Missouri v. Frye
| Citation | 182 L.Ed.2d 379,566 U.S. 134,132 S.Ct. 1399 |
| Decision Date | 21 March 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 10–444.,10–444. |
| Parties | MISSOURI, Petitioner v. Galin E. FRYE. |
| Court | United States Supreme Court |
566 U.S. 134
132 S.Ct. 1399
182 L.Ed.2d 379
MISSOURI, Petitioner
v.
Galin E. FRYE.
No. 10–444.
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued Oct. 31, 2011.
Decided March 21, 2012.
Chris Koster, Atty. Gen., State of Missouri, Jefferson City, MO, argued (James R. Layton, State Solicitor Gen., Shaun J. Mackelprang, Asst. Atty.
Gen., on the brief), for petitioner.
Anthony A. Yang, Asst. to the U.S. Solicitor Gen., Washington, D.C., argued (Neal Kumar Katyal, Acting Solicitor Gen., Lanny A. Breuer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Michael R. Dreeben, Dep. Solicitor Gen., Deborah Watson, Atty., Dept. of Justice, on the brief), for United States as amicus curiae supporting petitioner.
Emmett D. Queener, Asst. Public Defender, State of Missouri, Columbia, MO, argued (Craig A. Johnston, Asst. Public Defender, on the brief), for respondent.
Justice KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Sixth Amendment, applicable to the States by the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that the accused shall have the assistance of counsel in all criminal prosecutions. The right to counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). This case arises in the context of claimed ineffective assistance that led to the lapse of a prosecution offer of a plea bargain, a proposal that offered terms more lenient than the terms of the guilty plea entered later. The initial question is whether the constitutional right to counsel extends to the negotiation and consideration of plea offers that lapse or are rejected. If there is a right to effective assistance with respect to those offers, a further question is what a defendant must demonstrate in order to show that prejudice resulted from counsel's deficient performance. Other questions relating to ineffective assistance with respect to plea offers, including the question of proper remedies, are considered in a second case decided today. See Lafler v. Cooper, ––– U.S. ––––, –––– – ––––, 132 S.Ct. 1376, ––– L.Ed.2d ––––.
I
In August 2007, respondent Galin Frye was charged with driving with a revoked license. Frye had been convicted for that offense on three other occasions, so the State of Missouri charged him with a class D felony, which carries a maximum term of imprisonment of four years. See Mo.Rev.Stat. §§ 302.321.2, 558.011.1(4) (2011).
On November 15, the prosecutor sent a letter to Frye's counsel offering a choice of two plea bargains. App. 50. The prosecutor first offered to recommend a 3–year sentence if there was a guilty plea to the felony charge, without a recommendation regarding probation but with a recommendation that Frye serve 10 days in jail as so-called "shock" time. The second offer was to reduce the charge to a misdemeanor and, if Frye pleaded guilty to it, to recommend a
90–day sentence. The misdemeanor charge of driving with a revoked license carries a maximum term of imprisonment of one year. 311 S.W.3d 350, 360 (Mo.App.2010). The letter stated both offers would expire on December 28. Frye's attorney did not advise Frye that the offers had been made. The offers expired. Id., at 356.
Frye's preliminary hearing was scheduled for January 4, 2008. On December 30, 2007, less than a week before the hearing, Frye was again arrested for driving with a revoked license. App. 47–48, 311 S.W.3d, at 352–353. At the January 4 hearing, Frye waived his right to a preliminary hearing on the charge arising from the August 2007 arrest. He pleaded not guilty at a subsequent arraignment but then changed his plea to guilty. There was no underlying plea agreement. App. 5, 13, 16. The state trial court accepted Frye's guilty plea. Id., at 21. The prosecutor recommended a 3–year sentence, made no recommendation regarding probation, and requested 10 days shock time in jail. Id., at 22. The trial judge sentenced
Frye to three years in prison. Id., at 21, 23.
Frye filed for postconviction relief in state court. Id., at 8, 25–29. He alleged his counsel's failure to inform him of the prosecution's plea offer denied him the effective assistance of counsel. At an evidentiary hearing, Frye testified he would have entered a guilty plea to the misdemeanor had he known about the offer. Id., at 34.
A state court denied the postconviction motion, id., at 52–57, but the Missouri Court of Appeals reversed, 311 S.W.3d 350. It determined that Frye met both of the requirements for showing a Sixth Amendment violation under Strickland . First, the court determined Frye's counsel's performance was deficient because the "record is void of any evidence of any effort by trial counsel to communicate the Offer to Frye during the Offer window." 311 S.W.3d, at 355, 356 (emphasis deleted). The court next concluded Frye had shown his counsel's deficient performance caused him prejudice because
"Frye pled guilty to a felony instead of a misdemeanor and was subject to a maximum sentence of four years instead of one year." Id., at 360.
To implement a remedy for the violation, the court deemed Frye's guilty plea withdrawn and remanded to allow Frye either to insist on a trial or to plead guilty to any offense the prosecutor deemed it appropriate to charge. This Court granted certiorari. 562 U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 856, 178 L.Ed.2d 622 (2011).
II
A
It is well settled that the right to the effective assistance of counsel applies to certain steps before trial. The "Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to have counsel present at all ‘critical’ stages of the criminal proceedings." Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 786, 129 S.Ct. 2079, 173 L.Ed.2d 955 (2009) (quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227–228, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967) ). Critical stages include arraignments, postindictment interrogations, postindictment lineups, and the entry of a guilty plea. See Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 82 S.Ct. 157, 7 L.Ed.2d 114 (1961) (arraignment); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964) (postindictment interrogation); Wade, supra (postindictment lineup); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972) (guilty plea).
With respect to the right to effective counsel in plea negotiations, a proper beginning point is to discuss two cases from this Court considering the role of counsel in advising a client about a plea offer and an ensuing guilty plea: Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985) ; and Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. ––––, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010).
Hill established that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in the plea bargain context are governed by the two-part test set forth in Strickland . See Hill, supra, at 57, 106 S.Ct. 366. As noted above, in Frye's case, the Missouri Court of Appeals, applying the two part test of Strickland, determined first that defense counsel had been ineffective and second that there was resulting prejudice.
In Hill, the decision turned on the second part of the Strickland test. There, a defendant who had entered a guilty plea claimed his counsel had misinformed him of the amount of time he would have to serve before he became eligible for parole. But the defendant had not alleged that, even if adequate advice and assistance had
been given, he would have elected to plead not guilty and proceed to trial. Thus, the Court found that no prejudice from the inadequate advice had been shown or alleged. Hill, supra, at 60, 106 S.Ct. 366.
In Padilla, the Court again discussed the duties of counsel in advising a client with respect to a plea offer that leads to a guilty plea. Padilla held that a guilty plea, based on a plea offer, should be set aside because counsel misinformed the defendant of the immigration consequences of the conviction. The Court made clear that "the negotiation of a plea bargain is a critical phase of litigation for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel." 559 U.S., at ––––, 130 S.Ct., at 1486. It also rejected the argument made by petitioner in this case that a knowing and voluntary plea supersedes errors by defense counsel. Cf. Brief for Respondent in Padilla v. Kentucky, O.T. 2009, No. 08–651, p. 27 (arguing Sixth Amendment's assurance of effective assistance "does not extend to collateral aspects of the prosecution" because "knowledge of the consequences that are collateral to the guilty plea is not a prerequisite to the entry of a knowing and intelligent plea").
In the case now before the Court the State, as petitioner, points out that the legal question presented is different from that in Hill and Padilla . In those cases the claim was that the prisoner's plea of guilty was invalid because counsel had provided incorrect advice pertinent to the plea. In the instant case, by contrast, the guilty plea that was accepted, and the plea proceedings...
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