Ryan v. Gonzales
| Decision Date | 08 January 2013 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 10–930,11–218.,s. 10–930 |
| Parties | Charles L. RYAN, Petitioner v. Ernest Valencia GONZALES. Terry Tibbals, Petitioner v. Sean Carter. |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Thomas C. Horne, Attorney General, Phoenix, AZ, for Petitioner Ryan.
Ann O'Connell, for the United States as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, supporting the Petitioners.
Leticia Marquez, Tucson, AZ, for Respondent Gonzales.
Alexandra T. Schimmer, Columbus, OH, for Petitioner Tibbals.
Scott Michelman, Washington, DC, for Respondent Carter.
Thomas C. Horne, Attorney General, David R. Cole, Solicitor General, Kent E. Cattani, Division Chief Counsel, Jeffrey A. Zick, Section Chief Counsel, John Pressley Todd, Assistant Attorney General, Counsel of Record, Capital Litigation Section, Phoenix, AZ, for Petitioner.
Jeffrey T. Green, Quin M. Sorenson, Stephanie P. Hales, Joshua J. Fougere, Clayton G. Northouse, Sidley Austin LLP, Washington, DC, Jon M. Sands, Federal Public Defender, Dale A. Baich, Leticia Marquez, Counsel of Record, Office of the Federal Public Defender for the District of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, for Respondent.
Michael Dewine, Attorney General of Ohio, Alexandra T. Schimmer, Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, David M. Lieberman, Deputy Solicitor, Holly Leclair Welch, Assistant Attorney General, Columbus, OH, for Petitioner.
Linda Prucha, Rachel Troutman, Office of the Ohio Public Defender, Columbus, OH, Scott Michelman, Counsel of Record, David Muraskin, Scott L. Nelson, Allison M. Zieve, Public Citizen Litigation Group, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
These two cases present the question whether the incompetence of a state prisoner requires suspension of the prisoner's federal habeas corpus proceedings. We hold that neither 18 U.S.C. § 3599 nor 18 U.S.C. § 4241 provides such a right and that the Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and Sixth Circuits both erred in holding that district courts must stay federal habeas proceedings when petitioners are adjudged incompetent.
Ernest Valencia Gonzales was convicted by an Arizona jury of felony murder, armed robbery, aggravated assault, first-degree burglary, and theft. The convictions arose from Gonzales' repeated stabbing of Darrel and Deborah Wagner in front of their 7–year–old son during a burglary of the Wagners' home. Darrel Wagner died from the stabbing, while Deborah Wagner survived but spent five days in intensive care. The trial court sentenced Gonzales to death on the murder charge and to various prison terms for the other crimes.
After exhausting state remedies, Gonzales filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in Federal District Court on November 15, 1999. While the petition was pending, Gonzales' appointed counsel moved to stay the proceedings, contending that Gonzales was no longer capable of rationally communicating with or assisting counsel. He argued that mental incompetence entitled Gonzales to a stay under Ninth Circuit precedent. See Rohan v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 803 (2003). In Rohan, the Ninth Circuit held that the federal statute guaranteeing state capital prisoners a right to counsel in federal habeas proceedings, 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B) (2000 ed.) (now codified as 18 U.S.C. § 3599(a)(2) ), could not "be faithfully enforced unless courts ensure that a petitioner is competent," 334 F.3d, at 813.Rohan thus concluded that "where an incompetent capital habeas petitioner raises claims that could potentially benefit from his ability to communicate rationally, refusing to stay proceedings pending restoration of competence denies him his statutory right to assistance of counsel, whether or not counsel can identify with precision the information sought." Id., at 819.
Applying Rohan, the District Court denied a stay after concluding that the claims properly before it were record based or resolvable as a matter of law and thus would not benefit from Gonzales' input. The court found it unnecessary to determine whether Gonzales was incompetent, though it did find that he possessed "at least a limited capacity for rational communication." Gonzales v. Schriro, 617 F.Supp.2d 849, 863 (D.Ariz.2008).
Gonzales thereafter filed an emergency petition for a writ of mandamus in the Ninth Circuit. While Gonzales' petition was pending, the Ninth Circuit decided Nash v. Ryan, 581 F.3d 1048 (2009), which held that habeas petitioners have a right to competence on appeal, even though appeals are entirely record based. Id., at 1050 ( ). Applying Nash and Rohan, the court granted the writ of mandamus, concluding that even though Gonzales' "exhausted claims are record-based or legal in nature, he is entitled to a stay pending a competency determination" under 18 U.S.C. § 3599. In re Gonzales, 623 F.3d 1242, 1244 (C.A.9 2010).
We granted certiorari to determine whether § 3599 provides a statutory right to competence in federal habeas proceedings. 565 U.S. ––––, ––––, 132 S.Ct. 1738, 182 L.Ed.2d 528 (2012).
Sean Carter was convicted by an Ohio jury of aggravated murder, aggravated robbery, and rape, and sentenced to death for anally raping his adoptive grandmother, Veader Prince, and stabbing her to death. After exhausting his state-court appeals, Carter initiated federal habeas proceedings on March 19, 2002, in the Northern District of Ohio. Carter eventually filed a third amended petition, along with a motion requesting a competency determination and a stay of the proceedings. The District Court granted the motion.
Following several psychiatric evaluations and a competency determination, the District Court found Carter incompetent to assist counsel. Applying the Ninth Circuit's test in Rohan, it determined that Carter's assistance was required to develop four of his exhausted claims. As a result, the court dismissed his habeas petition without prejudice and prospectively tolled the statute of limitations. Carter v. Bradshaw, 583 F.Supp.2d 872, 884 (N.D.Ohio 2008). The State appealed.
The Sixth Circuit acknowledged that "[f]ederal habeas petitioners facing the death penalty for state criminal convictions do not enjoy a constitutional right to competence." Carter v. Bradshaw, 644 F.3d 329, 332 (2011). It nevertheless located a statutory right to competence in § 4241, part, on this Court's decision in Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312, 86 S.Ct. 1505, 16 L.Ed.2d 583 (1966) (per curiam ) (Rees I ).1 644 F.3d, at 332. The Sixth Circuit explained:
"By applying section 4241 to habeas actions, Rees addresses the situation where a habeas petitioner awaiting the death penalty may seek to forego any collateral attacks on his conviction or sentence, and defines a statutory right for the petitioner to be competent enough to (1) understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him, and (2) assist properly in his defense." Id., at 333.
The court concluded that "[a]nytime a capital habeas petitioner affirmatively seeks to forego his habeas petition, whether by action or inaction, ... a district court may employ section 4241." Id., at 334.
The court therefore amended the District Court's judgment and ordered that Carter's petition be stayed indefinitely with respect to any claims that required his assistance. Id., at 336–337. Judge Rogers dissented, arguing that there was no constitutional or statutory basis for the court's decision. Id., at 337–342.
We granted certiorari to determine whether § 4241 provides a statutory right to competence in federal habeas proceedings. 565 U.S. ––––, ––––, 132 S.Ct. 1738, 182 L.Ed.2d 528 (2012).
Both the Ninth and Sixth Circuits have concluded that death row inmates pursuing federal habeas are entitled to a suspension of proceedings when found incompetent. The Ninth Circuit located this right in § 3599, while the Sixth Circuit located it in § 4241. Neither section provides such a right.
Section 3599(a)(2) guarantees federal habeas petitioners on death row the right to federally funded counsel.2 The statute provides that petitioners who are "financially unable to obtain adequate representation ... shall be entitled to the appointment of one or more attorneys." Appointed attorneys are required to have experience in death penalty litigation, §§ 3599(b) – (d), and, once appointed, are directed to "represent the defendant throughout every subsequent stage of available judicial proceedings," § 3599(e). The statute also gives district courts the power to authorize funding for "investigative, expert, or other services" as are "reasonably necessary for the representation of the defendant." § 3599(f). But § 3599 does not direct district courts to stay proceedings when habeas petitioners are found incompetent.3
In addition to lacking any basis in the statutory text, the assertion that the right to counsel implies a right to competence is difficult to square with our constitutional precedents. The right to counsel is located in the Sixth Amendment. ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.") If the right to counsel carried with it an implied right to competence, the right to competence at trial would flow from the Sixth Amendment. But "[w]e have repeatedly and consistently recognized that 'the criminal trial of an incompetent defendant violates due process, ' " not the Sixth Amendment. Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 354, 116 S.Ct. 1373, 134 L.Ed.2d 498 (1996) (quoting Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 453, 112 S.Ct. 2572, 120 L.Ed.2d 353 (1992) ; emphasis added); see also Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975) (...
To continue reading
Request your trial
- Yale New Haven Hosp. v. Becerra
- Ramirez v. Collier
- Minerva Surgical, Inc. v. Hologic, Inc.
- Rehaif v. United States
-
Expanding cause: how federal courts should address severe psychiatric impairments that impact state post-conviction review
...numerous examples of courts remanding for “factual development” and fact-intensive analyses in the equitable-tolling context). 204. 568 U.S. 57, 64 (2013); see also Miller, supra note 90, at 277–78 (explaining that “death row inmates in most states . . . have no right to competency during t......