Law v. Siegel

• Decision Date: 04 March 2014
• Docket Number: No. 12–5196.,12–5196.
• Citation: 188 L.Ed.2d 146,134 S.Ct. 1188,571 U.S. 415
• Parties: Stephen LAW, Petitioner v. Alfred H. SIEGEL, Chapter 7 Trustee.
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

571 U.S. 415

134 S.Ct. 1188

188 L.Ed.2d 146

Stephen LAW, Petitioner

v.Alfred H. SIEGEL, Chapter 7 Trustee.

No. 12–5196.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued Jan. 13, 2014.

Decided March 4, 2014.

Matthew S. Hellman, Washington, DC, for Petitioner.

Neal K. Katyal, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Sarah E. Harrington, for the United States as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, supporting the Respondent.

Catherine L. Steege, Jenner & Block LLP, Chicago, IL, Carl N. Wedoff, Jenner & Block LLP, New York, NY, Matthew S. Hellman, Counsel of Record, Jessica Ring Amunson, Adam G. Unikowsky, Matthew S. McKenzie, Caroline M. DeCell, Jenner & Block LLP, Washington, DC, for Petitioner.

Neal Kumar Katyal, Counsel of Record, Mary Helen Wimberly, Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Jonathan D. Shaub, Hogan Lovells US LLP, Washington, DC, Steven T. Gubner, Ezra Brutzkus Gubner LLP, Woodland Hills, CA, for Respondent.

Justice SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Bankruptcy Code provides that a debtor may exempt certain assets from the bankruptcy estate. It further provides that exempt assets generally are not liable for any expenses associated with administering the estate. In this case, we consider whether a bankruptcy court nonetheless may order that a debtor's exempt assets be used to pay administrative expenses incurred as a result of the debtor's misconduct.

I. Background

A

Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code gives an insolvent debtor the opportunity to discharge his debts by liquidating his assets to pay his creditors. 11 U.S.C. §§ 704(a)(1), 726, 727. The filing of a bankruptcy petition under Chapter 7 creates a bankruptcy "estate" generally comprising all of the debtor's property. § 541(a)(1). The estate is placed under the control of a trustee, who is responsible for managing liquidation of the estate's assets and distribution of the proceeds. § 704(a)(1). The Code authorizes the debtor to "exempt," however, certain kinds of property from the estate, enabling him to retain those assets post-bankruptcy. § 522(b)(1). Except in particular situations specified in the Code, exempt property "is not liable" for the payment of "any [prepetition] debt" or "any administrative expense." § 522(c), (k).

Section 522(d) of the Code provides a number of exemptions unless they are specifically prohibited by state law. § 522(b)(2), (d). One, commonly known as the "homestead exemption," protects up to $22,975 in equity in the debtor's residence. § 522(d)(1) and note following § 522 ; see Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305, 310, 111 S.Ct. 1833, 114 L.Ed.2d 350 (1991). The debtor may elect, however, to forgo the § 522(d) exemptions and instead claim whatever exemptions are available under applicable state or local law. § 522(b)(3)(A). Some States provide homestead exemptions that are more generous than the federal exemption; some provide less generous versions; but nearly every State provides some type of homestead exemption. See López, State Homestead Exemptions and Bankruptcy Law: Is It Time for Congress To Close the Loophole? 7 Rutgers Bus. L.J. 143, 149–165 (2010) (listing state exemptions).

B

Petitioner, Stephen Law, filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in 2004, and respondent, Alfred H. Siegel, was appointed to serve as trustee. The estate's only significant asset was Law's house in Hacienda Heights, California. On a schedule filed with the Bankruptcy Court, Law valued the house at $363,348 and claimed that $75,000 of its value was covered by California's homestead exemption. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. § 704.730(a)(1) (West Supp. 2014). He also reported that the house was subject to two voluntary liens: a note and deed of trust for $147,156.52 in favor of Washington Mutual Bank, and a second note and deed of trust for $156,929.04 in favor of "Lin's Mortgage & Associates." Law thus represented that there was no equity in the house that could be recovered for his other creditors, because the sum of the two liens exceeded the house's nonexempt value.

If Law's representations had been accurate, he presumably would have been able to retain the house, since Siegel would have had no reason to pursue its sale. Instead, a few months after Law's petition was filed, Siegel initiated an adversary proceeding alleging that the lien in favor of "Lin's Mortgage & Associates" was fraudulent. The deed of trust supporting that lien had been recorded by Law in 1999 and reflected a debt to someone named "Lili Lin." Not one but two individuals claiming to be Lili Lin ultimately responded to Siegel's complaint. One, Lili Lin of Artesia, California, was a former acquaintance of Law's who denied ever having loaned him money and described his repeated efforts to involve her in various sham transactions relating to the disputed deed of trust. That Lili Lin promptly entered into a stipulated judgment disclaiming any interest in the house. But that was not the end of the matter, because the second "Lili Lin" claimed to be the true beneficiary of the disputed deed of trust. Over the next five years, this "Lili Lin" managed—despite supposedly living in China and speaking no English—to engage in extensive and costly litigation, including several appeals, contesting the avoidance of the deed of trust and Siegel's subsequent sale of the house.

Finally, in 2009, the Bankruptcy Court entered an order concluding that "no person named Lili Lin ever made a loan to [Law] in exchange for the disputed deed of trust." In re Law, 401 B.R. 447, 453 (Bkrtcy.Ct.C.D.Cal.). The court found that "the loan was a fiction, meant to preserve [Law's] equity in his residence beyond what he was entitled to exempt" by perpetrating "a fraud on his creditors and the court." Ibid. With regard to the second "Lili Lin," the court declared itself "unpersuaded that Lili Lin of China signed or approved any declaration or pleading purporting to come from her." Ibid. Rather, it said, the "most plausible conclusion" was that Law himself had "authored, signed, and filed some or all of these papers." Ibid. It also found that Law had submitted false evidence "in an effort to persuade the court that Lili Lin of China—rather than Lili Lin of Artesia—was the true holder of the lien on his residence."

Id., at 452. The court determined that Siegel had incurred more than $500,000 in attorney's fees overcoming Law's fraudulent misrepresentations. It therefore granted Siegel's motion to " surcharge" the entirety of Law's $75,000 homestead exemption, making those funds available to defray Siegel's attorney's fees.

The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed.

BAP No. CC–09–1077–PaMkH, 2009 WL 7751415 (Oct. 22, 2009) (per curiam ). It held that the Bankruptcy Court's factual findings regarding Law's fraud were not clearly erroneous and that the court had not abused its discretion by surcharging Law's exempt assets. It explained that in Latman v. Burdette, 366 F.3d 774 (2004), the Ninth Circuit had recognized a bankruptcy court's power to "equitably surcharge a debtor's statutory exemptions" in exceptional circumstances, such as "when a debtor engages in inequitable or fraudulent conduct." 2009 WL 7751415, at *5, *7. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel acknowledged that the Tenth Circuit had disagreed with Latman, see In re Scrivner, 535 F.3d 1258, 1263–1265 (2008), but the panel affirmed that Latman was correct. 2009 WL 7751415, at *7, n. 10. Judge Markell filed a concurring opinion agreeing with the panel's application of Latman but questioning "whether Latman remains good policy." 2009 WL 7751415, at *10.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed. In re Law, 435 Fed.Appx. 697 (2011) (per curiam ). It held that the surcharge was proper because it was "calculated to compensate the estate for the actual monetary costs imposed by the debtor's misconduct, and was warranted to protect the integrity of the bankruptcy process." Id., at 698. We granted certiorari. 570 U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 2824, 186 L.Ed.2d 883 (2013).

II. Analysis

A

A bankruptcy court has statutory authority to "issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of" the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a). And it may also possess "inherent power ... to sanction 'abusive litigation practices.' " Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 375–376, 127 S.Ct. 1105, 166 L.Ed.2d 956 (2007). But in exercising those statutory and inherent powers, a bankruptcy court may not contravene specific statutory provisions.

It is hornbook law that § 105(a)"does not allow the bankruptcy court to override explicit mandates of other sections of the Bankruptcy Code." 2 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 105.01[2], p. 105–6 (16th ed. 2013). Section 105(a) confers authority to "carry out" the provisions of the Code, but it is quite impossible to do that by taking action that the Code prohibits. That is simply an application of the axiom that a statute's general permission to take actions of a certain type must yield to a specific prohibition found elsewhere. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550–551, 94 S.Ct. 2474, 41 L.Ed.2d 290 (1974) ; D. Ginsberg & Sons, Inc. v. Popkin, 285 U.S. 204, 206–208, 52 S.Ct. 322, 76 L.Ed. 704 (1932).¹ Courts' inherent sanctioning powers are likewise subordinate to valid statutory directives and prohibitions. Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 823, 116 S.Ct. 1777, 135 L.Ed.2d 102 (1996) ; Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 47, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991). We have long held that "whatever equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy courts must and can only be exercised within the confines of" the Bankruptcy Code.

Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206, 108 S.Ct. 963, 99 L.Ed.2d 169 (1988) ; see, e.g., Raleigh v. Illinois Dept. of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 24–25, 120 S.Ct. 1951, 147 L.Ed.2d 13 (2000) ; United States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535, 543, 116 S.Ct. 1524, 134 L.Ed.2d 748 (1996) ; SEC v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 455, 60 S.Ct. 1044, 84 L.Ed. 1293 (1940).

Thus, the Bankruptcy...