United States v. Norman, 012716 FED11, 15-11275

Docket Nº:15-11275, 15-12390
Opinion Judge:PER CURIAM:
Party Name:UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KATEENA RENA NORMAN, Defendant-Appellant.
Judge Panel:Before MARCUS, WILLIAM PRYOR and FAY, Circuit Judges.
Case Date:January 27, 2016
Court:United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
 
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

KATEENA RENA NORMAN, Defendant-Appellant.

Nos. 15-11275, 15-12390

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit

January 27, 2016

DO NOT PUBLISH

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida

Before MARCUS, WILLIAM PRYOR and FAY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Kateena Rena Norman appeals her convictions and 96-month total sentence for three counts of credit-card fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(2), and six counts of aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). On appeal, Norman argues that: (1) the district court erred in denying her motion to suppress evidence obtained during the warrantless "security sweep" of her home immediately following her arrest on an arrest warrant; (2) the district court erred in allowing victims to testify at trial about how the credit card fraud affected their lives; and (3) the district court clearly erred in calculating the intended loss attributable to her and the amount of restitution. After thorough review, we affirm.

A district court's ruling on a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact. United States v. Timmann, 741 F.3d 1170, 1177 (11th Cir. 2013). We review the district court's factual findings for clear error and the court's application of the law to the facts de novo. Id. We allot deference to the district court in reaching credibility determinations with respect to witness testimony. United States v. McPhee, 336 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003). We review a district court's admission of evidence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Ruiz, 253 F.3d 634, 639-40 (11th Cir. 2001). We review the district court's amount-of-loss determination for clear error. United States v. Nosrati-Shamloo, 255 F.3d 1290, 1291 (11th Cir. 2001). We review the legality of a restitution order de novo and the underlying factual findings for clear error. United States v. Baldwin, 774 F.3d 711, 728 (11th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 1882 (2015).

First, we are unpersuaded by Norman's claim that the district court erred in denying her motion to suppress. A warrantless search inside a home is, with few exceptions, unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001). However, a warrantless search is permissible when both probable cause and exigent circumstances exist. United States v. Tobin, 923 F.2d 1506, 1510 (11th Cir. 1991) (en banc). The Supreme Court has also recognized that a properly limited "protective sweep, " conducted incident to an arrest, is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment "when the searching officer possesses a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene." Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 337 (1990). A "protective sweep" must be "narrowly confined to a cursory visual inspection of those places in which a person might be hiding." Id. at 327. If there is sufficient justification, a properly limited protective sweep may occur "in conjunction with an in-home arrest." Id. at 337.

We have expanded the scope of a protective sweep to situations in which a defendant was arrested in a "portion of a structure" outside the residence. United States v. Burgos, 720 F.2d 1520, 1526 (11th Cir. 1983). In Burgos, we held that a protective sweep of a home following an arrest on an open porch built as part of the home was constitutionally permissible. There, officers had observed the defendant and another individual unloading illegal guns into...

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