Freeman v. United States, 09–10245.

• Citation: 564 U.S. 522,180 L.Ed.2d 519,131 S.Ct. 2685
• Decision Date: 23 June 2011
• Docket Number: No. 09–10245.,09–10245.
• Parties: William FREEMAN, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.
• Court: United States Supreme Court

564 U.S. 522

131 S.Ct. 2685

180 L.Ed.2d 519

William FREEMAN, Petitioner,

v.UNITED STATES.

No. 09–10245.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued Feb. 23, 2011.

Decided June 23, 2011.

Frank W. Heft, Jr., Louisville, KY, for Petitioner.

Curtis E. Gannon, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Frank W. Heft, Jr., Counsel of Record, Scott T. Wendelsdorf, Office of the Federal Defender, Louisville, KY, for Petitioner.

Neal Kumar Katyal, Acting Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney General, Michael R. Dreeben, Deputy Solicitor General, Curtis E. Gannon, Assistant to the Solicitor General, John-Alex Romano, Attorney, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for U.S.

Justice KENNEDY announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Justice GINSBURG, Justice BREYER, and Justice KAGAN join.

The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3551 et seq., calls for the creation of Sentencing Guidelines to inform judicial discretion in order to reduce unwarranted disparities in federal sentencing. The Act allows retroactive amendments to the Guidelines for cases where the Guidelines become a cause of inequality, not a bulwark against it. When a retroactive Guideline amendment is adopted, § 3582(c)(2) permits defendants sentenced based on a sentencing range that has been modified to move for a reduced sentence.

The question here is whether defendants who enter into plea agreements that recommend a particular sentence as a condition of the guilty plea may be eligible for relief under § 3582(c)(2). See Fed. R.Crim. Proc. 11(c)(1)(C) (authorizing such plea agreements). The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that, barring a miscarriage of justice or mutual mistake, defendants who enter into 11(c)(1)(C) agreements cannot benefit from retroactive Guideline amendments.

Five Members of the Court agree that this judgment must be reversed. The Justices who join this plurality opinion conclude that the categorical bar enacted by the Court of Appeals finds no support in § 3582(c)(2), Rule 11(c)(1)(C), or the relevant Guidelines policy statements. In every case the judge must exercise discretion to impose an appropriate sentence. This discretion, in turn, is framed by the Guidelines. And the Guidelines must be consulted, in the regular course, whether the case is one in which the conviction was after a trial or after a plea, including a plea pursuant to an agreement that recommends a particular sentence. The district judge's decision to impose a sentence may therefore be based on the Guidelines even if the defendant agrees to plead guilty under Rule 11(c)(1)(C). Where the decision to impose a sentence is based on a range later subject to retroactive amendment, § 3582(c)(2) permits a sentence reduction.

Section 3582(c)(2) empowers district judges to correct sentences that depend on frameworks that later prove unjustified. There is no reason to deny § 3582(c)(2) relief to defendants who linger in prison pursuant to sentences that would not have been imposed but for a since-rejected, excessive range.

Justice SOTOMAYOR would reverse the judgment on a different ground set out in the opinion concurring in the judgment. That opinion, like the dissent, would hold that sentences following 11(c)(1)(C) agreement are based on the agreement rather than the Guidelines, and therefore that § 3582(c)(2) relief is not available in the typical case. But unlike the dissent she would permit the petitioner here to seek a sentence reduction because his plea agreement in express terms ties the recommended sentence to the Guidelines sentencing range.

The reasons that lead those Members of the Court who join this plurality opinion may be set forth as follows.

I

A

Federal courts are forbidden, as a general matter, to "modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed," 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) ; but the rule of finality is subject to a few narrow exceptions. Here, the exception is contained in a statutory provision enacted to permit defendants whose Guidelines sentencing range has been lowered by retroactive amendment to move for a sentence reduction if the terms of the statute are met. The statute provides:

"In the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(o )... the court may reduce the term of imprisonment, after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission." § 3582(c)(2).

This case concerns the application of the statute to cases in which defendants enter into plea agreements under Rule 11(c)(1)(C). That Rule permits the parties to "agree that a specific sentence or sentencing range is the appropriate disposition of the case, ... [a request which] binds the court once the court accepts the plea agreement." The question is whether defendants who enter into 11(c)(1)(C) agreements that specify a particular sentence may be said to have been sentenced "based on" a Guidelines sentencing range, making them eligible for relief under § 3582(c)(2).

B

Petitioner William Freeman was indicted in 2005 for various crimes, including possessing with intent to distribute cocaine base. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1); (b)(1)(C). He entered into an agreement under Rule 11(c)(1)(C) in which he agreed to plead guilty to all charges. In return the Government "agree[d] that a sentence of 106 months' incarceration is the appropriate disposition of this case." App. 26a. The agreement states that "[b]oth parties have independently reviewed the Sentencing Guidelines applicable in this case," and that "[Freeman] agrees to have his sentence determined pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines." The agreement reflects the parties' expectation that Freeman would face a Guidelines range of 46 to 57 months, id., at 27a–28a (Offense Level 19, Criminal History Category IV), along with a consecutive mandatory minimum of 60 months for possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). The recommended sentence of 106 months thus corresponded with the minimum sentence suggested by the Guidelines, in addition to the 60–month § 924(c)(1)(A) sentence.

The District Court accepted the plea agreement. At the sentencing hearing, the court "adopt[ed] the findings of the probation officer disclosed in the probation report and application of the guidelines as set out therein." App. 47a. "[H]aving considered the advisory guidelines and 18 USC 3553(a)," the court imposed the recommended 106–month sentence, which was "within the guideline ranges"—the 46– to 57–month range the parties had anticipated plus the mandatory 60 months under § 924(c)(1)(A) —and "sufficient to meet the objectives of the law." Id. at 48a–49a.

Three years later, the Commission issued a retroactive amendment to the Guidelines to remedy the significant disparity between the penalties for cocaine base and powder cocaine offenses. See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual Supp.App. C, Amdt. 706 (Nov.2010) (USSG) (effective Nov. 1, 2007) (adjusting Guidelines); id., Amdt. 713 (effective Mar. 3, 2008) (making Amendment 706 retroactive). Its effect was to reduce Freeman's applicable sentencing range to 37 to 46 months, again with the consecutive 60–month mandatory minimum. App. 142a–144a (Sealed).

Freeman moved for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2). The District Court, however, denied the motion, and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. United States v. Goins, 355 Fed.Appx. 1 (2009). Adhering to its decision in United States v. Peveler, 359 F.3d 369 (2004), the Court of Appeals held that defendants sentenced following 11(c)(1)(C) agreements that specify a particular sentence are ineligible for § 3582(c)(2) relief, barring a miscarriage of justice or mutual mistake.

This Court granted certiorari. 561 U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 61, 177 L.Ed.2d 1152 (2010).

II

Federal sentencing law requires the district judge in every case to impose "a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with" the purposes of federal sentencing, in light of the Guidelines and other § 3553(a) factors. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The Guidelines provide a framework or starting point—a basis, in the commonsense meaning of the term—for the judge's exercise of discretion. E.g., 1 Oxford English Dictionary 977 (2d ed.1989). Rule 11(c)(1)(C) permits the defendant and the prosecutor to agree that a specific sentence is appropriate, but that agreement does not discharge the district court's independent obligation to exercise its discretion. In the usual sentencing, whether following trial or plea, the judge's reliance on the Guidelines will be apparent, for the judge will use the Guidelines range as the starting point in the analysis and impose a sentence within the range. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). Even where the judge varies from the recommended range, id., at 50, 128 S.Ct. 586, if the judge uses the sentencing range as the beginning point to explain the decision to deviate from it, then the Guidelines are in a real sense a basis for the sentence.

Rule 11(c)(1)(C) makes the parties' recommended sentence binding on the court "once the court accepts the plea agreement," but the governing policy statement confirms that the court's acceptance is itself based on the Guidelines. See USSG § 6B1.2. That policy statement forbids the district judge to accept an 11(c)(1)(C) agreement without first evaluating the recommended sentence in light of the defendant's applicable sentencing range. The commentary to § 6B1.2 advises that a court may accept an 11(c)(1)(C) agreement "only if the court is satisfied either that such sentence is an appropriate sentence within the applicable guideline range or, if not, that the sentence departs from...