__ U.S. __, 16-8255, McCoy v. Louisiana
|Citation:||__ U.S. __, 138 S.Ct. 1500, 200 L.Ed.2d 821, 86 U.S.L.W. 4271, 27 Fla.L.Weekly Fed. S 244|
|Opinion Judge:||GINSBURG, Justice.|
|Party Name:||Robert Leroy MCCOY, Petitioner v. LOUISIANA.|
|Attorney:||Seth P. Waxman, Washington, DC, for Petitioner. Elizabeth Murrill, Solicitor General, for Respondent. Richard Bourke, Joe Vigneri, New Orleans, LA, Meghan Shapiro, Alexandria, VA, Alan E. Schoenfeld, Michael D. Gottesman, Wilmer Cutler Pickering, Hale and Dorr LLP, New York, NY, Seth P. Waxman, D...|
|Judge Panel:||GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C.J., and KENNEDY, BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS and GORSUCH, JJ., joined. Justice ALITO, with whom Justice THOMAS and Justice GORSUCH join, dissenting.|
|Case Date:||May 14, 2018|
|Court:||United States Supreme Court|
Argued Jan. 17, 2018.
[138 S.Ct. 1503] Syllabus [*]
Petitioner Robert McCoy was charged with murdering his estranged wifes mother, stepfather, and son. McCoy pleaded not guilty to first-degree murder, insisting that he was out of State at the time of the killings and that corrupt police killed the victims when a drug deal went wrong. Although he vociferously insisted on his innocence and adamantly objected to any admission of guilt, the trial court permitted his counsel, Larry English, to tell the jury, during the trials guilt phase, McCoy "committed [the] three murders." Englishs strategy was to concede that McCoy committed the murders, but argue that McCoys mental state prevented him from forming the specific intent necessary for a first-degree murder conviction. Over McCoys repeated objection, English told the jury McCoy was the killer and that English "took [the] burden off of [the prosecutor]" on that issue. McCoy testified in his own defense, maintaining his innocence and pressing an alibi difficult to fathom. The jury found him guilty of all three first-degree murder counts. At the penalty phase, English again conceded McCoys guilt, but urged mercy in view of McCoys mental and emotional issues. The jury returned three death verdicts. Represented by new counsel, McCoy unsuccessfully sought a new trial. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the trial courts ruling that English had authority to concede guilt, despite McCoys opposition.
Held : The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to choose the objective of his defense and to insist that his counsel refrain from admitting guilt, even when counsels experienced-based view is that confessing guilt offers the defendant the best chance to avoid the death penalty. Pp. 1507 - 1512.
(a) The Sixth Amendment guarantees to each criminal defendant "the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." The defendant does not surrender control entirely to counsel, for the Sixth Amendment, in "grant[ing] to the accused personally the right to make his defense," "speaks of the assistance of counsel, and an assistant, however expert, is still an assistant." Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819-820, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562. The lawyers province is trial management, but some decisions are reserved for the client— including whether to plead guilty, waive the right to a jury trial, testify in ones own behalf, and forgo an appeal. Autonomy to decide that the objective of the defense is to assert innocence belongs in this reserved-for-the-client category. Refusing to plead guilty in the face of overwhelming evidence against her, rejecting the assistance of counsel, and insisting on maintaining her innocence at the guilt phase of a capital trial are not strategic choices; they are decisions about what the defendants objectives in fact are . See Weaver v. Massachusetts, 582 U.S. __, __, 137 S.Ct. 1899, 1908, 198 L.Ed.2d 420. Counsel may reasonably assess a concession of guilt as best suited to avoiding the death penalty, as English did here. [138 S.Ct. 1504] But the client may not share that objective. He may wish to avoid, above all else, the opprobrium attending admission that he killed family members, or he may hold life in prison not worth living and prefer to risk death for any hope, however small, of exoneration. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 21-22. Thus, when a client makes it plain that the objective of "his defence" is to maintain innocence of the charged criminal acts and pursue an acquittal, his lawyer must abide by that objective and may not override it by conceding guilt. Pp. 1507 - 1509.
(b) Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 125 S.Ct. 551, 160 L.Ed.2d 565, is not to the contrary. Nixons attorney did not negate Nixons autonomy by overriding Nixons desired defense objective, for Nixon "was generally unresponsive" during discussions of trial strategy and "never verbally approved or protested" counsels proposed approach. Id., at 181, 125 S.Ct. 551. He complained about counsels admission of his guilt only after trial. Id., at 185, 125 S.Ct. 551. McCoy, in contrast, opposed Englishs assertion of his guilt at every opportunity, before and during trial, both in conference with his lawyer and in open court. Citing Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 106 S.Ct. 988, 89 L.Ed.2d 123, the Louisiana Supreme Court concluded that Englishs refusal to maintain McCoys innocence was necessitated by a Louisiana Rule of Professional Conduct that prohibits counsel from suborning perjury. But in Nix, the defendant told his lawyer that he intended to commit perjury. Here, there was no avowed perjury. English harbored no doubt that McCoy believed what he was saying; English simply disbelieved that account in view of the prosecutions evidence. Louisianas ethical rules might have stopped English from presenting McCoys alibi evidence if English knew perjury was involved, but Louisiana has identified no ethical rule requiring English to admit McCoys guilt over McCoys objection. Pp. 1509 - 1511.
(c) The Courts ineffective-assistance-of-counsel jurisprudence, see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, does not apply here, where the clients autonomy, not counsels competence, is in issue. To gain redress for attorney error, a defendant ordinarily must show prejudice. See id., at 692, 104 S.Ct. 2052. But here, the violation of McCoys protected autonomy right was complete when the court allowed counsel to usurp control of an issue within McCoys sole prerogative. Violation of a defendants Sixth Amendment-secured autonomy has been ranked "structural" error; when present, such an error is not subject to harmless-error review. See, e.g.,
McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177, n. 8, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122; United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 126 S.Ct. 2557, 165 L.Ed.2d 409; Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 81 L.Ed.2d 31. An error is structural if it is not designed to protect defendants from erroneous conviction, but instead protects some other interest, such as "the fundamental legal principle that a defendant must be allowed to make his own choices about the proper way to protect his own liberty." Weaver, 582 U.S., at __, 137 S.Ct., at 1908 (citing Faretta, 422 U.S., at 834, 95 S.Ct. 2525). Counsels admission of a clients guilt over the clients express objection is error structural in kind, for it blocks the defendants right to make a fundamental choice about his own defense. See Weaver, 582 U.S., at __, 137 S.Ct. 1899. McCoy must therefore be accorded a new trial without any need first to show prejudice. Pp. 1510 - 1511.
2014-1449 (La.10/19/16), 218 So.3d 535, reversed and remanded.
GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C.J., [138 S.Ct. 1505] and KENNEDY, BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS and GORSUCH, JJ., joined.
Seth P. Waxman, Washington, DC, for Petitioner.
Elizabeth Murrill, Solicitor General, for Respondent.
Richard Bourke, Joe Vigneri, New Orleans, LA, Meghan Shapiro, Alexandria, VA, Alan E. Schoenfeld, Michael D. Gottesman, Wilmer Cutler Pickering, Hale and Dorr LLP, New York, NY, Seth P. Waxman, Danielle Spinelli, Catherine M.A. Carroll, David Lehn, Jonathan A. Bressler, Samuel M. Strongin, Wilmer Cutler Pickering, Hale and Dorr LLP, Washington, DC, for Petitioner.
J. Schuyler Marvin, District Attorney, Office of the District Attorney, Benton, LA, Jeff Landry, Louisiana Attorney General, Elizabeth B. Murrill, Solicitor General, Colin Clark, Deputy Solicitor General, Andrea Barient, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Louisiana Department of Justice, Baton Rouge, LA, for Respondent.
In Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 125 S.Ct. 551, 160 L.Ed.2d 565 (2004), this Court considered whether the Constitution bars defense counsel from conceding a capital defendants guilt at trial "when [the] defendant, informed by counsel, neither consents nor objects," id., at 178, 125 S.Ct. 551. In that case, defense counsel had several times explained to the defendant a proposed guilt-phase concession strategy, but the defendant was unresponsive. Id., at 186, 125 S.Ct. 551. We held that when counsel confers with the defendant and the defendant remains silent, neither approving nor protesting counsels proposed concession strategy, id., at 181, 125 S.Ct. 551, "[no] blanket rule demand[s] the defendants explicit consent" to implementation of that strategy, id., at 192, 125 S.Ct. 551.
In the case now before us, in contrast to Nixon, the defendant vociferously insisted that he did not engage in the charged acts and adamantly objected to any admission of guilt. App. 286-287, 505-506. Yet the trial court permitted counsel, at the guilt phase of a capital trial, to tell the jury the defendant "committed three murders.... [H]es guilty." Id., at 509, 510. We hold that a defendant has the right to insist that counsel refrain from admitting guilt, even when counsels experienced-based view is that confessing guilt offers the defendant the best chance to avoid the death penalty. Guaranteeing a defendant the right "to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence," the Sixth Amendment so demands. With individual liberty— and, in capital cases, life— at stake, it is the defendants prerogative, not counsels, to decide on the objective of his defense: to admit guilt in the hope of gaining mercy at the sentencing stage, or to maintain his innocence, leaving...
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