Paulson v. Oregon State Bar, 071415 FED9, 13-35672
|Party Name:||LAUREN PAULSON, Attorney, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. OREGON STATE BAR; et al., Defendants-Appellees.|
|Judge Panel:||Before: LEAVY, HAWKINS, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.|
|Case Date:||July 14, 2015|
|Court:||United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit|
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Submitted June 22, 2015 [**]
Appeal from the United States District Court No. 6:13-cv-00175-AA for the District of Oregon Ann L. Aiken, Chief Judge, Presiding
Lauren Paulson appeals pro se from the district court's judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action challenging the constitutionality of the Oregon State Bar's disciplinary proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court's dismissal for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Paulson's claims for damages against Oregon Supreme Court Chief Justice Thomas Balmer, and the Oregon State Bar and its prosecutor, Jeff Sapiro, because these defendants are entitled to immunity. See Flint v. Dennison, 488 F.3d 816, 824-25 (9th Cir. 2007) (state officials sued in their official capacities are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity); Hirsh v. Justices of Supreme Court of Cal., 67 F.3d 708, 715 (9th Cir. 1995) (a state bar association is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity and state bar prosecutors are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity); Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc) ("Judges and those performing judge-like functions are absolutely immune from damage liability for acts performed in their official capacities.").
Paulson is no longer a member of the Oregon State Bar and does not seek reinstatement in this appeal. Thus, the district court properly dismissed Paulson's requests for declaratory and injunctive relief because he lacked standing. See Cantrell v. City of Long Beach, 241 F.3d 674, 679 (9th Cir. 2001) (setting forth the requirements for Article III standing); see also Canatella v. California, 304 F.3d 843, 852 (9th Cir. 2002) ("In the particular context of injunctive and declaratory relief, a plaintiff must show that he has suffered or is threatened with a concrete and particularized legal harm . . . coupled with a sufficient likelihood that he will again be wronged in a similar way." (citations and internal quotation marks...
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