Elgin v. Dep't of the Treasury

• Decision Date: 11 June 2012
• Docket Number: No. 11–45.,11–45.
• Citation: 183 L.Ed.2d 1,132 S.Ct. 2126,567 U.S. 1
• Parties: Michael B. ELGIN, et al., Petitioners v. DEPARTMENT OF the TREASURY et al.
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

567 U.S. 1

132 S.Ct. 2126

183 L.Ed.2d 1

Michael B. ELGIN, et al., Petitioners

v.DEPARTMENT OF the TREASURY et al.

No. 11–45.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued Feb. 27, 2012.

Decided June 11, 2012.

Harvey A. Schwartz, Boston, MA, for Petitioners.

Eric J. Feigin, Washington, DC, for Respondents.

Harvey A. Schwartz, Counsel of Record, Rodgers, Powers & Schwartz, LLP, Boston, MA, Leah M. Nicholls, Brian Wolfman, Institute for Public, Representation Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, DC, for Petitioners.

Elaine Kaplan, General Counsel, Kathie Ann Whipple, Deputy General Counsel, Steven E. Abow, Assistant General Counsel, Robin M. Richardson, Robert J. Girouard, Elizabeth Ghauri, Attorneys, Office

of Personnel Management, Washington, DC, Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, Tony West, Assistant Attorney General, Sri Srinivasan, Deputy Solicitor General, Eric J. Feigin, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Marleigh D. Dover, Jeffrey Clair, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondents.

Justice THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

Under the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA), 5 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq., certain federal employees may obtain administrative and judicial review of specified adverse employment actions. The question before us is whether the CSRA provides the exclusive avenue to judicial review when a qualifying employee challenges an adverse employment action by arguing that a federal statute is unconstitutional. We hold that it does.

I

The CSRA "established a comprehensive system for reviewing personnel action taken against federal employees." United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 455, 108 S.Ct. 668, 98 L.Ed.2d 830 (1988). As relevant here, Subchapter II of Chapter 75 governs review of major adverse actions taken against employees "for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service." 5 U.S.C. §§ 7503(a), 7513(a). Employees entitled to review are those in the "competitive service" and "excepted service" who meet certain requirements regarding probationary periods and years of service.¹ § 7511(a)(1). The reviewable agency actions are removal, suspension for more than 14 days, reduction in grade or pay, or furlough for 30 days or less. § 7512.

When an employing agency proposes a covered action against a covered employee, the CSRA gives the employee the right to notice, representation by counsel, an opportunity to respond, and a written, reasoned decision from the agency. § 7513(b). If the agency takes final adverse action against the employee, the CSRA gives the employee the right to a hearing and to be represented by an attorney or other representative before the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). §§ 7513(d), 7701(a)(1)–(2). The MSPB is authorized to order relief to prevailing employees, including reinstatement, backpay, and attorney's fees. §§ 1204(a)(2), 7701(g).

An employee who is dissatisfied with the MSPB's decision is entitled to judicial review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. That court "shall review the record and hold unlawful and set aside any agency action, findings, or conclusions" that are "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law," "obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having been followed," or "unsupported by substantial evidence." § 7703(a)(1), (c). The Federal Circuit has "exclusive jurisdiction" over appeals from a final decision of the MSPB. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9) ; see also 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1) (judicial review of an MSPB decision "shall be" in the Federal Circuit).

II

Petitioners are former federal competitive service employees who failed to comply with the Military Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C.App. § 453. That Act requires male citizens and permanent-resident aliens of the United States between the ages of 18 and 26 to register for the Selective Service. Another federal statute, 5 U.S.C. § 3328 (hereinafter Section 3328 ), bars from employment by an Executive agency anyone who has knowingly and willfully failed to register. Pursuant to Section 3328, petitioners were discharged (or allegedly constructively discharged) by respondents, their employing agencies.

Among petitioners, only Michael Elgin appealed his removal to the MSPB. Elgin argued that Section 3328 is an unconstitutional bill of attainder and unconstitutionally discriminates on the basis of sex when combined with the registration requirement of the Military Selective Service Act. The MSPB referred Elgin's appeal to an administrative law judge (ALJ) for an initial decision.² The ALJ dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that an employee is not entitled to MSPB review of agency action that is based on an absolute statutory bar to employment. App. to Pet. for Cert. 100a–101a. The ALJ also held that Elgin's constitutional claims could not "confer jurisdiction" on the MSPB because it "lacks authority to determine the constitutionality of a statute." Id., at 101a.

Elgin neither petitioned for review by the full MSPB nor appealed to the Federal Circuit. Instead, he joined the other petitioners in filing suit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, raising the same constitutional challenges to Section 3328 and the Military Selective Service Act.App. 4, 26–28, 29. Petitioners sought equitable relief in the form of a declaratory judgment that the challenged statutes are unconstitutional, an injunction prohibiting enforcement of Section 3328, reinstatement to their former positions, backpay, benefits, and attorney's fees. Id., at 29–30.

The District Court rejected respondents' argument that it lacked jurisdiction and denied petitioners' constitutional claims on the merits. See Elgin v. United States, 697 F.Supp.2d 187 (D.Mass.2010). The District Court held that the CSRA did not preclude it from hearing petitioners' claims, because the MSPB had no authority to determine the constitutionality of a federal statute. Id., at 193. Hence, the District Court concluded that it retained jurisdiction under the general grant of federal-question jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 697 F.Supp.2d, at 194.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. See 641 F.3d 6 (2011). The Court of Appeals held that challenges to a removal are not exempted from the CSRA review scheme simply because the employee argues that the statute authorizing the removal is unconstitutional. Id., at 11–12. According to the Court of Appeals, the CSRA provides a forum—the Federal Circuit—that may adjudicate the constitutionality of a federal statute, and petitioners "were obliged to use it." Id., at 12–13.

We granted certiorari to decide whether the CSRA precludes district court jurisdiction over petitioners' claims even though they are constitutional claims for equitable relief. See 565 U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 453, 181 L.Ed.2d 292 (2011). We conclude that it does, and we therefore affirm.

III

We begin with the appropriate standard for determining whether a statutory scheme of administrative and judicial review provides the exclusive means of review for constitutional claims. Petitioners argue that even if they may obtain judicial review of their constitutional claims before the Federal Circuit, they are not precluded from pursuing their claims in federal district court. According to petitioners, the general grant of federal-question jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which gives district courts authority over constitutional claims, remains undisturbed unless Congress explicitly directs otherwise. In support of this argument, petitioners rely on Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603, 108 S.Ct. 2047, 100 L.Ed.2d 632 (1988), which held that "where Congress intends to preclude judicial review of constitutional claims [,] its intent to do so must be clear." The Webster Court noted that this "heightened showing" was required "to avoid the ‘serious constitutional question’ that would arise if a federal statute were construed to deny any judicial forum for a colorable constitutional claim." Ibid. (quoting Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 681, n. 12, 106 S.Ct. 2133, 90 L.Ed.2d 623 (1986) ). Petitioners contend that the CSRA does not meet this standard because it does not expressly bar suits in district court.

Petitioners' argument overlooks a necessary predicate to the application of Webster' s heightened standard: a statute that purports to "deny any judicial forum for a colorable constitutional claim." 486 U.S., at 603, 108 S.Ct. 2047. Webster' s standard does not apply where Congress simply channels judicial review of a constitutional claim to a particular court. We held as much in Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 114 S.Ct. 771, 127 L.Ed.2d 29 (1994). In that case, we considered whether a statutory scheme of administrative review followed by judicial review in a federal appellate court precluded district court jurisdiction over a plaintiff's statutory and constitutional claims. Id., at 206, 114 S.Ct. 771. We noted that the plaintiff's claims could be "meaningfully addressed in the Court of Appeals" and that the case therefore did "not present the ‘serious constitutional question’ that would arise if an agency statute were construed to preclude all judicial review of a constitutional claim." Id., at 215, and n. 20, 114 S.Ct. 771 (quoting Bowen, supra, at 681, n. 12, 106 S.Ct. 2133). Accordingly, we did not require Webster' s"heightened showing," but instead asked only whether Congress' intent to preclude district court jurisdiction was " ‘fairly discernible in the statutory scheme.’ " 510 U.S., at 207, 114 S.Ct. 771 (quoting Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U.S. 340, 351, 104 S.Ct. 2450, 81 L.Ed.2d 270 (1984) ).

Like the statute in Thunder Basin , the CSRA does not foreclose all judicial review of petitioners'...