Sakoc v. Carlson, 082416 FED2, 15-1793-cv
| Party Name | Fata Sakoc, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Timothy Carlson, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Attorney | FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Brooks G. McArthur (David J. Williams, on the brief), Jarvis, McArthur & Williams, LLC, Burlington, VT. FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: Kate T. Gallagher, Assistant Attorney General, State of Vermont, Montpelier, VT. |
| Judge Panel | PRESENT: Pierre N. Leval, Christopher F. Droney, Circuit Judges, Paul A. Engelmayer, Judge. |
| Case Date | August 24, 2016 |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals, U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 24th day of August, two thousand sixteen.
Appeal from a May 8, 2015 opinion and order of the United States District Court for the District of Vermont (Reiss, C.J.).
FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Brooks G. McArthur (David J. Williams, on the brief), Jarvis, McArthur & Williams, LLC, Burlington, VT.
FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: Kate T. Gallagher, Assistant Attorney General, State of Vermont, Montpelier, VT.
PRESENT: Pierre N. Leval, Christopher F. Droney, Circuit
Judges, Paul A. Engelmayer,
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is VACATED and the case is REMANDED.
Plaintiff-Appellant Fata Sakoc appeals from a May 8, 2015 opinion and order of the United States District Court for the District of Vermont (Reiss, C.J.), granting Defendant-Appellee Timothy Carlson's motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.
This case arises from a traffic stop of Sakoc on March 5, 2010, on Route 15 in Essex, Vermont, by Carlson, a Vermont State Trooper, at approximately 11:15 p.m. Sakoc was returning home from her shift at a nearby nursing home, and was operating her car with one of its headlights not illuminated. Carlson stopped Sakoc's car on the basis of the defective light. Claiming he suspected that Sakoc's ability to operate the vehicle was impaired by alcohol, Carlson administered a series of field sobriety tests to her. Concluding that Sakoc failed to pass those tests, Carlson then administered an "Alco-Sensor" test, commonly known as a breath test. Before the breath test, Carlson told Sakoc that if she passed that test, she would be free to go home. Although Sakoc passed the Alco-Sensor test, Carlson then arrested her for violating the Vermont statute prohibiting driving while impaired by a drug other than alcohol. Carlson transported Sakoc to a police station and then to a local hospital where she passed a blood test for alcohol and drugs. As a result, the citation for driving while impaired was dismissed. Sakoc then filed this action against Carlson. Carlson was granted summary judgment by the district court on the basis of qualified immunity.
We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Mangino v. Inc. Vill. of Patchogue, 808 F.3d 951, 955 (2d Cir. 2015). In doing so, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and will affirm a district court's grant of summary judgment only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. United States v. All Funds Distributed To, or o/b/o Weiss, 345 F.3d 49, 53-54 (2d Cir. 2003).
Sakoc asserts that Carlson arrested her without probable cause, thus violating her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures. This is also known as a "false arrest" claim. The district court found that Carlson was protected by qualified immunity. Qualified immunity shields federal and state officials from money damages unless a plaintiff asserts facts showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, (2011) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). "Even if the right at issue was clearly established in certain respects, however, an officer is still entitled to qualified immunity if 'officers of reasonable competence could disagree' on the legality of the action at issue in its particular factual context." Walczyk v. Rio, 496 F.3d 139, 154 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).
"In analyzing § 1983 claims for unconstitutional false arrest, we have generally looked to the law of the state in which the arrest occurred." Jaegly v. Couch, 439 F.3d 149, 151 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under Vermont law, "probable cause for arrest exists where the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge are sufficient in themselves to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that a crime is being committed." State v. Guzman, 184 Vt. 518, 524 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). To be entitled to qualified immunity, "[t]he officer can make a mistake in finding probable cause, but the arrest must be one a reasonable police officer could have believed was lawful, given the established law and circumstances at the time." Long v. L'Esperance, 166 Vt. 566, 571 (1997). "Thus, an arresting officer is entitled to qualified immunity if the officer had an objectively reasonable belief that probable cause to arrest existed, or if officers of reasonable competence could disagree as to...
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