affirm.

         Dismissal of Hunt's quiet title claim was proper because Wells Fargo Bank, NA had statutory authority to initiate nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings. See Cal. Civ. Code § 2924(a)(1); Gomes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 121 Cal.Rptr.3d 819, 823-24 (Ct. App. 2011) (Cal. Civ. Code § 2924(a)(1) does not "provide for a judicial action to determine whether the person initiating the foreclosure process is indeed authorized"). Moreover, Hunt's contentions that the nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings violated his due process and jury trial rights are unpersuasive. See Apao v. Bank of N.Y., 324 F.3d 1091, 1094-95 (9th Cir. 2003) (nonjudicial foreclosure was not state action and therefore did not implicate due process); Garfinkle v. Superior Court, 578 P.2d 925, 933 (Cal. 1978) ("California's nonjudicial foreclosure procedure does not constitute state action and is therefore immune from the procedural due process requirements of the federal Constitution.").

         Dismissal of Hunt's slander of title claim was proper because the foreclosure notices were privileged. See Kachlon v. Markowitz, 85 Cal.Rptr.3d 532, 545 (Ct. App. 2008) (explaining that under Cal. Civ. Code § 2924(d), "the statutorily required mailing, publication, and delivery of notices in nonjudicial foreclosure, and the performance of statutory nonjudicial foreclosure procedures, [are] privileged communications under the qualified common-interest privilege of section 47, subdivision (c)(1)").

         Dismissal of Hunt's fraudulent concealment and negligent misrepresentation...

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