__ U.S. __, 17-9572, Flowers v. Mississippi
|Citation:||__ U.S. __, 139 S.Ct. 2228, 204 L.Ed.2d 638|
|Opinion Judge:||KAVANAUGH, Justice.|
|Party Name:||Curtis Giovanni FLOWERS, Petitioner v. MISSISSIPPI|
|Attorney:||Sheri Lynn Johnson for the petitioner. Special Assistant Attorney General Jason Davis for the respondent. Sheri Lynn Johnson, Counsel of Record, Keir M. Weyble, Cornell Law School, Ithaca, NY, Alison Steiner, Office of the State Public, Defender Capital Defense, Counsel Division, Jackson, MS, for...|
|Judge Panel:||KAVANAUGH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and GINSBURG, BREYER, ALITO, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. ALITO, J., filed a concurring opinion. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GORSUCH, J., joined as to Parts I, II, and III. Justice ALITO, concur...|
|Case Date:||June 21, 2019|
|Court:||United States Supreme Court|
Argued March 20, 2019
Petitioner Curtis Flowers has been tried six separate times for the murder of four employees of a Mississippi furniture store. Flowers is black; three of the four victims were white. At the first two trials, the State used its peremptory strikes on all of the qualified black prospective jurors. In each case, the jury convicted Flowers and sentenced him to death, but the convictions were later reversed by the Mississippi Supreme Court based on prosecutorial misconduct. At the third trial, the State used all of its 15 peremptory strikes against black prospective jurors, and the jury convicted Flowers and sentenced him to death. The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed again, this time concluding that the State exercised its peremptory strikes on the basis of race in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69. Flowers fourth and fifth trials ended in mistrials. At the fourth, the State exercised 11 peremptory strikes— all against black prospective jurors. No available racial information exists about the prospective jurors in the fifth trial. At the sixth trial, the State exercised six peremptory strikes— five against black prospective jurors, allowing one black juror to be seated. Flowers again raised a Batson claim, but the trial court concluded that the State had offered race-neutral reasons for each of the five peremptory strikes. The jury convicted Flowers and sentenced him to death. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed. After this Court vacated that judgment and remanded in light of Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. __, 136 S.Ct. 1737, 195 L.Ed.2d 1, the Mississippi Supreme Court again upheld Flowers conviction in a divided 5-to-4 decision. Justice King dissented on the Batson issue and was joined by two other Justices.
Held : All of the relevant facts and circumstances taken together establish that the trial court at Flowers sixth trial committed clear error in concluding that the States peremptory strike of black prospective juror Carolyn Wright was not motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent. Pp. 2237 - 2251.
(a) Under Batson, once a prima facie case of discrimination has been shown by a defendant, the State must provide race-neutral reasons for its peremptory strikes. The trial judge then must determine whether the prosecutors stated reasons were the actual reasons or instead were a pretext for discrimination. The Batson Court rejected four arguments. First, the Batson Court rejected the idea that a defendant must demonstrate a history of racially discriminatory strikes in order to make out a claim of race discrimination. Second, the Batson Court rejected the argument that a prosecutor could strike a black juror based on an assumption or belief that the black juror would favor a black defendant. Third, the Batson Court rejected the argument that race-based peremptories should be permissible because black, white, Asian, and Hispanic defendants and jurors were all "equally" subject to race-based discrimination. Fourth, the Batson Court rejected the argument that race-based peremptories are permissible because both the prosecution and defense could employ them in any individual case and in essence balance things out. Pp. 2237 - 2242.
(b) Four categories of evidence loom large in assessing the Batson issue here, where the State had a persistent pattern of striking black prospective jurors from Flowers first through his sixth trial. Pp. 2242 - 2250.
(1) A review of the history of the States peremptory strikes in Flowers first four trials strongly supports the conclusion that the States use of peremptory strikes in Flowers sixth trial was motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent. The State tried to strike all 36 black prospective jurors over the course of the first four trials. And the state courts themselves concluded that the State had violated Batson on two separate occasions. The States relentless, determined effort to rid the jury of black individuals strongly suggests that the State wanted to try Flowers before a jury with as few black jurors as possible, and ideally before an all-white jury. Pp. 2244 - 2246.
(2) The States use of peremptory strikes in Flowers sixth trial followed the same pattern as the first four trials. Pp. 2246 - 2247.
(3) Disparate questioning can be probative of discriminatory intent. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 331-332, 344-345, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931. Here, the State spent far more time questioning the black prospective jurors than the accepted white jurors— 145 questions asked of 5 black prospective jurors and 12 questions asked of 11 white seated jurors. The record refutes the States explanation that it questioned black and white prospective jurors differently only because of differences in the jurors characteristics. Along with the historical evidence from the earlier trials, as well as the States striking of five of six black prospective jurors at the sixth trial, the dramatically disparate questioning and investigation of black prospective jurors and white prospective jurors at the sixth trial strongly suggest that the State was motivated in substantial part by a discriminatory intent. Pp. 2243 - 2244.
(4) Comparing prospective jurors who were struck and not struck can be an important step in determining whether a Batson violation occurred. See Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 483-484, 128 S.Ct. 1203, 170 L.Ed.2d 175. Here, Carolyn Wright, a black prospective juror, was struck, the State says, in part because she knew several defense witnesses and had worked at Wal-Mart where Flowers father also worked. But three white prospective jurors also knew many individuals involved in the case, and the State asked them no individual questions about their connections to witnesses. White prospective jurors also had relationships with members of Flowers family, but the State did not ask them follow-up questions in order to explore the depth of those relationships. The State also incorrectly explained that it exercised a peremptory strike against Wright because she had worked with one of Flowers sisters and made apparently incorrect statements to justify the strikes of other black prospective jurors. When considered with other evidence, a series of factually inaccurate explanations for striking black prospective jurors can be another clue showing discriminatory intent. The overall context here requires skepticism of the States strike of Carolyn Wright. The trial court at Flowers sixth trial committed clear error in concluding that the States peremptory strike of black prospective juror Carolyn Wright was not motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent. Pp. 2248 - 2251.
240 So.3d 1082, reversed and remanded.
KAVANAUGH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and GINSBURG, BREYER, ALITO, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. ALITO, J., filed a concurring opinion. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GORSUCH, J., joined as to Parts I, II, and III.
[139 S.Ct. 2232] Sheri Lynn Johnson for the petitioner.
Special Assistant Attorney General Jason Davis for the respondent.
Sheri Lynn Johnson, Counsel of Record, Keir M. Weyble, Cornell Law School, Ithaca, NY, Alison Steiner, Office of the State Public, Defender Capital Defense, Counsel Division, Jackson, MS, for petitioner.
Jim Hood, Attorney General, State of Mississippi, Jason Davis, Counsel of Record, Special Assistant Attorney General, Brad Smith, Special Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Jackson, MI, for respondent.
[139 S.Ct. 2234] In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), this Court ruled that a State may not discriminate on the basis of race when exercising peremptory challenges against prospective jurors in a criminal trial.
In 1996, Curtis Flowers allegedly murdered four people in Winona, Mississippi. Flowers is black. He has been tried six separate times before a jury for murder. The same lead prosecutor represented the State in all six trials.
[139 S.Ct. 2235] In the initial three trials, Flowers was convicted, but the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed each conviction. In the first trial, Flowers was convicted, but the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the conviction due to "numerous instances of prosecutorial misconduct." Flowers v. State, 773 So.2d 309, 327 (2000). In the second trial, the trial court found that the prosecutor discriminated on the basis of race in the peremptory challenge of a black juror. The trial court seated the black juror. Flowers...
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