Lanin v. Borough of Tenafly, 031213 FED3, 12-3399
|Opinion Judge:||PER CURIAM.|
|Party Name:||SCOTT LANIN; LISA LANIN, Appellants. v. THE BOROUGH OF TENAFLY; THE TENAFLY BOARD OF EDUCATION|
|Judge Panel:||Before: RENDELL, FISHER and GARTH, Circuit Judges.|
|Case Date:||March 12, 2013|
|Court:||United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit|
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) March 12, 2013
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. Civ. No. 12-cv-02725) District Judge: Honorable Esther Salas
Appellants Scott and Lisa Lanin appeal an order of the District Court denying their motion for a preliminary injunction. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.
The Lanins, married residents of Tenafly, New Jersey, live on Lower Downey Drive, a public two-way street. Their house is located near a public elementary school. In June, 2010, the Borough of Tenafly adopted Ordinance No. 10-19, which turned Lower Downey Drive into a one-way street going eastbound and past the school during the school day, 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. The Borough also adopted Ordinance No. 10-20, which eliminated parking on Upper Downey Drive and shifted more cars onto Lower Downey Drive.
On May 8, 2012, the Lanins filed suit pro se under state law and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey.1 The Lanins raised numerous federal constitutional and state law claims, including a claim that their rights to substantive due process and to be free from unreasonable seizures had been violated by the Borough's and Board of Education's actions in depriving them of the right to freely travel on Lower Downey Drive. They later filed an amended complaint. Among other things, the Lanins complained that, after the passage of Ordinance 10-19, they (and eight other similarly situated families) could no longer exit their driveway, turn west on Downey Drive, and thereby avoid the school and its traffic altogether. Instead, as a result of the ordinance and the particular way that it was being implemented, the Lanins were forced to proceed eastbound, and, during the morning drop-off and afternoon pick-up, merge into heavy school traffic, where they would then make the same loop onto and off of school property that parents make when they drop their children off at school. The Lanins alleged that the trip is time-consuming and wasteful, and that their property has been devalued as a result of the traffic scheme. Prior to Ordinance 10-19, the school used the traffic circle on its own property in the front of the school for drop-off and dismissal of students.
Mr. Lanin, who suffers from juvenile diabetes and wears an insulin pump, also sought an injunction in the amended complaint under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., to prevent the Borough and Board from constructing a sidewalk adjacent to his property, which, he contended they would inevitably neglect to maintain and keep accessible to persons with disabilities. Moreover, he contended that Ordinance 10-19 would interfere with the free passage of emergency vehicles to and from his home.
On July 30, 2012, the Lanins filed a motion for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 65, and numerous supporting affidavits. In a supporting brief, the Lanins cited our decision in Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1990) (right to move freely about one's neighborhood by automobile is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" and "deeply rooted in the Nation's history" but cruising ordinance was reasonable...
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