United States v. Illies, 110215 FED5, 15-30112

Docket Nº:15-30112
Opinion Judge:STEPHEN A. HIGGINSON, CIRCUIT JUDGE.
Party Name:UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee v. MICHAEL F. ILLIES, Defendant-Appellant
Judge Panel:Before WIENER, HIGGINSON, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.
Case Date:November 02, 2015
Court:United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
 
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

MICHAEL F. ILLIES, Defendant-Appellant

No. 15-30112

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit

November 2, 2015

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana

Before WIENER, HIGGINSON, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

STEPHEN A. HIGGINSON, CIRCUIT JUDGE.

While on supervised release, Michael Illies left the state of Texas without the permission of his probation officer and travelled to Arkansas, where he was arrested and charged with several drug offenses. He pled guilty, in Arkansas state court, to possession of methamphetamine with the intent to deliver. The state court sentenced him to twenty years in prison, with twelve years suspended. Thereafter, Illies appeared in federal court for a revocation hearing. At the hearing, Illies agreed that he was convicted of a new felony in Arkansas, which required mandatory revocation of his sentence and that the applicable advisory guideline sentencing range was 27 to 33 months. The district court sentenced him to 27 months in prison, to be served consecutively to any other sentence, with no term of supervised release. This appeal followed.

As a preliminary matter, we note that Illies did not object to his sentence after it was imposed. Nor did he raise below any of the arguments he now makes on appeal. Thus, we review for plain error. See United States v. Whitelaw, 580 F.3d 256, 259 (5th Cir. 2009).

Illies challenges his sentence on three grounds. He first argues that the district court committed procedural error by failing to consider the proper 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors when determining his sentence. He contends that, in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), the district court was required to consider the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. §§3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B)-(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), and (a)(7), and should not have considered the factors set forth in 18 § 3553(a)(2)(A): "the need for the sentence imposed . . . to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense." Illies's reliance on 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), which concerns discretionary revocations, is misplaced. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g), revocation is mandatory for a defendant who unlawfully possesses a controlled substance in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g)(1). When revoking a term of...

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