Holder v. Gutierrez

• Decision Date: 21 May 2012
• Docket Number: Nos. 10–1542,10–1543.,s. 10–1542
• Citation: 182 L.Ed.2d 922,566 U.S. 583,132 S.Ct. 2011
• Parties: Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Petitioner v. Carlos MARTINEZ GUTIERREZ. Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General, Petitioner v. Damien Antonio Sawyers.
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

566 U.S. 583

132 S.Ct. 2011

182 L.Ed.2d 922

Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Petitioner

v.Carlos MARTINEZ GUTIERREZ.

Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General, Petitioner

v.Damien Antonio Sawyers.

Nos. 10–1542

10–1543.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued Jan. 18, 2012.

Decided May 21, 2012.

Leondra R. Kruger, for Petitioner.

Stephen B. Kinnaird, Washington, DC, for Carlos Martinez Gutierrez.

Charles A. Rothfeld, Washington, DC, for Damien Antonio Sawyers.

Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Petitioners.

Stephanos Bibas, University of Pennsylvania, Law School Supreme, Philadelphia, PA, Michael Franquinha, Aguirre Law Group LLP, Phoenix, AZ, Stephen B. Kinnaird, Counsel of Record, Igor V. Timofeyev, Tamara L. Graham, Maria T. Davis, D. Scott Carlton, Michelle E. Yetter, Devon E. Winkles, Paul Hastings LLP, Washington, DC, Dario Aguirre, Aguirre Law Group LLP, Denver, CO, for Carlos Martinez Gutierrez.

Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, Tony West, Assistant Attorney General, Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Pratik A. Shah, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Donald E. Keener, Carol Federighi, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Petitioner.

Jeffrey A. Meyer, Yale Law School, Supreme Court Clinic, New Haven, CT, Hugo F. Larios, Hugo F. Larios Law PLLC, Tempe, AZ, Charles A. Rothfeld, Counsel of Record, Andrew J. Pincus, Paul W. Hughes, Michael B. Kimberly, Mayer Brown LLP, Washington, DC, for Damien Antonio Sawyers.

Justice KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

An immigration statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a), authorizes the Attorney General to cancel the removal of an alien from the United States so long as the alien satisfies certain criteria. One of those criteria relates to the length of time an alien has lawfully resided in the United States, and another to the length of time he has held permanent resident status here. We consider whether the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA or Board) could reasonably conclude that an alien living in this country as a child must meet those requirements on his own, without counting a parent's years of residence or immigration status. We hold that the BIA's approach is based on a permissible construction of the statute.

I

A

The immigration laws have long given the Attorney General discretion to permit certain otherwise-removable aliens to remain in the United States. See Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. ––––, ––––, 132 S.Ct. 476, 479–481, 181 L.Ed.2d 449 (2011). The Attorney General formerly exercised this authority by virtue of § 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 66 Stat. 187, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994 ed.), a provision with some lingering relevance here, see infra, at 2017 – 2019. But in 1996, Congress replaced § 212(c) with § 1229b(a) (2006 ed.). That new section, applicable to the cases before us, provides as follows:

"(a) Cancellation of removal for certain permanent residents

"The Attorney General may cancel removal in the case of an alien who is inadmissible or deportable from the United States if the alien—

"(1) has been an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence for not less than 5 years,

"(2) has resided in the United States continuously for 7 years after having been admitted in any status, and

"(3) has not been convicted of any aggravated felony." Ibid.

Section 1229b(a) thus specifies the criteria that make an alien eligible to obtain relief from the Attorney General. The first paragraph requires that the alien have held the status of a lawful permanent resident (LPR) for at least five years. And the second adds that the alien must have lived in the United States for at least seven continuous years after a lawful admission, whether as an LPR or in some other immigration status.¹ (The third paragraph is not at issue in these cases.)

The question we consider here is whether, in applying this statutory provision, the BIA should impute a parent's years of continuous residence or LPR status to his or her child. That question arises because a child may enter the country lawfully, or may gain LPR status, after one of his parents does. A parent may therefore satisfy the requirements of §§ 1229b(a)(1) and (2), while his or her child, considered independently, does not. In these circumstances, is the child eligible for cancellation of removal?

The Ninth Circuit, the first court of appeals to confront this issue, held that such an alien could obtain relief. See Cuevas–Gaspar v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 1013 (2005). Enrique Cuevas–Gaspar and his parents came to the United States illegally in 1985, when he was one year old. Cuevas–Gaspar's mother was lawfully admitted to the country in 1990, as an LPR. But Cuevas–Gaspar was lawfully admitted only in 1997, when he too received LPR status. That meant that when Cuevas–Gaspar committed a removable offense in 2002, he could not independently satisfy § 1229b(a)(2)'s requirement of seven consecutive years of residence after a lawful entry.² (The parties agreed that he just met § 1229b(a)(1)'s 5–year status requirement.) The Board deemed Cuevas–Gaspar ineligible for relief on that account, but the Ninth Circuit found that position unreasonable. According to the Court of Appeals, the Board should have "imputed" to Cuevas–Gaspar his mother's years of continuous residence during the time he lived with her as an "unemancipated minor." Id., at 1029. That approach, the Ninth Circuit reasoned, followed from both the INA's "priorit[ization]" of familial relations and the Board's "consistent willingness" to make imputations from a parent to a child in many areas of immigration law. Id., at 1026.

The Board responded by reiterating its opposition to imputation under both relevant paragraphs of § 1229b(a). In In re Escobar, 24 I. & N. Dec. 231 (BIA 2007), the Board considered whether a child could rely on a parent's period of LPR status to satisfy § 1229b(a)(1)'s 5–year clock. The Board expressly "disagree[d] with the reasoning" of Cuevas–Gaspar, rejecting the Ninth Circuit's understanding of both the statute and the Board's prior policies. 24 I. & N. Dec., at 233–234, and n. 4. Accordingly, the Board announced that it would "decline to extend" Cuevas–Gaspar to any case involving § 1229b(a)(1), and that it would ignore the decision even as to § 1229b(a)(2) outside the Ninth Circuit. 24 I. & N. Dec., at 235. A year later, in Matter of Ramirez–Vargas, 24 I. & N. Dec. 599 (2008), the BIA took the final step: It rejected imputation under § 1229b(a)(2) in a case arising in the Ninth Circuit, maintaining that the court should abandon Cuevas–Gaspar and defer to the Board's intervening reasoned decision in Escobar . See Ramirez–Vargas, 24 I. & N. Dec., at 600–601 (citing National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967, 125 S.Ct. 2688, 162 L.Ed.2d 820 (2005) ).

The BIA's position on imputation touched off a split in the courts of appeals. The Third and Fifth Circuits both deferred to the BIA's approach as a reasonable construction of § 1229b(a). See Augustin v. Attorney Gen., 520 F.3d 264 (C.A.3 2008) ; Deus v. Holder, 591 F.3d 807 (C.A.5 2009). But in Mercado–Zazueta v. Holder, 580 F.3d 1102 (2009), the Ninth Circuit doubled down on its contrary view, declaring the BIA's position unreasonable and requiring imputation under both §§ 1229b(a)(1) and (a)(2). See id., at 1103 ("[T]he rationale and holding of Cuevas–Gaspar apply equally to the five-year permanent residence and the seven-year continuance residence requirements" of § 1229b(a) ).

B

Two cases are before us. In 1989, at the age of five, respondent Carlos Martinez Gutierrez illegally entered the United States with his family. Martinez Gutierrez's father was lawfully admitted to the country two years later as an LPR. But Martinez Gutierrez himself was neither lawfully admitted nor given LPR status until 2003. Two years after that, Martinez Gutierrez was apprehended for smuggling undocumented aliens across the border. He admitted the offense, and sought cancellation of removal. The Immigration Judge concluded that Martinez Gutierrez qualified for relief because of his father's immigration history, even though Martinez Gutierrez could not satisfy either § 1229b(a)(1) or § 1229b(a)(2) on his own. See App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 10–1542, pp. 20a–22a (citing Cuevas–Gaspar, 430 F.3d 1013). The BIA reversed, and after entry of a removal order on remand, reaffirmed its disposition in an order relying on Escobar, see App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 10–1542, at 5a–6a. The Ninth Circuit then granted Martinez Gutierrez's petition for review and remanded the case to the Board for reconsideration in light of the court's contrary decisions. See 411 Fed.Appx. 121 (2011).

Respondent Damien Sawyers was lawfully admitted as an LPR in October 1995, when he was 15 years old. At that time, his mother had already resided in the country for six consecutive years following a lawful entry. After Sawyers's conviction of a drug offense in August 2002, the Government initiated removal proceedings. The Immigration Judge found Sawyers ineligible for cancellation of removal because he was a few months shy of the seven years of continuous residence required under § 1229b(a)(2). See App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 10–1543, p. 13a. (No one doubted that Sawyers had by that time held LPR status for five years, as required under § 1229b(a)(1).) The Board affirmed, relying on its reasoning in Escobar . See In re Sawyers, No. A44 852 478, 2007 WL 4711443 (BIA, Dec. 26, 2007). Sawyers petitioned the Ninth Circuit for review, arguing that the Board should have counted his mother's years of residency while he was a minor toward § 1229b(a)(2)'s 7–year requirement. As in Gutierrez, the Court of Appeals granted the petition and remanded the case to the BIA. See 399 Fed.Appx. 313 (2010).

We granted the Government's petitions for certiorari, 564 U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 71, 180 L.Ed.2d 939 (2011),...