564 U.S. 338 (2011), 10-277, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes
|Citation:||564 U.S. 338, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 180 L.Ed.2d 374, 79 U.S.L.W. 4527, 79 Fed.R.Serv.3d 1460|
|Opinion Judge:||Scalia, Justice|
|Party Name:||WAL-MART STORES, INC., Petitioner v. BETTY DUKES et al|
|Attorney:||Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr. argued the cause for petitioner. Joseph M. Sellers argued the cause for respondents.|
|Judge Panel:||Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, Parts I and III of which were unanimous, and PART II of which was joined by Roberts, C. J., and Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ. Ginsburg, Justice with whom Breyer, Justice, Sotomayor, Justice and Kagan, Justice|
|Case Date:||June 20, 2011|
|Court:||United States Supreme Court|
Case Below: Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. Cal., 2010)
Argued March 29, 2011
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.
[180 L.Ed.2d 382] [131 S.Ct. 2544] Respondents, current or former employees of petitioner Wal-Mart, sought judgment against the company for injunctive and declaratory relief, punitive damages, and backpay, on behalf of themselves and a nationwide class of some 1.5 million female employees, because of Wal-Mart's alleged discrimination against women in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. They claim that local managers exercise their discretion over pay and promotions disproportionately in favor of men, which has an unlawful disparate impact on female employees; and that Wal-Mart's refusal to cabin its managers' authority amounts to disparate treatment. The District Court certified the class, finding that respondents satisfied Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), and Rule 23(b)(2)'s requirement of showing that " the party opposing the class has acted or [180 L.Ed.2d 383] refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole." The Ninth Circuit substantially affirmed, concluding, inter alia, that respondents met Rule 23(a)(2)'s commonality requirement and that their backpay claims could be certified as part of a (b)(2) class because those claims did not predominate over the declaratory and injunctive relief requests. It also ruled that the class action could be manageably tried without depriving Wal-Mart of its right to present its statutory defenses if the District Court selected a random set of claims for valuation and then extrapolated the validity and value of the untested claims from the sample set.
1. The certification of the plaintiff class was not consistent with Rule 23(a). Pp. 348-360, 180 L.Ed.2d, at 388-396.
[131 S.Ct. 2545] (a) Rule 23(a)(2) requires a party seeking class certification to prove that the class has common " questions of law or fact." Their claims must depend upon a common contention of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution--which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke. Here, proof of commonality necessarily overlaps with respondents' merits contention that Wal-Mart engages in a pattern or practice of discrimination. The crux of a Title VII inquiry is " the reason for a particular employment decision," Cooper
v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 876, 104 S.Ct. 2794, 81 L.Ed.2d 718, and respondents wish to sue for millions of employment decisions at once. Without some glue holding together the alleged reasons for those decisions, it will be impossible to say that examination of all the class members' claims will produce a common answer to the crucial discrimination question. Pp. 349-352, 180 L.Ed.2d, at 389-391.
(b) General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 102 S.Ct. 2364, 72 L.Ed.2d 740, describes the proper approach to commonality. On the facts of this case, the conceptual gap between an individual's discrimination claim and " the existence of a class of persons who have suffered the same injury," id., at 157-158, 102 S.Ct. 2364, 72 L.Ed.2d 740, must be bridged by " [s]ignificant proof that an employer operated under a general policy of discrimination," id., at 159, n. 15, 102 S.Ct. 2364, 72 L.Ed.2d 740. Such proof is absent here. Wal-Mart's announced policy forbids sex discrimination, and the company has penalties for denials of equal opportunity. Respondents' only evidence of a general discrimination policy was a sociologist's analysis asserting that Wal-Mart's corporate culture made it vulnerable to gender bias. But because he could not estimate what percent of Wal-Mart employment decisions might be determined by stereotypical thinking, his testimony was worlds away from " [s]ignificant proof" that Wal-Mart " operated under a general policy of discrimination." Pp. 352-355, 180 L.Ed.2d, at 391-392.
(c) The only corporate policy that the plaintiffs' evidence convincingly establishes is Wal-Mart's " policy" of giving local supervisors discretion over employment matters. While such a policy could be the basis of a Title VII disparate-impact claim, recognizing that a claim " can" exist does not [180 L.Ed.2d 384] mean that every employee in a company with that policy has a common claim. In a company of Wal-Mart's size and geographical scope, it is unlikely that all managers would exercise their discretion in a common way without some common direction. Respondents' attempt to show such direction by means of statistical and anecdotal evidence falls well short. Pp. 355-360, 180 L.Ed.2d, at 392-396.
Respondents' backpay claims were improperly certified under Rule 23(b)(2). Pp. 360-367, 180 L.Ed.2d, at 396-400.
(a) Claims for monetary relief may not be certified under Rule 23(b)(2), at least where the monetary relief is not incidental to the requested injunctive or declaratory relief. It is unnecessary to decide whether monetary claims can ever be certified under the Rule because, at a minimum, claims for individualized relief, like backpay, are excluded. Rule 23(b)(2) applies only when a single, indivisible remedy would provide relief to each class member. The Rule's history and structure indicate that individualized monetary claims belong instead in Rule 23(b)(3), with its procedural protections of predominance, superiority, mandatory notice, and the right to opt out. Pp. 360-363, 180 L.Ed.2d, at 396-398.
(b) Respondents nonetheless argue that their backpay claims were appropriately [131 S.Ct. 2546] certified under Rule 23(b)(2) because those claims do not " predominate" over their injunctive and declaratory relief requests. That interpretation has no basis in the Rule's text and does obvious violence to the Rule's structural features. The mere " predominance" of a proper (b)(2) injunctive claim does nothing to justify eliminating Rule 23(b)(3)'s procedural protections, and creates incentives for class representatives to place at risk potentially valid monetary relief claims. Moreover, a district court would have to reevaluate the roster of class members continuously to excise those who leave their employment and become ineligible for classwide injunctive or declaratory relief. By contrast, in a properly certified (b)(3) class action for backpay, it would be irrelevant whether the plaintiffs are still employed at Wal-Mart. It follows that backpay claims should not be certified under Rule 23(b)(2). Pp. 363-365, 180 L.Ed.2d, at 398-399.
(c) It is unnecessary to decide whether there are any forms of " incidental" monetary relief that are consistent with the above interpretation of Rule 23(b)(2) and the Due Process Clause because respondents' backpay claims are not incidental to their requested injunction. Wal-Mart is entitled to individualized determinations of each employee's eligibility for backpay. Once a plaintiff establishes a pattern or practice of discrimination, a district court must usually conduct " additional proceedings . . . to determine the scope of individual relief." Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 361, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396. The company can then raise individual affirmative defenses and demonstrate that its action was lawful. Id., at 362, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396. The Ninth Circuit erred in trying to replace such proceedings with Trial by Formula. Because Rule 23 cannot be interpreted to " abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right," 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b), a class cannot be certified on the premise that Wal-Mart will not be entitled to litigate its statutory defenses to individual [180 L.Ed.2d 385] claims. Pp. 365-367, 180 L.Ed.2d, at 399-400.
603 F.3d 571, reversed.
Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr. argued the cause for petitioner.
Joseph M. Sellers argued the cause for respondents.
Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, Parts I and III of which were unanimous, and PART II of which was joined by Roberts, C. J., and Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ.
[131 S.Ct. 2547] Scalia, Justice
We are presented with one of the most expansive class actions ever. The District Court and the Court of Appeals approved the certification of a class comprising about one and a half million plaintiffs, current and former female employees of petitioner Wal-Mart who allege that the discretion exercised by their local supervisors over pay and promotion matters violates Title VII by discriminating against women. In addition to injunctive and declaratory relief, the plaintiffs seek an award of backpay. We consider whether the certification of the plaintiff class was consistent with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(2).
Petitioner Wal-Mart is the Nation's largest private employer. It operates four types of retail stores throughout the country: Discount Stores, Supercenters, Neighborhood Markets, and Sam's Clubs. Those stores are divided into seven nationwide divisions, which in turn comprise 41 regions of 80 to 85 stores apiece. Each store has between 40 and 53 separate departments and 80 to 500 staff positions. In all, Wal-Mart operates approximately 3,400 stores and employs more than 1 million people.
Pay and promotion...
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