Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union

Decision Date21 June 2012
Docket NumberNo. 10–1121.,10–1121.
Parties Dianne KNOX, et al., Petitioners v. SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, LOCAL 1000.
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

567 U.S. 298
132 S.Ct. 2277
183 L.Ed.2d 281

Dianne KNOX, et al., Petitioners
v.
SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, LOCAL 1000.

No. 10–1121.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued Jan. 10, 2012.
Decided June 21, 2012.


William J. Young, Springfield, VA, for Petitioners.

Jeremiah Collins, for Respondent.

Neal Kumar Katyal, Dominic F. Perella, Hogan Lovells US LLP, Washington, DC, W. James Young, Esq., Counsel of Record, William L. Messenger, Esq., Milton L. Chappell, Esq., c/o National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, Inc., Springfield, VA, for Petitioners.

Jeffrey B. Demain, Counsel of Record, Scott A. Kronland, P. Casey Pitts, Altshuler Berzon LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent Service Employees International Union, Local 1000.

Justice ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.

567 U.S. 302

In this case, we decide whether the First Amendment allows a public-sector union to require objecting nonmembers to pay a special fee for the purpose of financing the union's political and ideological activities.

I

A

Under California law, public-sector employees in a bargaining unit may decide by majority vote to create an "agency shop" arrangement under which all the employees are represented by a union selected by the majority. Cal. Govt.Code Ann. § 3502.5(a) (West 2010). While employees in the unit are not required to join the union, they must nevertheless pay the union an annual fee to cover the cost of union services related to collective bargaining (so-called chargeable expenses). See Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Assn., 500 U.S. 507, 524, 111 S.Ct. 1950, 114 L.Ed.2d 572 (1991) ; Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 760, 81 S.Ct. 1784, 6 L.Ed.2d 1141 (1961).

Our prior cases have recognized that such arrangements represent an "impingement" on the First Amendment rights of nonmembers. Teachers v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 307, n. 20, 106 S.Ct. 1066, 89 L.Ed.2d 232 (1986). See also Davenport v. Washington Ed. Assn., 551 U.S. 177, 181, 127 S.Ct. 2372, 168 L.Ed.2d 71 (2007) ("[A]gency-shop arrangements in the public sector raise First Amendment concerns because they force individuals to contribute money to unions as a condition of government employment"); Street, supra, at 749, 81 S.Ct. 1784 (union shop presents First Amendment "questions of the utmost gravity"). Thus, in Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed. , 431 U.S. 209, 97 S.Ct. 1782, 52 L.Ed.2d 261 (1977), we held that a public-sector union, while permitted to bill nonmembers for chargeable expenses, may not require nonmembers to fund its political and ideological projects. And in Hudson, we identified procedural requirements that a union must meet in order to collect fees from nonmembers without violating their rights. 475 U.S., at 302–311, 106 S.Ct. 1066. The First Amendment, we held, does not permit

567 U.S. 303

a public-sector union

132 S.Ct. 2285

to adopt procedures that have the effect of requiring objecting nonmembers to lend the union money to be used for political, ideological, and other purposes not germane to collective bargaining. Id., at 305, 106 S.Ct. 1066. In the interest of administrative convenience, however, we concluded that a union "cannot be faulted" for calculating the fee that nonmembers must pay "on the basis of its expenses during the preceding year." Id., at 307, n. 18, 106 S.Ct. 1066.

Hudson concerned a union's regular annual fees. The present case, by contrast, concerns the First Amendment requirements applicable to a special assessment or dues increase that is levied to meet expenses that were not disclosed when the amount of the regular assessment was set.

B

In June 2005, respondent, the Service Employees International Union, Local 1000 (SEIU), sent out its regular Hudson notice informing employees what the agency fee would be for the year ahead. The notice set monthly dues at 1% of an employee's gross monthly salary but capped monthly dues at $45. Based on the most recently audited year, the SEIU estimated that 56.35% of its total expenditures in the coming year would be dedicated to chargeable collective-bargaining activities. Thus, if a nonunion employee objected within 30 days to payment of the full amount of union dues, the objecting employee was required to pay only 56.35% of total dues. The SEIU's notice also included a feature that was not present in Hudson: The notice stated that the agency fee was subject to increase at any time without further notice.

During this time, the citizens of the State of California were engaged in a wide-ranging political debate regarding state budget deficits, and in particular the budget consequences of growing compensation for public employees backed by powerful public-sector unions. On June 13, 2005, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger called for a special election to be held in November 2005, where voters would

567 U.S. 304

consider various ballot propositions aimed at state-level structural reforms. Two of the most controversial issues on the ballot were Propositions 75 and 76. Proposition 75 would have required unions to obtain employees' affirmative consent before charging them fees to be used for political purposes. Proposition 76 would have limited state spending and would have given the Governor the ability under some circumstances to reduce state appropriations for public-employee compensation. The SEIU joined a coalition of public-sector unions in vigorously opposing these measures. Calling itself the "Alliance for a Better California," the group would eventually raise "more than $10 million, with almost all of it coming from public employee unions, including $2.75 million from state worker unions, $4.7 million from the California Teachers Association, and $700,000 from school workers unions."1

On July 30, shortly after the end of the 30–day objection period for the June Hudson notice, the SEIU proposed a temporary 25% increase in employee fees, which it billed as an "Emergency Temporary Assessment to Build a Political Fight–Back Fund." App. 25. The proposal stated that the money was needed to achieve the union's political objectives, both in the special November 2005 election and in the November 2006 election. Id., at 26. According

132 S.Ct. 2286

to the proposal, money in the Fight–Back Fund would be used "for a broad range of political expenses, including television and radio advertising, direct mail, voter registration, voter education, and get out the vote activities in our work sites and in our communities across California." Ibid. The proposal specifically stated that "[t]he Fund will not be used for regular costs of the union—such as office rent, staff salaries or routine equipment replacement, etc." Ibid. It noted that "all other public worker unions are in the process of raising the extraordinary funds needed to defeat the Governor."

567 U.S. 305

Id., at 27. And it concluded: "Each of us must do our part to turn back these initiatives which would allow the Governor to destroy our wages and benefits and even our jobs, and threaten the well-being of all Californians." Ibid. On August 27, the SEIU's General Council voted to implement the proposal.

On August 31, the SEIU sent out a letter addressed to "Local 1000 Members and Fair Share Fee Payers," announcing that, for a limited period, their fees would be raised to 1.25% of gross monthly salary and the $45–per–month cap on regular dues would not apply. Id., at 31. The letter explained that the union would use the fund to "defeat Proposition 76 and Proposition 75 on November 8," and to "defeat another attack on [its] pension plan" in June 2006. Ibid . The letter also informed employees that, in the following year, the money would help "to elect a governor and a legislature who support public employees and the services [they] provide." Ibid .

After receiving this letter, one of the plaintiffs in this case called the SEIU's offices to complain that the union was levying the special assessment for political purposes without giving employees a fair opportunity to object. An SEIU area manager responded that "even if [the employee] objected to the payment of the full agency fee, there was nothing he could do about the September increase for the Assessment." Knox v. Westly, No. 2:05–cv–02198, 2008 WL 850128, *3 (E.D.Cal., Mar. 28, 2008). "She also stated that 'we are in the fight of our lives,' that the Assessment was needed, and that there was nothing that could be done to stop the Union's expenditure of that Assessment for political purposes." Ibid. As a consolation, however, those employees who had filed timely objections after the regular June Hudson notice were required to pay only 56.35% of the temporary increase.

Petitioners filed this class-action suit on behalf of 28,000 nonunion employees who were forced to contribute money to the Political Fight–Back Fund. Some of the class members

567 U.S. 306

had filed timely objections after receiving the regular Hudson notice in June, and others had not. Those who had objected argued that it was wrong to require...

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