570 U.S. 529 (2013), 12-96, Shelby County v. Holder
|Citation:||570 U.S. 529, 133 S.Ct. 2612, 186 L.Ed.2d 651, 81 U.S.L.W. 4572, 24 Fla.L.Weekly Fed. S 407|
|Opinion Judge:||ROBERTS, Chief Justice.|
|Party Name:||SHELBY COUNTY, ALABAMA, Petitioner v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, et al.|
|Attorney:||Bert W. Rein, for Petitioner. Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Solicitor General, for Federal Respondent. Debo P. Adegbile, for Respondents Bobby Pierson, et al. Frank C. Ellis, Jr., Wallace, Ellis, Fowler, Head & Justice, Columbiana, AL, Bert W. Rein, William S. Consovoy, Thomas R. McCarthy, Brendan J. ...|
|Judge Panel:||ROBERTS, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which SCALIA, KENNEDY, THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a concurring opinion. GINSBURG, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. Williams, Judge dissented. THOMAS, Justice concurring....|
|Case Date:||June 25, 2013|
|Court:||United States Supreme Court|
Argued February 27, 2013
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
[133 S.Ct. 2615] Syllabus [*]
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was enacted to address entrenched racial discrimination in voting, "an insidious and pervasive evil which had been perpetuated in certain parts of our country through unremitting and ingenious defiance of the Constitution." South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309, 86 S.Ct. 803, 15 L.Ed.2d 769. Section 2 of the Act, which bans any "standard, practice, or procedure" that "results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen ... to vote on account of race or color, " 42 U.S.C. §1973(a), applies nationwide, is permanent, and is not at issue in this case. Other sections apply only to some parts of the country. Section 4 of the Act provides the "coverage formula, " defining the "covered jurisdictions" as States or political subdivisions that maintained tests or devices as prerequisites to voting, and had low voter registration or turnout, in the 1960s and early 1970s. §1973b(b). In those covered jurisdictions, §5 of the Act provides that no change in voting procedures can take effect until approved by specified federal authorities in Washington, D. C. §1973c(a). Such approval is known as "preclearance."
The coverage formula and preclearance requirement were initially set to expire after five years, but the Act has been reauthorized several times. In 2006, the Act was reauthorized for an additional 25 years, but the coverage formula was not changed. Coverage still turned on whether a jurisdiction had a voting test in the 1960s or 1970s, and had low voter registration or turnout at that time. Shortly after the 2006 reauthorization, a Texas utility district sought to bail out from the Act's coverage and, in the alternative, challenged the Act's constitutionality. This Court resolved the challenge on statutory grounds, but expressed serious doubts about the Act's continued constitutionality. See Northwest Austin Municipal Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 129 S.Ct. 2504, 174 L.Ed.2d 140.
Petitioner Shelby County, in the covered jurisdiction of Alabama, sued the Attorney General in Federal District Court in Washington, D. C, seeking a declaratory judgment that sections 4(b) and 5 are facially unconstitutional, as well as a permanent injunction against their enforcement. The District Court upheld the Act, finding that the evidence before Congress in 2006 was sufficient to justify reauthorizing §5 and continuing §4(b)'s coverage formula. The D. C. Circuit affirmed. After surveying the evidence in the record, that court accepted Congress's conclusion that §2 litigation remained inadequate in the covered jurisdictions to protect the rights of minority voters, that §5 was therefore still necessary, and that the coverage formula continued to pass constitutional muster.
Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act is unconstitutional; its formula can no longer be used as a basis for subjecting jurisdictions to preclearance. Pp. 2622 -2628.
(a) In Northwest Austin, this Court noted that the Voting Rights Act "imposes current burdens and must be justified by current needs" and concluded that "a [133 S.Ct. 2616] departure from the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty requires a showing that a statute's disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently related to the problem that it targets." 557 U.S., at 203, 129 S.Ct. 2504. These basic principles guide review of the question presented here. Pp. 2622-2627.
(1) State legislation may not contravene federal law. States retain broad autonomy, however, in structuring their governments and pursuing legislative objectives. Indeed, the Tenth Amendment reserves to the States all powers not specifically granted to the Federal Government, including "the power to regulate elections." Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461-462, 111 S.Ct. 2895, 115 L.Ed.2d 410. There is also a "fundamental principle of equal sovereignty" among the States, which is highly pertinent in assessing disparate treatment of States. Northwest Austin, supra, at 203, 129 S.Ct. 2504.
The Voting Rights Act sharply departs from these basic principles. It requires States to beseech the Federal Government for permission to implement laws that they would otherwise have the right to enact and execute on their own. And despite the tradition of equal sovereignty, the Act applies to only nine States (and additional counties). That is why, in 1966, this Court described the Act as "stringent" and "potent, " Katzenbach, 383 U.S., at 308, 315, 337, 86 S.Ct. 803. The Court nonetheless upheld the Act, concluding that such an "uncommon exercise of congressional power" could be justified by "exceptional conditions." Id., at 834, 86 S.Ct. 803. Pp. 2622 - 2625.
(2) In 1966, these departures were justified by the "blight of racial discrimination in voting" that had "infected the electoral process in parts of our country for nearly a century, " Katzenbach, 383 U.S., at 308, 86 S.Ct. 803. At the time, the coverage formula—the means of linking the exercise of the unprecedented authority with the problem that warranted it—made sense. The Act was limited to areas where Congress found "evidence of actual voting discrimination, " and the covered jurisdictions shared two characteristics: "the use of tests and devices for voter registration, and a voting rate in the 1964 presidential election at least 12 points below the national average." Id., at 330, 86 S.Ct, 803. The Court explained that "[t]ests and devices are relevant to voting discrimination because of their long history as a tool for perpetrating the evil; a low voting rate is pertinent for the obvious reason that widespread disenfranchisement must inevitably affect the number of actual voters." Ibid. The Court therefore concluded that "the coverage formula [was] rational in both practice and theory." Ibid. Pp. 2624 - 2625.
(3) Nearly 50 years later, things have changed dramatically. Largely because of the Voting Rights Act, "[v]oter turnout and registration rates" in covered jurisdictions "now approach parity. Blatantly discriminatory evasions of federal decrees are rare. And minority candidates hold office at unprecedented levels." Northwest Austin, supra, at 202, 129 S.Ct. 2504. The tests and devices that blocked ballot access have been forbidden nationwide for over 40 years. Yet the Act has not eased §5's restrictions or narrowed the scope of §4's coverage formula along the way. Instead those extraordinary and unprecedented features have been reauthorized as if nothing has changed, and they have grown even stronger. Because §5 applies only to those jurisdictions singled out by §4, the Court turns to consider that provision. Pp. 2625 - 2627.
(b) Section 4's formula is unconstitutional in light of current conditions. Pp. 2627-2631. [133 S.Ct. 2617] (1) In 1966, the coverage formula was "rational in both practice and theory." Katzenbach, supra, at 330, 86 S.Ct. 803. It looked to cause (discriminatory tests) and effect (low voter registration and turnout), and tailored the remedy (preclearance) to those jurisdictions exhibiting both. By 2009, however, the "coverage formula raise[d] serious constitutional questions." Northwest Austin, supra, at 204, 129 S.Ct. 2504. Coverage today is based on decades-old data and eradicated practices. The formula captures States by reference to literacy tests and low voter registration and turnout in the 1960s and early 1970s. But such tests have been banned for over 40 years. And voter registration and turnout numbers in covered States have risen dramatically. In 1965, the States could be divided into those with a recent history of voting tests and low voter registration and turnout and those without those characteristics. Congress based its coverage formula on that distinction. Today the Nation is no longer divided along those lines, yet the Voting Rights Act continues to treat it as if it were. Pp. 2627 - 2628.
(2) The Government attempts to defend the formula on grounds that it is "reverse-engineered"—Congress identified the jurisdictions to be covered and then came up with criteria to describe them. Katzenbach did not sanction such an approach, reasoning instead that the coverage formula was rational because the "formula . . . was relevant to the problem." 383 U.S., at 329, 330, 86 S.Ct. 803. The Government has a fallback argument—because the formula was relevant in 1965, its continued use is permissible so long as any discrimination remains in the States identified in 1965. But this does not look to "current political conditions, " Northwest Austin, supra, at 203, 129 S.Ct. 2504, instead relying on a comparison between the States in 1965. But history did not end in 1965. In assessing the "current need[ ]" for a preclearance system treating States differently from one another today, history since 1965 cannot be ignored. The Fifteenth Amendment is not designed to punish for the past; its purpose is to ensure a better future. To serve that purpose, Congress—if it is to divide the States—must identify those jurisdictions to be singled out on a basis that makes sense in light of current conditions. Pp. 2627-2629.
(3) Respondents also rely heavily on data from the record compiled by Congress before reauthorizing the Act. Regardless of how one looks at that record, no one can fairly say that it shows anything approaching the "pervasive, " "flagrant, " "widespread, " and "rampant" discrimination that clearly distinguished the covered jurisdictions from the rest of the Nation in 1965. Katzenbach,...
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