Porter v. Duval County School Board, 123010 FED11, 10-11944

Docket Nº:10-11944
Opinion Judge:PER CURIAM
Party Name:HATTIE PORTER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DUVAL COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, DENISE ROBINSON, Principal, individually, VALERIE STANSFIELD, Vice Principal, individually, DEBBIE MENARD, individually, DETECTIVE CHARLES WILSON, individually, Defendants-Appellees.
Judge Panel:Before BARKETT, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
Case Date:December 30, 2010
Court:United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
 
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HATTIE PORTER, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

DUVAL COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, DENISE ROBINSON, Principal, individually, VALERIE STANSFIELD, Vice Principal, individually, DEBBIE MENARD, individually, DETECTIVE CHARLES WILSON, individually, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 10-11944

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit

December 30, 2010

DO NOT PUBLISH

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 3:09-cv-00285-TJC-MCR.

Before BARKETT, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM

Hattie Porter ("Porter"), proceeding pro se, appeals the dismissal of her amended complaint against the Duval County School Board ("Duval") and four named school officials for failure to state a claim.1 The district court dismissed Porter's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims with prejudice but dismissed her state law claims without prejudice. On appeal, Porter argues that the district court erred by denying her motion to remand, requiring her to amend her complaint, and dismissing her amended complaint for failure to state a claim. After thorough review, we affirm.

I.

First, we decline to address Porter's motion to remand because she waived her claims relating to the motion by either abandoning them on appeal or failing to raise them before the district court. Although we construe pro se pleadings under a "less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys, . . . . issues not raised below are normally deemed waived." Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). Porter failed to argue before the district court that removal was improper because the notice of removal did not comply with one of the district court's local rules. Similarly, on appeal Porter has abandoned her argument, which she raised below, that the notice of removal was untimely by failing to address it in her briefs. See Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570, 1573 n.6 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that issues not argued on appeal are deemed abandoned); Rioux v. City of Atlanta, Ga., 520 F.3d 1269, 1274 n.4 (11th Cir. 2008). Therefore, Porter waived all claims relating to her motion to remand.

II.

Porter argues that the district court erred when it granted appellees' motion for a more definite statement and required her to file an amended complaint. We review for abuse of discretion a district court's grant of a motion for a more definite statement. Mitchell v. E-Z Way Towers, Inc., 269 F.2d 126, 131 (5th Cir. 1959).2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e) provides that "[a] party may move for a more definite statement of a pleading to which a responsive...

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