A.A v. Warsaw Cmty. Sch. Corp.
| Docket Number | 3:21-CV-378 JD |
| Decision Date | 07 June 2023 |
| Parties | A.A., et al., Plaintiffs, v. WARSAW COMMUNITY SCHOOL CORPORATION, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
Kasha Harris filed suit on behalf of her daughter, A.A., a high school student who was asked to go to the back of the school bus line after repeatedly cutting the line the same week. Ms Harris alleges the actions of the school bus driver were motivated by racial animus and brought Equal Protection Clause and Title VI claims against the bus driver, Laura Brito, the school, and the director of transportation, Mark Fick (“Defendants”). The undisputed facts and video evidence support Defendants' version of events, and Plaintiffs have offered no evidence sufficient to support an inference of racial animus on the part of any defendant. As such, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (DE 35).
Except where noted, these facts are taken from the undisputed statement of facts (DE 38). In March 2021, A.A. was a student at Warsaw Community High School. She rode the bus to get to school each day, and her bus driver was Lauren Brito. A.A. and her brother were picked up directly outside of their house, and about eight other students boarded at the same stop. A.A. and her brother are African American; two of the other students boarding were also African American. All students riding Warsaw Schools buses have assigned seats by policy, and Ms. Brito assigned seats on her bus during A.A.'s tenure as a rider. (DE 36-5 at 26-27.)
A.A. and her brother had a history of being late and missing the bus. When the siblings missed the bus, Ms. Harris would call the school transportation department and demand her children be picked up. Invariably, the department sent a bus to pick up the siblings. This occurred with such frequency that the bus was re-routed so the siblings could see the bus as it approached. (DE 36-3 at 25.) In early March, other students boarding at the stop complained to Ms. Brito about A.A. cutting the line. Ms. Brito discussed the issue with her trainer and was advised a proper course of action was to ask the student to go to the back of the line. During the week of March 8, 2021, Ms. Brito observed A.A. cutting other students in line when boarding the bus. In response, Ms. Brito asked A.A. to go to the back of the line. A video taken from the bus's internal cameras on March 12, 2021, confirms that A.A. cut the line that day and was asked to go to the back of the line, which she did without objection. Ms. Brito did not ask any of the other African American students to go to the back of the line, and all other students boarded the bus without incident. No other students can be seen cutting the line.
A.A. felt that Ms. Brito was targeting her and that her actions in asking her to go to the back of the line were racist. A.A. expressed this to her mother, who decided to get proof of Ms. Brito's racist actions. On March 16, Ms. Harris accompanied A.A. to the bus and decided to film her boarding. Both Ms. Harris's recording and the recording from the bus's internal camera were provided to the Court. When the bus pulled up, it was still dark out. A.A. attempted to board first. Ms. Brito asked A.A. to go to the back of the line. A.A. informed her she was at the bus stop first, to which Ms. Brito replied that she had seen A.A. come down the stairs from her house. Ms. Harris replied that Ms. Brito was mistaken, because she had seen her son, not A.A., come down the stairs. All parties begin raising their voices; Ms. Harris then accused Ms. Brito of racism and informed Ms. Brito that A.A. had been at the bus stop since 6:50 A.M. Ms. Brito replied, “That's a first.” A.A., Ms. Harris, and Ms. Brito began arguing. A.A. and Ms. Harris soon became incensed and yelled at Ms. Brito that she was racist and harassing A.A. Plaintiffs then asked the other children in line if A.A. had cut them, and the children replied that she had not. After several more moments of yelling, Ms. Brito asked A.A. if she wanted to ride the school bus that day. One of the Plaintiffs said, “That's what I thought,” and A.A. and Ms. Harris walked away. Ms. Harris drove A.A. to school, where they met with administrators who promised to investigate.
Later that evening, Mark Fick, the director of transportation at Warsaw Schools, called Ms. Harris and informed her that her children were not allowed to ride the bus because they had disrupted bus services. There is no record of any disciplinary action against A.A. in the school's records.[1]A.A. did not return to Warsaw Schools after the March 16 incident, and later enrolled in an online high school education program. A.A.'s brother returned to Warsaw Schools and was transported on a different bus. (DE 36-4 at 62.)
Ms. Harris brought suit against Warsaw Community School Corporation, Ms. Brito, and Mr. Fick as next friend of A.A., bringing Equal Protection Clause and Title VI claims. The allegations in the amended complaint were shocking; in addition to the line issue described above, it stated Ms. Brito “at various times” called A.A. a monkey and told her to go to the back of the bus, and that this behavior was motivated by racial animus. (DE 13 at ¶ 13.) During discovery, Plaintiffs admitted Ms. Brito never called A.A. a monkey and never told her to go to the back of the bus, so these allegations are not considered as part of the evidence of racial animus for the purpose of summary judgment. See (DE 36-1 at 9-14); (DE 36-4 at 22-24); (DE 36-1 at ¶ 18-19); Schrott v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 403 F.3d 940, 944 (7th Cir. 2005) ().
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A dispute over “material facts” is “genuine” if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). On summary judgment, the court construes the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of that party. Id. “Speculation, however, is not the source of a reasonable inference.” Burwell v. Pekin Cmty. High Sch. Dist. 303, 213 F.Supp.2d 917, 929 (C.D. Ill. 2002) (citing Chmiel v. JC Penney Life Ins. Co., 158 F.3d 966, 968 (7th Cir.1998). If plaintiff's facts are “blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for the purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007).
The nonmoving party may not rest on the allegations within the complaint and instead must provide “definite, competent evidence in rebuttal.” Butts v. Aurora Health Care, Inc., 387 F.3d 921, 924 (7th Cir. 2004). Entry of summary judgment is appropriate “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). “In such a situation, there can be no genuine issue as to any material fact, since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. at 32223.
Plaintiffs have made no showing that Defendant's actions were motivated by racial animus, which is required to sustain a claim under both the Equal Protection Clause and Title VI. Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden under numerous steps of the McDonnell Douglas inquiry, the only method for proving their claims that they advanced, and failed to present any evidence that would permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude A.A.'s race led to any adverse action. See Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2016) (). Plaintiffs' case rests entirely on speculation and conclusory legal allegations, which cannot sustain a reasonable inference that intentional discrimination took place. See Khan v. Midwestern Univ., 147 F.Supp.3d 718, 720 (N.D. Ill. 2015). Defendants are therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Plaintiffs have failed to make a showing on essential elements of their claims.
(1) Preliminary Matters
Plaintiffs did not follow Local Rule 56-1 and have not provided the Court with the requisite correspondingly numbered response admitting or denying each of Defendants' Statement of Material Facts (DE 38) with citations. See Local R. 56-1(b)(2). The noncompliance is not minimal; no statement of facts was filed at all. This alone could justify the Court's adoption of Defendants' facts. See Stevo v. Frasor, 662 F.3d 880, 886-87 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Because of the high volume of summary judgment motions and the benefits of clear presentation of relevant evidence and law, we have repeatedly held that the district judges are entitled to insist on strict compliance with local rules designed to promote the clarity of summary judgment filings.”)
But the Court, in all fairness to Plaintiffs, has reviewed their response to determine whether any properly supported material factual dispute exists. None does, as Ms. Harris and A.A.'s deposition testimony, the sole support for many key arguments,...
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