Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach

Citation568 U.S. 115,133 S.Ct. 735,184 L.Ed.2d 604
Decision Date15 January 2013
Docket NumberNo. 11–626.,11–626.
Parties Fane LOZMAN, Petitioner v. The CITY OF RIVIERA BEACH, FLORIDA.
CourtUnited States Supreme Court

Jeffrey L. Fisher, for Petitioner.

Curtis E. Gannon, for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, supporting the Petitioner.

David C. Frederick, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Pamala A. Ryan, City Attorney, City of Riviera Beach, Riviera Beach, FL, Robert B. Birthisel, Jules V. Massee, Hamilton, Miller & Birthisel, LLP, Tampa, FL, Erin Glenn Busby, Houston, TX, David C. Frederick, Counsel of Record, Joshua D. Branson, Kellogg, Huber, Hansen, Todd, Evans & Figel, P.L.L.C., Washington, DC, Michael F. Sturley, Lynn E. Blais, Austin, TX, for Respondent.

Edward M. Mullins, Annette C. Escobar, Astigarraga Davis Mullins & Grossman, LLP, Miami, FL, Robert Taylor Bowling, Cobb Cole, Daytona Beach, FL, Jeffrey L. Fisher, Counsel of Record, Stanford Law School, Supreme Court Litigation

Clinic, Stanford, CA, Kerri L. Barsh, Greenberg Traurig, Miami, FL, for Petitioner.

Justice BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Rules of Construction Act defines a "vessel" as including "every description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water." 1 U.S.C. § 3. The question before us is whether petitioner's floating home (which is not self-propelled) falls within the terms of that definition.

In answering that question we focus primarily upon the phrase "capable of being used." This term encompasses "practical" possibilities, not "merely ... theoretical" ones. Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., 543 U.S. 481, 496, 125 S.Ct. 1118, 160 L.Ed.2d 932 (2005). We believe that a reasonable observer, looking to the home's physical characteristics and activities, would not consider it to be designed to any practical degree for carrying people or things on water. And we consequently conclude that the floating home is not a "vessel."

I

In 2002 Fane Lozman, petitioner, bought a 60–foot by 12–foot floating home. App. 37, 71. The home consisted of a house-like plywood structure with French doors on three sides. Id., at 38, 44. It contained a sitting room, bedroom, closet, bathroom, and kitchen, along with a stairway leading to a second level with office space. Id., at 45–66. An empty bilge space underneath the main floor kept it afloat. Id., at 38. (See Appendix, infra, for a photograph.) After buying the floating home, Lozman had it towed about 200 miles to North Bay Village, Florida, where he moored it and then twice more had it towed between nearby marinas. In 2006 Lozman had the home towed a further 70 miles to a marina owned by the city of Riviera Beach (City), respondent, where he kept it docked. Brief for Respondent 5.

After various disputes with Lozman and unsuccessful efforts to evict him from the marina, the City brought this federal admiralty lawsuit in rem against the floating home. It sought a maritime lien for dockage fees and damages for trespass. See Federal Maritime Lien Act, 46 U.S.C. § 31342 (authorizing federal maritime lien against vessel to collect debts owed for the provision of "necessaries to a vessel"); 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (civil admiralty jurisdiction). See also Leon v. Galceran, 11 Wall. 185, 20 L.Ed. 74 (1871) ; The Rock Island Bridge, 6 Wall. 213, 215, 18 L.Ed. 753 (1867).

Lozman, acting pro se, asked the District Court to dismiss the suit on the ground that the court lacked admiralty jurisdiction. See 2 Record, Doc. 64. After summary judgment proceedings, the court found that the floating home was a "vessel" and concluded that admiralty jurisdiction was consequently proper. Pet. for Cert. 42a. The judge then conducted a bench trial on the merits and awarded the City $3,039.88 for dockage along with $1 in nominal damages for trespass. Id., at 49a.

On appeal the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Riviera Beach v. That Certain Unnamed Gray, Two–Story Vessel Approximately Fifty–Seven Feet in Length, 649 F.3d 1259 (2011). It agreed with the District Court that the home was a "vessel." In its view, the home was "capable" of movement over water and the owner's subjective intent to remain moored "indefinitely" at a dock could not show the contrary. Id., at 1267–1269.

Lozman sought certiorari. In light of uncertainty among the Circuits about application of the term "capable" we granted his petition. Compare De La Rosa v. St. Charles Gaming Co., 474 F.3d 185, 187 (C.A.5 2006) (structure is not a "vessel" where "physically," but only "theoretical[ly]," "capable of sailing," and owner intends to moor it indefinitely as floating casino), with Board of Comm'rs of Orleans Levee Dist. v. M/V Belle of Orleans, 535 F.3d 1299, 1311–1312 (C.A.11 2008) (structure is a "vessel" where capable of moving over water under tow, "albeit to her detriment," despite intent to moor indefinitely). See also 649 F.3d, at 1267 (rejecting views of Circuits that " 'focus on the intent of the shipowner' ").

II

At the outset we consider one threshold matter. The District Court ordered the floating home sold to satisfy the City's judgment. The City bought the home at public auction and subsequently had it destroyed. And, after the parties filed their merits briefs, we ordered further briefing on the question of mootness in light of the home's destruction. 567 U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 1543, 182 L.Ed.2d 160 (2012). The parties now have pointed out that, prior to the home's sale, the District Court ordered the City to post a $25,000 bond "to secure Mr. Lozman's value in the vessel." 1 Record, Doc. 20, p. 2. The bond ensures that Lozman can obtain monetary relief if he ultimately prevails. We consequently agree with the parties that the case is not moot.

III
A

We focus primarily upon the statutory phrase "capable of being used ... as a means of transportation on water." 1 U.S.C. § 3. The Court of Appeals found that the home was "capable" of transportation because it could float, it could proceed under tow, and its shore connections (power cable, water hose, rope lines) did not "'rende[r]"' it "practically incapable of transportation or movement." 649 F.3d, at 1266 (quoting Belle of Orleans, supra, at 1312, in turn quoting Stewart, 543 U.S., at 494, 125 S.Ct. 1118). At least for argument's sake we agree with the Court of Appeals about the last-mentioned point, namely that Lozman's shore connections did not " 'render' " the home " 'practically incapable of transportation.' " But unlike the Eleventh Circuit, we do not find these considerations (even when combined with the home's other characteristics) sufficient to show that Lozman's home was a "vessel."

The Court of Appeals recognized that it had applied the term "capable" broadly. 649 F.3d, at 1266. Indeed, it pointed with approval to language in an earlier case, Burks v. American River Transp. Co.,

679 F.2d 69 (C.A.5 1982), in which the Fifth Circuit said:

" 'No doubt the three men in a tub would also fit within our definition, and one probably could make a convincing case for Jonah inside the whale.' " 649 F.3d, at 1269 (brackets omitted) (quoting Burks, supra, at 75).

But the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation is too broad. Not every floating structure is a "vessel." To state the obvious, a wooden washtub, a plastic dishpan, a swimming platform on pontoons, a large fishing net, a door taken off its hinges, or Pinocchio (when inside the whale) are not "vessels," even if they are "artificial contrivance[s]" capable of floating, moving under tow, and incidentally carrying even a fair-sized item or two when they do so. Rather, the statute applies to an "artificial contrivance ... capable of being used ... as a means of transportation on water ." 1 U.S.C. § 3 (emphasis added). "[T]ransportation" involves the "conveyance (of things or persons) from one place to another." 18 Oxford English Dictionary 424 (2d ed. 1989) (OED). Accord, N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language 1406 (C. Goodrich & N. Porter eds. 1873) ("[t]he act of transporting, carrying, or conveying from one place to another"). And we must apply this definition in a "practical," not a "theoretical," way. Stewart, supra, at 496, 125 S.Ct. 1118. Consequently, in our view a structure does not fall within the scope of this statutory phrase unless a reasonable observer, looking to the home's physical characteristics and activities, would consider it designed to a practical degree for carrying people or things over water.

B

Though our criterion is general, the facts of this case illustrate more specifically what we have in mind. But for the fact that it floats, nothing about Lozman's home suggests that it was designed to any practical degree to transport persons or things over water. It had no rudder or other steering mechanism. 649 F.3d, at 1269. Its hull was unraked, ibid., and it had a rectangular bottom 10 inches below the water. Brief for Petitioner 27; App. 37. It had no special capacity to generate or store electricity but could obtain that utility only through ongoing connections with the land. Id., at 40. Its small rooms looked like ordinary nonmaritime living quarters. And those inside those rooms looked out upon the world, not through watertight portholes, but through French doors or ordinary windows. Id., at 44–66.

Although lack of self-propulsion is not dispositive, e.g., The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U.S. 17, 31, 24 S.Ct. 8, 48 L.Ed. 73 (1903), it may be a relevant physical characteristic. And Lozman's home differs significantly from an ordinary houseboat in that it has no ability to propel itself. Cf. 33 CFR § 173.3 (2012) ("Houseboat means a motorized vessel ... designed primarily for multi-purpose accommodation spaces with low freeboard and little or no foredeck or cockpit" (emphasis added)). Lozman's home was able to travel over water only by being towed. Prior to its arrest, that home's travel by tow over water took place on only four occasions over a period of...

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