McCray v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 050510 FED11, 09-11939
|Opinion Judge:||PER CURIAM.|
|Party Name:||NAOMI MCCRAY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WAL-MART STORES, INC., WAL-MART STORES EAST, L.P., Defendants-Appellees.|
|Judge Panel:||Before BLACK, CARNES and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.|
|Case Date:||May 05, 2010|
|Court:||United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit|
DO NOT PUBLISH
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama D. C. Docket No. 06-01123-CV-S.
Naomi McCray, a black female, appeals pro se following the entry of final judgment in favor of Wal-Mart, her former employer, on her discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), 3(a), and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983. In her complaint, McCray alleged her termination was a result of racial discrimination and retaliation against her opposition to discrimination. McCray included a number of other allegations, including: discriminatory pay, discipline, training, and promotions; discriminatory and retaliatory scheduling; and a racially hostile work environment. We address the district court's grant of summary judgment against each of McCray's claims in turn.1 After review, we affirm the district court.
McCray contends the district court erred in granting summary judgment against her claims for discriminatory and retaliatory termination. We review a district courts' order granting summary judgment de novo, and view all of the facts in the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, drawing all inferences in her favor. Houston v. Williams, 547 F.3d 1357, 1361 (11th Cir. 2008). Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(2); Allmond v. Akal Sec., Inc., 558 F.3d 1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S.Ct. 1139 (2010).
Both § 1981 and Title VII "are subject to the same standards of proof and employ the same analytical framework." Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1296, n.20 (11th Cir. 2009). When a claim involves circumstantial evidence of discrimination, the district court analyzes the case using the burden-shifting framework set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 93 S.Ct. 1817 (1973). Under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of presenting sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to determine that he has satisfied the elements of his prima facie case. Id. at...
To continue readingFREE SIGN UP