Sampson v. City of Brunswick, 111813 FED11, 13-11374
|Opinion Judge:||PER CURIAM:|
|Party Name:||MARIETTA SAMPSON, OSCAR MANGRAM, ERNEST FULLER, III, RASHEED MANGRAM, Plaintiffs - Appellants, v. CITY OF BRUNSWICK, GLYNN COUNTY, GEORGIA, SHAUN T. JOHNSON, R. C. ALEXANDER, TERRY WRIGHT, JAMES JORDAN, MIKE LAWSON, et al, Defendants-Appellees.|
|Judge Panel:||Before MARCUS, WILSON, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.|
|Case Date:||November 18, 2013|
|Court:||United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit|
DO NOT PUBLISH
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia D.C. Docket No. 2:11-cv-00013-LGW-JEG
Plaintiffs-Appellants Marietta Sampson, Oscar Mangram, Ernest Fuller, III, and Rasheed Mangram appeal from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of R.C. Alexander, Terry Wright, James Jordan, and Mike Lawson (collectively, "individual Defendants"), as well as the City of Brunswick and Glynn County, Georgia. The plaintiffs brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of their Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and for state law claims of battery and false arrest. Their allegations stem from the execution of a no-knock search warrant -- at the family home of plaintiffs Sampson, her son Oscar Mangram, and Sampson's grandson Rasheed Mangram --that the police had obtained in search of evidence of violations of the Georgia Controlled Substance Act. On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that the district court erroneously concluded that: (1) the individual Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity for all claims arising from the plaintiffs' detention during the execution of the warrant; and (2) the City of Brunswick and Glynn County, Georgia were not liable for their customs and policies. After careful review, we affirm. 1
We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Robinson v. Tyson Foods, Inc. 595 F.3d 1269, 1273 (11th Cir. 2010). Summary judgment is warranted when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, the "movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." See United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).
First, we are unpersuaded by the plaintiffs' argument that the district court erred in granting qualified immunity to the individual Defendants. To establish a § 1983 claim, the plaintiffs must make a prima facie...
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