__ U.S. __ (2016), 15-7, Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar

Docket Nº:15-7
Citation:__ U.S. __, 136 S.Ct. 1989, 195 L.Ed.2d 348, 84 U.S.L.W. 4410, 26 Fla.L.Weekly Fed. S 258
Opinion Judge:THOMAS, JUSTICE.
Party Name:UNIVERSAL HEALTH SERVICES, INC., PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES AND MASSACHUSETTS, EX REL. JULIO ESCOBAR AND CARMEN CORREA
Attorney:Roy T. Englert, Jr., argued the cause for petitioner. Malcolm L. Stewart, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of the court. David C. Frederick, argued the cause for respondent.
Case Date:June 16, 2016
Court:United States Supreme Court
SUMMARY

A Massachusetts’ Medicaid beneficiary received services at Arbour, a mental health facility owned by Universal’s subsidiary. The teenager had an adverse reaction to a medication that a purported doctor prescribed after diagnosing her with bipolar disorder. She died of a seizure. Her parents discovered that few Arbour employees were licensed to provide mental health counseling or to prescribe medications without supervision. They filed a... (see full summary)

 
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__ U.S. __ (2016)

136 S.Ct. 1989, 195 L.Ed.2d 348, 84 U.S.L.W. 4410, 26 Fla.L.Weekly Fed. S 258

UNIVERSAL HEALTH SERVICES, INC., PETITIONER

v.

UNITED STATES AND MASSACHUSETTS, EX REL. JULIO ESCOBAR AND CARMEN CORREA

No. 15-7

United States Supreme Court

June 16, 2016

[136 S.Ct. 1992] Argued April 19, 2016.

DECISION BELOW: 780 F.3d 504

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 14-1423

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

780 F.3d 504, vacated and remanded.

SYLLABUS

[136 S.Ct. 1993] [195 L.Ed.2d 354] Yarushka Rivera, a teenage beneficiary of Massachusetts' Medicaid program, received counseling services for several years at Arbour Counseling Services, a satellite mental health facility owned and operated by a subsidiary of petitioner Universal Health Services, Inc. She had an adverse reaction to a medication that a purported doctor at Arbour prescribed after diagnosing her with bipolar disorder. Her condition worsened, and she eventually died of a seizure. Respondents, her mother and stepfather, later discovered that few Arbour employees were actually licensed to provide mental health counseling or authorized to prescribe medications or offer counseling services without supervision.

Respondents filed a qui tam suit, alleging that Universal Health had violated the False Claims Act (FCA). That Act imposes significant penalties on anyone who " knowingly presents . . . a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval" to the Federal Government, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A). [195 L.Ed.2d 355] Respondents sought to hold Universal Health liable under what is commonly referred to as an " implied false certification theory of liability," which treats a payment request as a claimant's implied certification of compliance with relevant statutes, regulations, or contract requirements that are material conditions of payment and treats a failure to disclose a violation as a misrepresentation that renders the claim " false or fraudulent." Specifically, respondents alleged, Universal Health (acting through Arbour) defrauded the Medicaid program by submitting reimbursement claims that made representations about the specific services provided by specific types of professionals, but that failed to disclose serious violations of Massachusetts Medicaid regulations pertaining to staff qualifications and licensing requirements for these services. Universal Health thus allegedly defrauded the program because Universal Health knowingly misrepresented its compliance with mental health facility requirements that are so central to the provision of mental health counseling that the Medicaid program would have refused to pay these claims had it known of these violations.

The District Court granted Universal Health's motion to dismiss. It held that respondents had failed to state a claim under the " implied false certification" theory of liability because none of the regulations violated by Arbour was a condition of payment. The First Circuit reversed in relevant part, holding that every submission of a claim implicitly represents compliance with relevant regulations, and that any undisclosed violation of a precondition of payment (whether or not expressly identified as such) renders a claim " false or fraudulent." The First Circuit further held that the regulations themselves provided conclusive evidence that compliance was a material condition of payment because the regulations expressly required facilities to adequately supervise staff as a condition of payment.

Held :

1. The implied false certification theory can be a basis for FCA liability when a defendant submitting a claim makes specific representations about the goods or services provided, but fails to disclose noncompliance with material statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirements that [136 S.Ct. 1994] make those representations misleading with respect to those goods or services. Pp. 8-11.

(a) The FCA does not define a " false" or " fraudulent" claim, so the Court turns to the principle that " absent other indication, 'Congress intends to incorporate the well-settled meaning of the common-law terms it uses,'" Sekhar v. United States, 570 U.S. ___, ___, 133 S.Ct. 2720, 186 L.Ed.2d 794, 798. Under the common-law definition of " fraud," the parties agree, certain misrepresentations by omission can give rise to FCA liability. Respondents and the Government contend that every claim for payment implicitly represents that the claimant is legally entitled to payment, and that failing to disclose violations of material legal requirements renders the claim misleading. Universal Health, on the other hand, argues that submitting a claim involves no representations and that the nondisclosure of legal violations is not actionable absent a special duty of reasonable care to disclose such matters. [195 L.Ed.2d 356] Today's decision holds that the claims at issue may be actionable because they do more than merely demand payment; they fall squarely within the rule that representations that state the truth only so far as it goes, while omitting critical qualifying information, can be actionable misrepresentations. Pp. 8-10.

(b) By submitting claims for payment using payment codes corresponding to specific counseling services, Universal Health represented that it had provided specific types of treatment. And Arbour staff allegedly made further representations by using National Provider Identification numbers corresponding to specific job titles. By conveying this information without disclosing Arbour's many violations of basic staff and licensing requirements for mental health facilities, Universal Health's claims constituted misrepresentations. Pp. 10-11.

2. Contrary to Universal Health's contentions, FCA liability for failing to disclose violations of legal requirements does not turn upon whether those requirements were expressly designated as conditions of payment. Pp. 11-17.

(a) Section 3729(a)(1)(A), which imposes liability on those presenting " false or fraudulent claim[s]," does not limit claims to misrepresentations about express conditions of payment. Nothing in the text supports such a restriction. And under the Act's materiality requirement, statutory, regulatory, and contractual requirements are not automatically material, even if they are labeled conditions of payment. Nor is the restriction supported by the Act's scienter requirement. A defendant can have " actual knowledge" that a condition is material even if the Government does not expressly call it a condition of payment. What matters is not the label that the Government attaches to a requirement, but whether the defendant knowingly violated a requirement that the defendant knows is material to the Government's payment decision. Universal Health's policy arguments are unavailing, and are amply addressed through strict enforcement of the FCA's stringent materiality and scienter provisions. Pp. 12-14.

(b) A misrepresentation about compliance with a statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirement must be material to the Government's payment decision in order to be actionable under the FCA. The FCA's materiality requirement is demanding. An undisclosed fact is material if, for instance, " [n]o one can say with reason that the plaintiff would have signed this contract if informed of the likelihood" of the undisclosed fact. Junius Constr. Co. v. Cohen, 257 N.Y. 393, 400, 178 N.E. 672, 674. When evaluating the FCA's materiality [136 S.Ct. 1995] requirement, the Government's decision to expressly identify a provision as a condition of payment is relevant, but not automatically dispositive. A misrepresentation cannot be deemed material merely because the Government designates compliance with a particular requirement as a condition of payment. Nor is the Government's option to decline to pay if it knew of the defendant's noncompliance sufficient for a finding of materiality. Materiality also cannot be found where [195 L.Ed.2d 357] noncompliance is minor or insubstantial. Moreover, if the Government pays a particular claim in full despite its actual knowledge that certain requirements were violated, that is very strong evidence that those requirements are not material. The FCA thus does not support the Government's and First Circuit's expansive view that any statutory, regulatory, or contractual violation is material so long as the defendant knows that the Government would be entitled to refuse payment were it aware of the violation. Pp. 14-17.

780 F.3d 504, vacated and remanded.

Roy T. Englert, Jr., argued the cause for petitioner.

Malcolm L. Stewart, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of the court.

David C. Frederick, argued the cause for respondent.

OPINION

THOMAS, JUSTICE.

...

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