Dorsey v. United States
| Decision Date | 21 June 2012 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 11–5683,11–5721.,s. 11–5683 |
| Citation | 567 U.S. 260,183 L.Ed.2d 250,132 S.Ct. 2321 |
| Parties | Edward DORSEY, Sr., Petitioner v. UNITED STATES. Corey A. Hill, Petitioner v. United States. |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
567 U.S. 260
132 S.Ct. 2321
183 L.Ed.2d 250
Edward DORSEY, Sr., Petitioner
v.
UNITED STATES.
Corey A. Hill, Petitioner
v.
United States.
Nos. 11–5683
11–5721.
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued April 17, 2012.
Decided June 21, 2012.
Stephen E. Eberhardt, for Petitioners.
Michael R. Dreeben, Washington, DC, for Respondent supporting the Petitioners.
Miguel A. Estrada, Washington, DC, as amicus curiae, appointed by this Court.
Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for the United States.
Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney General, Michael R. Dreeben, Deputy Solicitor General, Mark R. Freeman, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Joshua S. Johnson, Attorney Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for the United States supporting Petitioners.
Jonathan E. Hawley, Chief Federal Public Defender, Daniel T. Hansmeier, Counsel of Record, Staff Attorney, Federal Public Defender's Office, Springfield, IL, for Petitioner.
Mark D. Harris, Richard L. Spinogatti, Anna G. Kaminska, Rebecca L. Berkebile, Proskauer Rose LLP, New York, NY, Douglas A. Berman, Moritz College of Law at the Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, Stephen E. Eberhardt, Counsel of Record, Tinley Park, IL, William H. Theis, Federal Defender Program, Inc., Chicago, IL, for Petitioner.
Justice BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.
Federal statutes impose mandatory minimum prison sentences upon those convicted of federal drug crimes. These statutes
typically base the length of a minimum prison term upon the kind and amount of the drug involved. Until 2010, the relevant statute imposed upon an offender who dealt in powder cocaine the same sentence it imposed upon an offender who dealt in one one-hundredth that amount of crack cocaine. It imposed, for example, the same 5–year minimum
term upon (1) an offender convicted of possessing with intent to distribute 500 grams of powder cocaine as upon (2) an offender convicted of possessing with intent to distribute 5 grams of crack.
In 2010, Congress enacted a new statute reducing the crack-to-powder cocaine disparity from 100–to–1 to 18–to–1. Fair Sentencing Act, 124 Stat. 2372. The new statute took effect on August 3, 2010. The question here is whether the Act's more lenient penalty provisions apply to offenders who committed a crack cocaine crime before August 3, 2010, but were not sentenced until after August 3. We hold that the new, more lenient mandatory minimum provisions do apply to those pre-Act offenders.
I
The underlying question before us is one of congressional intent as revealed in the Fair Sentencing Act's language, structure, and basic objectives. Did Congress intend the Act's more lenient penalties to apply to pre-Act offenders sentenced after the Act took effect?
We recognize that, because of important background principles of interpretation, we must assume that Congress did not intend those penalties to apply unless it clearly indicated to the contrary. See infra, at 2330 – 2332. But we find that clear indication here. We rest our conclusion primarily upon the fact that a contrary determination would seriously undermine basic Federal Sentencing Guidelines objectives such as uniformity and proportionality in sentencing. Indeed, seen from that perspective, a contrary determination would (in respect to relevant groups of drug offenders) produce sentences less uniform and more disproportionate than if Congress had not enacted the Fair Sentencing Act at all. See infra, at 2332 – 2335.
Because our conclusion rests upon an analysis of the Guidelines-based sentencing system Congress has established, we describe that system at the outset and include
an explanation of how the Guidelines interact with federal statutes setting forth specific terms of imprisonment.
A
The Guidelines originate in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 1987. That statute created a federal Sentencing Commission instructed to write guidelines that judges would use to determine sentences imposed upon offenders convicted of committing federal crimes. 28 U.S.C. §§ 991, 994. Congress thereby sought to increase transparency, uniformity, and proportionality in sentencing. United States Sentencing Commission (USSC or Commission), Guidelines Manual § 1A1.3, p. 2 (Nov. 2011) (USSG); see 28 U.S.C. §§ 991(b)(1), 994(f).
The Sentencing Reform Act directed the Commission to create in the Guidelines categories of offense behavior (e.g., " ‘bank robbery/committed with a gun/ $2500 taken’ ") and offender characteristics (e.g., "one prior conviction"). USSG § 1A1.2, at 1; see 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) – (e). A sentencing judge determines a Guidelines range by (1) finding the applicable offense level and offender category and then (2) consulting a table that lists proportionate sentencing ranges (e.g., 18 to 24 months of imprisonment) at the intersections of rows (marking offense levels) and columns
(marking offender categories). USSG ch. 5, pt. A, Sentencing Table, §§ 5E1.2, 7B1.4; see also § 1A1.4(h), at 11. The Guidelines, after telling the judge how to determine the applicable offense level and offender category, instruct the judge to apply the intersection's range in an ordinary case, but they leave the judge free to depart from that range in an unusual case. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) ; USSG §§ 1A1.2, at 1–2, 1A1.4(b), at 6–7. This Court has held that the Guidelines are now advisory. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245, 264, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005) ; see Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 91, 128 S.Ct. 558, 169 L.Ed.2d 481 (2007).
The Guidelines determine most drug-crime offense levels in a special way. They set forth a Drug Quantity Table
(or Table) that lists amounts of various drugs and associates different amounts with different "Base Offense Levels" (to which a judge may add or subtract levels depending upon the " specific" characteristics of the offender's behavior). See USSG § 2D1.1. The Table, for example, associates 400 to 499 grams of powder cocaine with a base offense level of 24, a level that would mean for a first-time offender a prison term of 51 to 63 months. § 2D1.1(c).
In 1986, Congress enacted a more specific, drug-related sentencing statute, the Anti–Drug Abuse Act (1986 Drug Act), 100 Stat. 3207. That statute sets forth mandatory minimum penalties of 5 and 10 years applicable to a drug offender depending primarily upon the kind and amount of drugs involved in the offense. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)–(C) (2006 ed. and Supp. IV). The minimum applicable to an offender convicted of possessing with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of powder cocaine is 5 years, and for 5,000 grams or more of powder the minimum is 10 years. § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii), (B)(ii). The 1986 Drug Act, however, treated crack cocaine crimes as far more serious. It applied its 5–year minimum to an offender convicted of possessing with intent to distribute only 5 grams of crack (as compared to 500 grams of powder) and its 10–year minimum to one convicted of possessing with intent to distribute only 50 grams of crack (as compared to 5,000 grams of powder), thus producing a 100–to–1 crack-to-powder ratio. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), (B)(iii) (2006 ed.).
The 1986 Drug Act, like other federal sentencing statutes, interacts with the Guidelines in an important way. Like other sentencing statutes, it trumps the Guidelines. Thus, ordinarily no matter what the Guidelines provide, a judge cannot sentence an offender to a sentence beyond the maximum contained in the federal statute setting forth the crime of conviction. Similarly, ordinarily no matter what range the Guidelines set forth, a sentencing judge must sentence an offender to at least the minimum prison term set forth in
a statutory mandatory minimum. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(a), (b) (1) ; USSG § 5G1.1 ; Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 289–290, 295, 116 S.Ct. 763, 133 L.Ed.2d 709 (1996).
Not surprisingly, the Sentencing Commission incorporated the 1986 Drug Act's mandatory minimums into the first version of the Guidelines themselves. Kimbrough, supra, at 96–97, 128 S.Ct. 558. It did so by setting a base offense level for a first-time drug offender that corresponded to the lowest Guidelines range above the applicable mandatory minimum. USSC, Report to the Congress: Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System 53–54 (Oct. 2011) (2011 Report). Thus, the first Guidelines Drug Quantity Table associated 500 grams of powder cocaine with an offense level of 26,
which for a first-time offender meant a sentencing range of 63 to 78 months (just above the 5–year minimum), and it associated 5,000 grams of powder cocaine with an offense level of 32,...
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