Turner v. Rogers, 10–10.
Decision Date | 20 June 2011 |
Docket Number | No. 10–10.,10–10. |
Citation | 131 S.Ct. 2507,564 U.S. 431,180 L.Ed.2d 452 |
Parties | Michael D. TURNER, Petitioner, v. Rebecca L. ROGERS et al. |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Seth P. Waxman, Washington, DC, for petitioner.
Leondra R. Kruger, for United States as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court supporting reversal.
Stephanos Bibas, Philadelphia, PA, for respondents.
Derek J. Enderlin, Ross & Enderlin, P.A., Greenville, SC, Kathrine Haggard Hudgins, South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense, Columbia, SC, Seth P. Waxman, Counsel of Record, Paul R.Q. Wolfson, Catherine M.A. Carroll, Sonya L. Lebsack, Shivaprasad Nagaraj, Wilmer Cutler Pickering, Hale and Dorr LLP, Washington, DC, for Petitioner.
Stephanos Bibas, Counsel of Record, James A. Feldman, Nancy Bregstein Gordon, Amy Wax, University of Pennsylvania Law School, Supreme Court Clinic, Philadelphia, PA, Stephen B. Kinnaird, Panteha Abdollahi, D. Scott Carlton, Eric A. Long, Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker LLP, Washington, DC, for Respondents.
Leondra R. Kruger, Acting Deputy Solicitor General, Washington, D.C., for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Reversal.
South Carolina's Family Court enforces its child support orders by threatening with incarceration for civil contempt those who are (1) subject to a child support order, (2) able to comply with that order, but (3) fail to do so. We must decide whether the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause requires the State to provide counsel (at a civil contempt hearing) to an indigent person potentially faced with such incarceration. We conclude that where as here the custodial parent (entitled to receive the support) is unrepresented by counsel, the State need not provide counsel to the noncustodial parent (required to provide the support). But we attach an important caveat, namely, that the State must nonetheless have in place alternative procedures that assure a fundamentally fair determination of the critical incarceration-related question, whether the supporting parent is able to comply with the support order.
South Carolina family courts enforce their child support orders in part through civil contempt proceedings. Each month the family court clerk reviews outstanding child support orders, identifies those in which the supporting parent has fallen more than five days behind, and sends that parent an order to "show cause" why he should not be held in contempt. S.C. Rule Family Ct. 24 (2011). The "show cause" order and attached affidavit refer to the relevant child support order, identify the amount of the arrearage, and set a date for a court hearing. At the hearing that parent may demonstrate that he is not in contempt, say, by showing that he is not able to make the required payments. See Moseley v. Mosier, 279 S.C. 348, 351, 306 S.E.2d 624, 626 (1983) (). If he fails to make the required showing, the court may hold him in civil contempt. And it may require that he be imprisoned unless and until he purges himself of contempt by making the required child support payments (but not for more than one year regardless). See S.C.Code Ann. § 63–3–620 (Supp.2010) ( ); Price v. Turner, 387 S.C. 142, 145, 691 S.E.2d 470, 472 (2010) ( ).
In June 2003 a South Carolina family court entered an order, which (as amended) required petitioner, Michael Turner, to pay $51.73 per week to respondent, Rebecca Rogers, to help support their child. (Rogers' father, Larry Price, currently has custody of the child and is also a respondent before this Court.) Over the next three years, Turner repeatedly failed to pay the amount due and was held in contempt on five occasions. The first four times he was sentenced to 90 days' imprisonment, but he ultimately paid the amount due (twice without being jailed, twice after spending two or three days in custody). The fifth time he did not pay but completed a 6–month sentence.
After his release in 2006 Turner remained in arrears. On March 27, 2006, the clerk issued a new "show cause" order. And after an initial postponement due to Turner's failure to appear, Turner's civil contempt hearing took place on January 3, 2008. Turner and Rogers were present, each without representation by counsel.
The judge added that Turner would not receive good-time or work credits, but "[i]f you've got a job, I'll make you eligible for work release."Ibid. When Turner asked why he could not receive good-time or work credits, the judge said, "[b]ecause that's my ruling." Ibid.
The court made no express finding concerning Turner's ability to pay his arrearage (though Turner's wife had voluntarily submitted a copy of Turner's application for disability benefits, cf. post, at 2524, n. 3 (THOMAS, J., dissenting); App. 135a–136a). Nor did the judge ask any followup questions or otherwise address the ability-to-pay issue. After the hearing, the judge filled out a prewritten form titled "Order for Contempt of Court," which included the statement:
"Defendant (was) (was not) gainfully employed and/or (had) (did not have) the ability to make these support payments when due." Id., at 60a, 61a.
But the judge left this statement as is without indicating whether Turner was able to make support payments.
While serving his 12–month sentence, Turner, with the help of pro bono counsel, appealed. He claimed that the Federal Constitution entitled him to counsel at his contempt hearing. The South Carolina Supreme Court decided Turner's appeal after he had completed his sentence. And it rejected his "right to counsel" claim. The court pointed out that civil contempt differs significantly from criminal contempt. The former does not require all the "constitutional safeguards" applicable in criminal proceedings. 387 S.C., at 145, 691 S.E.2d, at 472. And the right to government-paid counsel, the Supreme Court held, was one of the "safeguards" not required. Ibid.
Turner sought certiorari. In light of differences among state courts (and some federal courts) on the applicability of a "right to counsel" in civil contempt proceedings enforcing child support orders, we granted the writ. Compare, e.g., Pasqua v. Council, 186 N.J. 127, 141–146, 892 A.2d 663, 671–674 (2006) ; Black v. Division of Child Support Enforcement, 686 A.2d 164, 167–168 (Del.1996) ; Mead v. Batchlor, 435 Mich. 480, 488–505, 460 N.W.2d 493, 496–504 (1990) ; Ridgway v. Baker, 720 F.2d 1409, 1413–1415 (C.A.5 1983) ( ), with Rodriguez v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., County of Clark, 120 Nev. 798, 808–813, 102 P.3d 41, 48–51 (2004) ( ); Andrews v. Walton, 428 So.2d 663, 666 (Fla.1983) (). Compare also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 468 F.2d 1368, 1369 (C.A.9 1972)(per curiam) ( ), with Duval v. Duval, 114 N.H. 422, 425–427, 322 A.2d 1, 3–4 (1974) ( ).
Respondents argue that this case is moot. See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 480, 43 S.Ct. 597, 67 L.Ed. 1078 (1923) ( ); Alvarez v. Smith, 558 U.S. 87, ––––, 130 S.Ct. 576, 580, 175 L.Ed.2d 447 (2009) ( ). They point out that Turner completed his 12–month prison sentence in 2009. And they add that there are no "collateral consequences" of that particular contempt determination that might keep the dispute alive. Compare Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 55–56, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) ( ), with Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 14, 118 S.Ct. 978, 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998) ( ).
The short, conclusive answer to respondents' mootness claim, however, is that this case is not moot because it falls within a special category of disputes that are "capable of repetition" while "evading review." Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515, 31 S.Ct. 279, 55...
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