Lomax v. Ruvin, 032612 FED11, 11-11495
|Opinion Judge:||PER CURIAM:|
|Party Name:||MATTIE LOMAX, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HARVEY RUVIN, SHIRLEY SHABAZZ, et al., Defendants-Appellees.|
|Judge Panel:||Before MARCUS, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.|
|Case Date:||March 26, 2012|
|Court:||United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit|
DO NOT PUBLISH
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 1:09-cv-23293-UU
Liberally construing Mattie Lomax's pleadings, 1 we determine that she has appealed the district court's post-judgment denial of (1) Lomax's March 3, 2011, motion to recuse; and (2) Lomax's March 11, 2011, motion to amend her motion for recusal and for reconsideration of the district court's dismissal of Lomax's amended complaint.2
I. MOTIONS TO RECUSE
We review a district court's denial of a motion for recusal for abuse of discretion. United States v. Bailey, 175 F.3d 966, 968 (11th Cir. 1999). Under the abuse of discretion standard, we will affirm the refusal to recuse unless we "conclude that the impropriety is clear and one which would be recognized by all objective, reasonable persons." Id.
A federal judge must disqualify herself if her "impartiality might reasonably be questioned, " or where a judge "has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, " has participated as counsel in the matter, or has a financial interest in the matter. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), (b). Under § 455(a), challenges to a judge's "ordinary efforts at courtroom administration, " including "judicial rulings, routine trial administration efforts, and ordinary admonishments (whether or not legally supportable) to counsel and to witnesses, " are not sufficient to require a judge to recuse herself. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 556, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 1157, 1158 (1994).
While we liberally construe the pleadings of pro se litigants, Lomax fails to present any argument relevant to the motions for recusal. Because she has presented no argument germane to these issues, Lomax has abandoned her appeal with respect to the denials of recusal. Rowe v. Schreiber, 139 F.3d 1381, 1382 n.1 (11th Cir. 1998). Even if we consider the merits, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) or (b). There is no evidence that the district court judge's impartiality could be questioned, nor that she had any personal bias or financial interest in the case.
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