Dan's City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey

Decision Date13 May 2013
Docket NumberNo. 12–52.,12–52.
Citation133 S.Ct. 1769,569 U.S. 251,185 L.Ed.2d 909
Parties DAN'S CITY USED CARS, INC., dba Dan's City Auto Body, Petitioner v. Robert PELKEY.
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

Andre D. Bouffard, Burlington, VT, for Petitioner.

Brian C. Shaughnessy, Manchester, NH, for Respondent.

Lewis S. Yelin, for the United States as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, supporting the Respondent.

Andre D. Bouffard, Downs Rachlin Martin PLLC, Counsel of Record, Burlington, VT, Katherine M. Strickland, Downs Rachlin Martin PLLC, Lebanon, NH, for Petitioner.

Brian C. Shaughnessy, Kazan, Shaughnessy, Kasten & McDonald, PLLC, Counsel of Record, Manchester, NH, Adina H. Rosenbaum, Allison M. Zieve, Scott L. Nelson, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Justice GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case concerns the preemptive scope of a provision of the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA or Act) applicable to motor carriers. Codified at 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1), the provision reads:

"[A] State ... may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier ... with respect to the transportation of property."

Plaintiff-respondent Robert Pelkey brought suit under New Hampshire law against defendant-petitioner Dan's City Used Cars (Dan's City), a towing company. Pelkey alleged that Dan's City took custody of his car after towing it without Pelkey's knowledge, failed to notify him of its plan to auction the car, held an auction despite Pelkey's communication that he wanted to arrange for the car's return, and eventually traded the car away without compensating Pelkey for the loss of his vehicle.

Disposal of abandoned vehicles by a "storage company" is regulated by chapter 262 of the New Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated. See N.H.Rev.Stat. Ann. §§ 262:31 to 262:40–c (West 2004 and 2012 West Cum.Supp.). Dan's City relied on those laws to dispose of Pelkey's vehicle for nonpayment of towing and storage fees. According to Pelkey, however, Dan's City failed to comply with New Hampshire's provisions governing the sale of stored vehicles and the application of sale proceeds. Pelkey charged that Dan's City's disposal of his car without following the requirements contained in chapter 262 violated the New Hampshire Consumer Protection Act, § 358–A:2 (West 2009), as well as Dan's City's statutory and common-law duties as bailee to exercise reasonable care while in possession of a bailor's property.

We hold, in accord with the New Hampshire Supreme Court, that state-law claims stemming from the storage and disposal of a car, once towing has ended, are not sufficiently connected to a motor carrier's service with respect to the transportation of property to warrant preemption under § 14501(c)(1). The New Hampshire law in point regulates no towing services, no carriage of property. Instead, it trains on custodians of stored vehicles seeking to sell them. Congress did not displace the State's regulation of that activity by any federal prescription.

I
A

The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978(ADA), 92 Stat. 1705, largely deregulated the domestic airline industry. In keeping with the statute's aim to achieve "maximum reliance on competitive market forces," id., at 1706, Congress sought to "ensure that the States would not undo federal deregulation with regulation of their own." Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378, 112 S.Ct. 2031, 119 L.Ed.2d 157 (1992). Congress therefore included a preemption provision, now codified at 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1), prohibiting States from enacting or enforcing any law " related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier."

Two years later, the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, 94 Stat. 793, extended deregulation to the trucking industry. Congress completed the deregulation 14 years thereafter, in 1994, by expressly preempting state trucking regulation. Congress did so upon finding that state governance of intrastate transportation of property had become "unreasonably burden[some]" to "free trade, interstate commerce, and American consumers." Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Service, Inc., 536 U.S. 424, 440, 122 S.Ct. 2226, 153 L.Ed.2d 430 (2002) (citing FAAAA § 601(a)(1), 108 Stat. 1605). Borrowing from the ADA's preemption clause, but adding a new qualification, § 601(c) of the FAAAA supersedes state laws "related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier ... with respect to the transportation of property ."

108 Stat. 1606, now codified at 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) (emphasis added).1 The Act exempts certain measures from its preemptive scope, including state laws regulating motor vehicle safety, size, and weight; motor carrier insurance; and the intrastate transportation of household goods. § 14501(c)(2)(A)(B). Also exempted from preemption are state laws "relating to the price" of "vehicle transportation by a tow truck," if towing occurs without prior consent of the vehicle owner. § 14501(c)(2)(C).

This case involves the interaction between the FAAAA's preemption clause and the State of New Hampshire's regulation of the removal, storage, and disposal of abandoned motor vehicles. Chapter 262 of the New Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated establishes procedures by which an "authorized official" or the "owner ... of any private property ... on which a vehicle is parked without permission" may arrange to have the vehicle towed and stored. N.H.Rev.Stat. Ann. §§ 262:31 to 262:34, 262:40–a(I). It generally makes the owner of a towed vehicle responsible for reasonable removal and storage fees. See § 262:33(I) (reasonable removal and storage charges " shall be a lien against the vehicle which shall be paid by the owner"); § 262:33(II) (owner entitled to recover vehicle after "payment of all reasonable towing and storage charges"); § 262:40–a(II) (owner of a vehicle towed from a parking lot or parking garage is responsible for "removal and storage charges" when the lot or garage conspicuously posts notice of parking restrictions).

Under chapter 262, the custodian of a car that remains unclaimed for 30 days following a tow may dispose of the vehicle upon compliance with notice requirements. § 262:36–a(I), (II). A "garage owner or keeper" must post notices of an impending sale in public places and provide mail notice to the vehicle owner whenever the owner's address may "be ascertained ... by the exercise of reasonable diligence." § 262:38. If a towed vehicle is not fit for legal use, its custodian need not provide individual or public notice prior to disposal, and sale of the vehicle may occur upon written notice to and approval from New Hampshire's Department of Public Safety. § 262:36–a(III).2

On compliance with the statutory requirements, the custodian of a stored vehicle may sell the vehicle by public auction at its place of business. § 262:37. The storage company may use the sale proceeds to pay "the amount of the liens and the reasonable expenses incident to the sale." § 262:39 (West 2004). Remaining proceeds are payable "to the [vehicle's] owner ... if claimed at any time within one year from the date of sale." Ibid.

B

The landlord of the apartment complex in which Pelkey lived required tenants to remove their cars from the parking lot in the event of a snowstorm, so that the snow could be cleared. Pelkey's 2004 Honda Civic remained in the lot during and after a February 2007 snowstorm. At the landlord's request, Dan's City towed and stored the vehicle. Confined to his bed with a serious medical condition, Pelkey did not know his car had been towed. Soon after removal of his car, Pelkey was admitted to the hospital for a procedure to amputate his left foot, during which he suffered a heart attack

. He remained under hospital care until his discharge on April 9, 2007.

Unaware of Pelkey's identity or illness, Dan's City sought permission from New Hampshire's Department of Public Safety to sell the Honda at auction without notice. In response, the department identified Pelkey as the last known owner of the vehicle. Dan's City wrote to Pelkey, notifying him that it had towed and was storing his car. When the post office returned the letter, checking the box "moved, left no address," Dan's City scheduled an auction for April 19. Meanwhile, in the days following Pelkey's discharge from the hospital, his attorney learned from counsel for the apartment complex that the car had been towed by Dan's City and was scheduled to be sold at public auction. On April 17, Pelkey's attorney informed Dan's City that Pelkey wanted to pay any charges owed and reclaim his vehicle. Dan's City nevertheless proceeded with the auction. Attracting no bidders, Dan's City later disposed of the car by trading it to a third party. Pelkey was not notified in advance of the trade, and has received no proceeds from the sale.

Pelkey brought suit against Dan's City in New Hampshire Superior Court. He alleged that Dan's City violated the New Hampshire Consumer Protection Act, N.H.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 358–A:2, by failing to comply with chapter 262's requirements for disposal of stored vehicles, making false statements about the condition and value of his Honda, and proceeding with the auction despite notice that Pelkey wanted to reclaim the car.3 He also alleged that Dan's City negligently breached both statutory and common-law duties as a bailee to use reasonable care in disposing of the car. Granting summary judgment to Dan's City, the New Hampshire Superior Court concluded that Pelkey's claims were preempted by the FAAAA.

The New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed. It held the FAAAA's preemption clause, 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1), inapplicable because Pelkey's claims related to Dan's City's conduct in disposing of his Honda post-storage, not to conduct concerning "the transportation of property." 163 N.H. 483, 490–493, 44 A.3d 480, 487–489 (2012) (emphasis deleted). Alternatively, the...

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