Miss. ex rel. Hood v. Au Optronics Corp.

• Decision Date: 14 January 2014
• Docket Number: No. 12–1036.,12–1036.
• Citation: 571 U.S. 161,134 S.Ct. 736,187 L.Ed.2d 654
• Parties: MISSISSIPPI ex rel. Jim HOOD, Attorney General, Petitioner v. AU OPTRONICS CORPORATION et al.
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

571 U.S. 161
134 S.Ct. 736
187 L.Ed.2d 654

MISSISSIPPI ex rel. Jim HOOD, Attorney General, Petitioner
v.
AU OPTRONICS CORPORATION et al.

No. 12–1036.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued Nov. 6, 2013.
Decided Jan. 14, 2014.

Jonathan S. Massey, Washington, DC, for Petitioner.

Christopher M. Curran, Washington, DC, for Respondents.

Jonathan Massey, Massey & Gail LLP, Counsel of Record, Washington, DC, Jim Hood, Attorney General for the State of Mississippi, Geoffrey Morgan, George W. Neville, Office of the Mississippi, Attorney General, Jackson, MS, A. Lee Abraham, Jr., Preston Rideout, Abraham & Rideout, Greenwood, MS, Carolyn G. Anderson, David M. Cialkowski, Patricia A. Bloodgood, June P. Hoidal, Zimmerman Reed PLLP, Minneapolis, MN, for Petitioner.

Martin M. Toto, John H. Chung, Ross E. Elfand, White & Case LLP, New York, NY, Christopher M. Curran, Counsel of Record, Eric Grannon, Kristen J. McAhren, White & Case LLP, Washington, DC, for the Toshiba Respondents, Toshiba Corporation, Toshiba America Information Systems, Inc., Toshiba America Electronic Components, Inc., and Toshiba Mobile Display Co., Ltd.

Charles E. Ross, Michael B. Wallace, Rebecca Hawkins, Wise Carter Child & Caraway, P.A., Jackson, MS, Additional Counsel for the Toshiba Respondents.

134 S.Ct. 739

Christopher A. Nedeau, Carl L. Blumenstein, Nossaman, LLP, San Francisco, CA, James W. Shelson, Phelps Dunbar LLP, Jackson, MS, for Respondents AU Optronics Corporation and AU Optronics Corporation America.

Robert E. Freitas, Jason S. Angell, Jessica N. Leal, Freitas Tseng & Kaufman LLP, Redwood Shores, CA, for Respondent HannStar Display Corporation.

Christopher B. Hockett, Neal A. Potischman, Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, Menlo Park, CA, Stephen L. Thomas, Bradley Arant Boult, Cummings LLP, Jackson, MS, for Respondents Chi Mei Corporation, Chimei Innolux Corporation, Chi Mei Optoelectronics USA, Inc., and CMO Japan Co., Ltd.

Stephen B. Kinnaird, Kevin C. McCann, Lee F. Berger, Sean D. Unger, Paul Hastings LLP, Washington, DC, Robert A. Miller, P. Ryan Beckett, Butler, Snow, O'Mara, Stevens and Cannada, PLLC, Ridgeland, MS, Henry L. Parr, Jr., Wyche, P.A., Greenville, SC, for Respondents LG Display Co., Ltd. and LG Display America, Inc.

Robert A. Long, Robert D. Wick, Covington & Burling LLP, Washington, DC, for Respondents Samsung Electronics America, Inc., Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., and Samsung Semiconductor, Inc.

John M. Grenfell, Jacob R. Sorensen, Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Respondents Sharp Corporation and Sharp Electronics Corporation.

Justice SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

571 U.S. 164

Under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA or Act), defendants in civil suits may remove "mass actions" from state to federal court. CAFA defines a "mass action" as "any civil action ... in which monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs' claims involve common questions of law or fact." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i). The question presented is whether a suit filed by a State as the sole plaintiff constitutes a "mass action" under CAFA where it includes a claim for restitution based on injuries suffered by the State's citizens. We hold that it does not. According to CAFA's plain text, a "mass action" must involve monetary claims brought by 100 or more persons who propose to try those claims jointly as named plaintiffs. Because the State of Mississippi is the only named plaintiff in the instant action, the case must be remanded to state court.

I

571 U.S. 165

A

Congress enacted CAFA in order to "amend the procedures that apply to consideration of interstate class actions." 119 Stat. 4. In doing so, Congress recognized that "[c]lass action lawsuits are an important and valuable part of the legal system." CAFA § 2. It was concerned, however, that certain requirements of federal diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, had functioned to "kee[p] cases of national importance" in state courts rather than federal courts. CAFA § 2.

CAFA accordingly loosened the requirements for diversity jurisdiction for two types of cases—"class actions" and "mass actions." The Act defines "class action" to mean "any civil action filed under

134 S.Ct. 740

rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or similar State statute or rule of judicial procedure." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(B). And it defines "mass action" to mean "any civil action ... in which monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs' claims involve common questions of law or fact." § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i).

For class and mass actions, CAFA expanded diversity jurisdiction in two key ways. First, it replaced the ordinary requirement of complete diversity of citizenship among all plaintiffs and defendants, see State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530–531, 87 S.Ct. 1199, 18 L.Ed.2d 270 (1967), with a requirement of minimal diversity. Under that requirement, a federal court may exercise jurisdiction over a class action if "any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any defendant." § 1332(d)(2)(A). The same rule applies to mass actions. See § 1332(d)(11)(A) ("[A] mass action shall be deemed ... removable under [ §§ 1332(d)(2) through (d)(10) ]"). Second, whereas § 1332(a) ordinarily requires each plaintiff's claim to exceed the sum or value of $75,000, see

571 U.S. 166

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 554–555, 125 S.Ct. 2611, 162 L.Ed.2d 502 (2005), CAFA grants federal jurisdiction over class and mass actions in which the aggregate amount in controversy exceeds $5 million. §§ 1332(d)(2), (d)(6), (d)(11)(A). Class and mass actions filed in state court that satisfy CAFA's requirements may be removed to federal court, 28 U.S.C. § 1453, but federal jurisdiction in a mass action, unlike a class action, "shall exist only over those plaintiffs" whose claims individually satisfy the $75,000 amount in controversy requirement, § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i).¹

B

Respondents manufacture liquid crystal displays, or LCDs. In March 2011, the State of Mississippi sued them in state court, alleging that they had formed an international cartel to restrict competition and raise prices in the LCD market. The State claimed that these actions violated two Mississippi statutes: the Mississippi Antitrust Act, Miss.Code Ann. § 75–21–1 et seq . (2009), and the Mississippi Consumer Protection Act, § 75–24–1 et seq. (2009 and Cum. Supp. 2013). The State sought injunctive relief and civil penalties under both statutes, along with punitive damages, costs, and attorney's fees. It also sought restitution for its own purchases "of LCD products and the purchases of its citizens." App. to Brief in Opposition 65a; § 75–24–11.

Respondents filed a notice to remove the case from state to federal court, arguing that the case was removable under CAFA as either a "class action" or a "mass action." The District Court ruled that the suit did not qualify as a "class action" because it was "not brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 or a 'similar State statute or rule of judicial procedure.' " 876 F.Supp.2d 758, 769 (S.D.Miss.2012). But it held that the suit did qualify as a "mass action,"

571 U.S. 167

because "[i]t is a civil action 'in which monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs' claims involve common questions of law or fact.' " Id. , at 771. The District Court reached that conclusion on the basis of Fifth Circuit precedent in

134 S.Ct. 741

Louisiana ex rel. Caldwell v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 536 F.3d 418 (C.A.5 2008), which it understood to "stan[d] for the proposition that the words 'persons' and 'plaintiffs' in [the mass action definition] are to be defined as 'real parties in interest.' " 876 F.Supp.2d, at 771. Applying that rule, the court found that 100 or more unidentified Mississippi consumers had purchased LCD screens and were therefore real parties in interest to the State's restitution claim. Ibid. The court noted the "possibility that a 'mass action' should be thought of as a 'mass joinder,' "—that is, as a suit involving 100 or more "named plaintiffs." Ibid., n. 9. But it deemed that interpretation to be foreclosed by Caldwell .

The District Court nonetheless remanded the case to state court on the basis of CAFA's "general public exception," which excludes from the "mass action" definition "any civil action in which ... all of the claims in the action are asserted on behalf of the general public (and not on behalf of individual claimants or members of a purported class) pursuant to a State statute specifically authorizing such action." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(III).

The Court of Appeals reversed. 701 F.3d 796 (C.A.5 2012). It agreed with the District Court's determination that...