565 U.S. 625 (2012), 10-879, Kurns v. Railroad Friction Products Corp.
|Citation:||565 U.S. 625, 132 S.Ct. 1261, 182 L.Ed.2d 116, 80 U.S.L.W. 4191, 23 Fla.L.Weekly Fed. S 157|
|Opinion Judge:||THOMAS, Justice.|
|Party Name:||GLORIA GAIL KURNS, executrix of the ESTATE OF GEORGE M. CORSON, DECEASED, et al., Petitioners v. RAILROAD FRICTION PRODUCTS CORPORATION et al|
|Attorney:||David C. Frederick argued the cause for petitioners. Sarah E. Harrington argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court. Jonathan D. Hacker argued the cause for respondents.|
|Judge Panel:||Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Alito, and Kagan, JJ., joined. Kagan, J., filed a concurring opinion. Sotomayor, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., joined. Justice Kagan, ...|
|Case Date:||February 29, 2012|
|Court:||United States Supreme Court|
George Corson and his wife sued respondents, claiming injury from Corson's exposure to asbestos in locomotives and locomotive parts distributed by respondents. The Corsons alleged state-law claims of defective design and failure to warn of the dangers posed by asbestos. After Corson died, his wife was substituted as a party. Respondents removed the case to the Federal District Court, which... (see full summary)
Argued November 9, 2011.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT.
[182 L.Ed.2d 120] [132 S.Ct. 1262] George Corson worked as a welder and machinist for a railroad carrier. After retirement, Corson was diagnosed with mesothehoma. He and his wife, a petitioner here, sued respondents Railroad Friction Products Corporation and Viad Corp in state court, claiming injury from Corson's exposure to asbestos in locomotives and locomotive parts distributed by respondents. The Corsons alleged state-law claims of defective design and failure to warn of the dangers posed by asbestos. After Corson died, petitioner Kurns, executrix of his estate, was substituted as a party. Respondents removed the case to the Federal District Court, which granted them summary judgment, ruling that the state-law claims were pre-empted by the Locomotive Inspection Act (LIA), 49 U.S.C. § 20701 et seq. The Third Circuit affirmed.
Held: Petitioners' state-law design-defect and failure-to-warn claims fall within the field of locomotive equipment regulation pre-empted by the LIA, as that field was defined in Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 272 U.S. 605, 47 S.Ct. 207, 71 L.Ed. 432. Pp. ___ - ___, 182 L.Ed.2d, at 122-127.
(a) The LIA provides that a railroad carrier may use or allow to be used a locomotive or tender on its railroad line only when the locomotive or tender and its parts or appurtenances are in proper condition and safe to operate without unnecessary danger of personal injury, have been inspected as required by the LIA and regulations prescribed thereunder by the Secretary of Transportation, and can withstand every test prescribed under the LIA by the Secretary. See § 20701. Pp. ___ - ___, 182 L.Ed.2d, at 122-123.
[132 S.Ct. 1263] (b) Congress may expressly pre-empt state law. But even without an express pre-emption provision, state law must yield to a congressional Act to the extent of any conflict with a federal statute, see Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372, [182 L.Ed.2d 121] 120 S.Ct. 2288, 147 L.Ed.2d 352, or when the federal statute's scope indicates that Congress intended federal law to occupy a field exclusively, see Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287, 115 S.Ct. 1483, 131 L.Ed.2d 385. This case involves only the latter, so-called field pre-emption. Pp. ___ - ___, 182 L.Ed.2d, at 123.
(c) In Napier, this Court held two state laws prescribing the use of locomotive equipment pre-empted by the LIA, concluding that the broad
power conferred by the LIA on the Interstate Commerce Commission (the agency then vested with authority to carry out the LIA's requirements) was a " general one" that " extends to the design, the construction and the material of every part of the locomotive and tender and of all appurtenances." 272 U.S., at 611, 47 S.Ct. 207, 71 L.Ed. 432. The Court rejected the States' contention that the scope of the preempted field was to " be determined by the object sought through the legislation, rather than the physical elements affected by it," id., at 612, 47 S.Ct. 207, 71 L.Ed. 432, and found it dispositive that " [t]he federal and the state statutes are directed to the same subject the equipment of locomotives" ibid. Pp. ___ - ___, 182 L.Ed.2d, at 123-124.
(d) The Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (FRSA) did not alter the LIA's pre-emptive scope. By its terms, the FRSA--which instructs that " [t]he Secretary of Transportation . . . shall prescribe regulations and issue orders for every area of railroad safety supplementing laws and regulations in effect on October 16, 1970," 49 U.S.C. § 20103(a)-does not alter pre-existing federal railroad safety statutes. Rather, it leaves those statutes intact and authorizes the Secretary to fill interstitial areas of railroad safety with supplemental regulation. Because the LIA was already in effect when the FRSA was enacted, the FRSA left the LIA, and its pre-emptive scope as defined by Napier, intact. P. ___, 182 L.Ed.2d, at 124.
(e) Petitioners do not argue that Napier should be overruled. Instead, petitioners contend that their claims fall outside the LIA's pre-empted field, as it was defined in Napier. Petitioners' arguments are unpersuasive. First, the argument that the pre-empted field does not extend to state-law claims arising from the repair or maintenance of locomotives is inconsistent with Napier 's holding that Congress, in enacting the LIA, " manifest[ed] the intention to occupy the entire field of regulating locomotive equipment." 272 U.S., at 611, 47 S.Ct. 207, 71 L.Ed. 432. Second, the argument that petitioners' failure-to-warn claims are not pre-empted because they do not base liability on the design or manufacture of a product ignores that a failure-to-warn claim alleges that the product itself is defective unless accompanied by sufficient warnings or instructions. Because petitioners' failure-to-warn claims are therefore directed at the equipment of locomotives, they fall within the pre-empted field defined by Napier. Third, the argument that petitioners' claims are not pre-empted because manufacturers were not regulated under the LIA when Corson was exposed to asbestos is inconsistent with Napier, which defined the pre-empted field on the basis of the physical elements regulated, not on the basis of the entity directly subject to regulation. Finally, contrary to petitioners' argument, the LIA's pre-emptive
scope is not limited to state legislation or regulation but extends to state [182 L.Ed.2d 122] common-law duties and standards of care directed to [132 S.Ct. 1264] the subject of locomotive equipment. Pp. ___ - ___, 182 L.Ed.2d, at 125-128.
620 F.3d 392, affirmed.
David C. Frederick argued the cause for petitioners.
Sarah E. Harrington argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court.
Jonathan D. Hacker argued the cause for respondents.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Alito, and Kagan, JJ., joined. Kagan, J., filed a concurring opinion. Sotomayor, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., joined.
This case requires us to determine whether petitioners' state-law tort claims for defective design and failure to warn are pre-empted by the Locomotive Inspection Act (LIA), 49 U.S.C. § 20701 et seq. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit determined that petitioners' claims fall within the field pre-empted by that Act, as that field was defined by this Court's decision in Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 272 U.S. 605, 47 S.Ct. 207, 71 L.Ed. 432 (1926). We agree.
George Corson was employed as a welder and machinist by the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad from 1947 until 1974. Corson worked in locomotive repair and maintenance facilities, where his duties included installing brakeshoes on locomotives and stripping insulation from locomotive boilers. In 2005, Corson was diagnosed with malignant mesothelioma.
In 2007, Corson and his wife filed suit in Pennsylvania state court against 59 defendants, including respondents Railroad Friction Products Corporation (RFPC) and Viad Corp (Viad). According to the complaint, RFPC distributed locomotive brakeshoes containing asbestos, and Viad was the successor-in-interest to a company that manufactured and sold locomotives and locomotive engine valves containing asbestos. Corson alleged that he handled this equipment and that he was injured by exposure to asbestos. The complaint
asserted state-law claims that the equipment was defectively designed because it contained asbestos, and that respondents failed to warn of the dangers of asbestos or to provide instructions regarding its safe use. After the complaint was filed, Corson passed away, and the executrix of [132 S.Ct. 1265] his estate, Gloria Kurns, was substituted as a party. Corson's widow and the executrix are petitioners here.
Respondents removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and moved for summary judgment. Respondents argued that petitioners' state-law claims were pre-empted by the LIA. The District Court agreed and granted summary judgment for respondents. See Kurns v. A. W. Chesterton, Civ. Action No. 08-2216, (ED Pa., Feb. 3, 2009), App. to Pet. for Cert. 39a. The Third Circuit affirmed. See Kurns v. A.W. Chesterton...
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