Simmons v. Monserrate, 091412 FED11, 12-11679

Docket Nº:12-11679
Opinion Judge:PER CURIAM:
Party Name:BRUCE SIMMONS, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. JUAN R. MONSERRATE, MAGGIE ROSADO, VIVIAN BONET, ERNESTO ALVAREZ, JORGE PASTRANA, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
Judge Panel:Before CARNES, WILSON and FAY, Circuit Judges.
Case Date:September 14, 2012
Court:United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

BRUCE SIMMONS, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

JUAN R. MONSERRATE, MAGGIE ROSADO, VIVIAN BONET, ERNESTO ALVAREZ, JORGE PASTRANA, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 12-11679

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit

September 14, 2012

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 1:10-cv-23529-KMM

Before CARNES, WILSON and FAY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Bruce Simmons, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the eight named defendants on his claim that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs.1 In addition, Simmons argues that his constitutional rights were violated when his case was transferred to a different district court judge after his original district judge—Judge Jordan—was elevated to this court. We affirm.

I

We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts and making all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Josendis v. Wall to Wall Residence Repairs, Inc., 662 F.3d 1292, 1314 (11th Cir. 2011). We affirm a district court's grant of summary judgment when the record shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the moving party below is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

II

A

The Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments forbids prison officials from acting with a "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S.Ct. 285, 291 (1976). Necessarily, not every claim of inadequate medical treatment rises to the level of a constitutional violation, id. at 105, 97 S.Ct. at 291, and an incarcerated individual must establish "more than ordinary lack of due care" to succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim, Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1084 (1986).2

To prevail on a deliberate indifference claim, the plaintiff must show that: (1) he had a serious medical need (the objective component), (2) the prison officials acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical need (the subjective component), and (3) the injury was caused by the defendants' wrongful conduct. Goebert v. Lee Cnty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1326 (11th Cir. 2007). The objective component requires a plaintiff to show that his serious medical need would pose a substantial risk of serious harm if left unattended and that the prison officials' response to that need was sufficiently poor to constitute "'an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.'" Taylor v. Adams, 221 F.3d 1254, 1258 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Gamble, 429 U.S. at 105–06, 97 S.Ct. at 291–92). The subjective component requires that a plaintiff demonstrate (1) the prison officials' subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm, (2) their disregard of that risk, and (3) conduct that arises to more than gross negligence. Goebert, 510 F.3d at 1326–27.

Delay in providing "diagnostic care and medical treatment known to be necessary" can qualify as deliberate indifference. H.C. ex rel. Hewett v. Jarrard, 786 F.2d 1080, 1086 (11th Cir. 1986); see also Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir. 1985) ("[I]f necessary medical treatment has been delayed for non-medical reasons, a case of deliberate indifference has been made out."). That delay, however, must be "tantamount to unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, " and we require an inmate who alleges a delay-based Eighth Amendment claim to "place verifying medical evidence in the record to establish the detrimental effect of delay in medical treatment to succeed." Hill v. Dekalb Reg'l Youth Det. Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1187–88 (11th Cir. 1994) (quotation marks omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 122 S.Ct. 2508 (2002). We have found cognizable deliberate-indifference claims when the prison officials delayed treatment for life-threatening...

To continue reading

FREE SIGN UP