Sebelius v. Cloer
| Decision Date | 20 May 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 12–236.,12–236. |
| Citation | 569 U.S. 369,185 L.Ed.2d 1003,133 S.Ct. 1886 |
| Parties | Kathleen SEBELIUS, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Petitioner v. Melissa CLOER. |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Benjamin J. Horwich, Washington, DC, for Petitioner.
Robert T. Fishman, Denver, CO, for Respondent.
William B. Schultz, Acting General Counsel, David Benor, Associate General Counsel for Public Health, Anna Loraine Jacobs, Attorney, Department of Health and Human Services, Washington, DC, Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Solicitor General, Stuart F. Delery, Principal Deputy, Assistant Attorney General, Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Benjamin J. Horwich, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, Michael S. Raab, Anisha S. Dasgupta, Vincent J. Matanoski, Lynn E. Ricciardella, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Petitioner.
Mari C. Bush, Kaye and Bush, LLC, Denver, CO, Robert T. Moxley, Robert T. Moxley, PC, Cheyenne, WY, Robert T. Fishman, Counsel of Record, Ridley, McGreevy & Winocur, PC, Denver, CO, for Respondent.
*
The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 (NCVIA or Act), 100 Stat. 3756, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa–1 et seq., provides that a court may award attorney's fees and costs "incurred [by a claimant] in any proceeding on" an unsuccessful vaccine-injury "petition filed under section 300aa–11," if that petition "was brought in good faith and there was a reasonable basis for the claim for which the petition was brought." § 300aa–15(e)(1). The Act's limitations provision states that "no petition may be filed for compensation" more than 36 months after the claimant's initial symptoms occur. § 300aa–16(a)(2). The question before us is whether an untimely petition can garner an award of attorney's fees. We agree with a majority of the en banc Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit that it can.
The NCVIA "establishes a no-fault compensation program 'designed to work faster and with greater ease than the civil tort system.' " Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. ––––, ––––, 131 S.Ct. 1068, 1073, 179 L.Ed.2d 1 (2011) (quoting Shalala v. Whitecotton, 514 U.S. 268, 269, 115 S.Ct. 1477, 131 L.Ed.2d 374 (1995) ). Congress enacted the NCVIA to stabilize the vaccine market and expedite compensation to injured parties after complaints mounted regarding the inefficiencies and costs borne by both injured consumers and vaccine manufacturers under the previous civil tort compensation regime. 562 U.S., at –––– – ––––, 131 S.Ct., at 1072–1073; H.R.Rep. No. 99–908, pt. 1, pp. 6–7 (1986) (hereinafter H.R. Rep.).
The compensation program's procedures are straightforward. First, "[a] proceeding for compensation under the Program for a vaccine-related injury or death shall be initiated by service upon the Secretary [for the Department of Health and Human Services] and the filing of a petition containing the matter prescribed by subsection (c) of this section with the United States Court of Federal Claims." 42 U.S.C. § 300aa–11(a)(1). Subsection (c) provides in relevant part that a petition must include "an affidavit, and supporting documentation, demonstrating that the person who suffered such injury" was actually vaccinated and suffered an injury. § 300aa–11(c)(1). Next, upon receipt of an NCVIA petition, "[t]he clerk of the United States Court of Federal Claims shall immediately forward the filed petition to the chief special master for assignment to a special master." § 300aa–11(a)(1). This special master then "makes an informal adjudication of the petition." Bruesewitz, 562 U.S., at ––––, 131 S.Ct., at 1073 (citing § 300aa–12(d)(3) ). A successful claimant may recover medical costs, lost earning capacity, and an award for pain and suffering, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa–15(a), with compensation paid out from a federal trust fund supported by an excise tax levied on each dose of certain covered vaccines, see 26 U.S.C. §§ 4131, 4132, 9510 ; 42 U.S.C. § 300aa–15(f)(4)(A). But under the Act's limitations provision, "no petition may be filed for compensation under the Program for [a vaccine-related] injury after the expiration of 36 months after the date of the occurrence of the first symptom or manifestation of onset or of the significant aggravation of" the alleged injury. § 300aa–16(a)(2).
The Act also includes an unusual scheme for compensating attorneys who work on NCVIA petitions. See § 300aa–15(e).1 "No attorney may charge any fee for services in connection with a petition filed under section 300aa–11 of this title." § 300aa–15(e)(3).2 But a court may award attorney's fees in certain circumstances. In the case of successful petitions, the award of attorney's fees is automatic. § 300aa–15(e)(1) (). For unsuccessful petitions, "the special master or court may award an amount of compensation to cover petitioner's reasonable attorneys' fees and other costs incurred in any proceeding on such petition if the special master or court determines that the petition was brought in good faith and there was a reasonable basis for the claim for which the petition was brought." Ibid. In other words, "[a]ttorney's fees are provided, not only for successful cases, but even for unsuccessful claims that are not frivolous."
Respondent, Dr. Melissa Cloer, received three Hepatitis–B immunizations
from September 1996 to April 1997. Shortly after receiving the third vaccine, Dr. Cloer began to experience numbness and strange sensations in her left forearm and hand. She sought treatment in 1998 and 1999, but the diagnoses she received were inconclusive. By then, Dr. Cloer was experiencing numbness in her face, arms, and legs, and she had difficulty walking. She intermittently suffered these symptoms until 2003, when she began to experience the full manifestations of, and was eventually diagnosed with, multiple sclerosis (MS). In 2004, Dr. Cloer became aware of a link between MS and the Hepatitis–B vaccine, and in September 2005, she filed a claim for compensation under the NCVIA, alleging that the vaccinations she received had caused or exacerbated her MS.
Dr. Cloer's petition was sent by the clerk of the Court of Federal Claims to the Chief Special Master, who went on to adjudicate it. After reviewing the petition and its supporting documentation, the Chief Special Master concluded that Dr. Cloer's claim was untimely because the Act's 36–month limitations period began to run when she first experienced the symptoms of MS in 1997. Cloer v. Secretary of Dept. of Health and Human Servs., No. 05–1002V, 2008 WL 2275574, at *1, *10 (Fed.Cl., May 15, 2008) (opinion of Golkiewicz, Chief Special Master) (citing § 300aa–16(a)(2) (NCVIA's limitations provision )). Relying on Federal Circuit precedent, the Chief Special Master also rejected Dr. Cloer's argument that the NCVIA's limitations period should be subject to equitable tolling. Id., at *9 (citing Brice v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 240 F.3d 1367, 1373 (2001) ). A divided panel of the Federal Circuit reversed the Chief Special Master, concluding that the NCVIA's limitations period did not commence until "the medical community at large objectively recognize[d] a link between the vaccine and the injury." Cloer v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 603 F.3d 1341, 1346 (2010).
The en banc court then reversed the panel's decision, Cloer v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 654 F.3d 1322 (2011), cert. denied, 566 U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 1908, 182 L.Ed.2d 807 (2012), and held that the statute's limitations period begins to run on "the calendar date of the occurrence of the first medically recognized symptom or manifestation of onset of the injury claimed by the petitioner." 654 F.3d, at 1324–1325. The Court of Appeals also held that the Act's limitations provision was nonjurisdictional and subject to equitable tolling in limited circumstances, overruling its prior holding in Brice . 654 F.3d, at 1341–1344. The court concluded, however, that Dr. Cloer was ineligible for tolling and that her petition was untimely. Id., at 1344–1345.
Following this decision, Dr. Cloer moved for an award of attorney's fees. The en banc Federal Circuit agreed with her that a person who files an untimely NCVIA petition "assert[ing] a reasonable limitations argument" may recover fees and costs so long as " 'the petition was brought in good faith and there was a reasonable basis for the claim for which the petition was brought.' " 675 F.3d 1358, 1359–1361 (2012) (quoting § 300aa–15(e)(1) ). Six judges disagreed with this conclusion and instead read the NCVIA to bar such awards for untimely petitions. Id., at 1364–1368 (Bryson, J., dissenting). We granted the Government's petition for writ of certiorari. 568 U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 638, 184 L.Ed.2d 452 (2012). We now affirm.
As in any statutory construction case, "[w]e start, of course, with the statutory text," and proceed from the understanding that " [u]nless otherwise defined, statutory terms are generally interpreted in accordance with their ordinary meaning." BP America Production Co. v. Burton, 549 U.S. 84, 91, 127 S.Ct. 638, 166 L.Ed.2d 494 (2006). The Act's fees provision ties eligibility for attorney's fees broadly to "any proceeding on such petition," referring specifically to "a petition filed under section 300aa–11." 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa–15(e)(1), (3). Section 300aa–11 provides that "[a] proceeding for compensation" is "initiated" by "service upon the Secretary" and "the filing of a petition containing" certain documentation with the clerk of the Court of Federal Claims who then "immediately forward[s] the filed petition" for assignment to a special master. § 300aa–11(a)(1). See supra, at 2.
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