AAAA Enterprises, Inc. v. River Place Community Urban Redevelopment Corp.

• Decision Date: 18 April 1990
• Docket Number: No. 88-2021,88-2021
• Citation: 553 N.E.2d 597,50 Ohio St. 3d 157
• Parties: AAAA ENTERPRISES, INC., Appellee, v. RIVER PLACE COMMUNITY URBAN REDEVELOPMENT CORP.; City of Columbus, Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 157

50 Ohio St.3d 157

553 N.E.2d 597

AAAA ENTERPRISES, INC., Appellee, v.RIVER PLACE COMMUNITY URBAN REDEVELOPMENT CORP.; City of Columbus, Appellant.

No. 88-2021.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted Dec. 13, 1989.

Decided April 18, 1990.

Syllabus by the Court

1.The proper standard for judicial review of a city council's determination that an area is a "blighted area" for purposes of R.C. Chapter 1728 and for the purpose of the exercise of the city's power of eminent domain is an abuse-of-discretion standard.

2.Regardless of who may have the burden of proof at trial, the burden is upon the party moving for summary judgment to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.The evidentiary material submitted by the movant may be relied upon by the respondent in support of the latter's argument that there is a genuine issue of material fact.

In 1980, as a prerequisite to the use of R.C. Chapter 1728 as a vehicle for the redevelopment of a portion of the southern part of its downtown area, the city of Columbus, the appellant, through its city council, declared a four-block square area to be a "blighted area" pursuant to the definition set forth in R.C. 1728.01(E).The area in question includes a parcel owned by AAAA Enterprises, Inc.("landowner"), the appellee.

Thereafter, the city negotiated an agreement with River Place Community Urban Redevelopment Corporation("River Place"), pursuant to R.C. Chapter 1728, for the redevelopment of the area.Under the agreement, the city was required to use its "best efforts" to acquire the fee simple title to the parcels within the project area, for sale to River Place.These "best efforts" were expressly declared in the agreement to include the power of eminent domain, if necessary.

In an exhibit to the agreement, it was stated that the project plans called for the construction of eight hundred sixty residential units, together with "commercial and service facilities and one above-grade parking structure."The agreement expressly contemplated that River Place would accomplish the planned redevelopment of the project area by leasing or subleasing portions of the area to third parties, and that River Place might sell portions of the project area to third parties.

In determining that the project area was a "blighted area" for purposes of R.C. Chapter 1728, the Columbus City Council expressly relied upon a "physical condition survey" that had been performed by members of the staff of the Columbus Department of Development.Of the twenty-seven parcels described in the survey, twenty were used for parking, and one was a vacant lot.Of the remaining six parcels, their descriptions varied, but most were described as being in essentially good condition.

In 1985, the landowner brought this declaratory judgment action against River Place and the city in the court of common pleas, seeking to determine, among other things, that the city had no right to acquire the landowner's property through the exercise of its power of eminent domain.The landowner based its contention upon two theories: (1) that the project area was not, in fact, a "blighted area" as defined in R.C. 1728.01(E); and (2) that the use of the city's general revenues, or its funds raised through general obligation bonds, to acquire the property would constitute an unconstitutional lending of the city's credit, in violation of Sections 6and13 of Article VIII of the Ohio Constitution.

River Place moved for, and was granted, judgment on the pleadings.In this court, the landowner has not challenged the judgment in favor of River Place.

The city moved for summary judgment, supported with an affidavit.Attached as exhibits to the city's affidavit were copies of the resolution declaring the project area to be a "blighted area," the ordinance authorizing the project, the agreement between the city and River Place, an exhibit to that agreement describing the project, the "physical condition survey" describing the project area, and various notices and correspondence concerning the project.

The landowner opposed the city's motion for summary judgment, but did not support its position with an affidavit; instead, the landowner relied upon the city's evidentiary material to support the landowner's argument that there were genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment.

The trial court granted the city's motion for summary judgment, and the landowner appealed.On appeal, the Court of Appeals for Franklin County reversed the summary judgment in the city's favor, and remanded the cause to the trial court for further proceedings.The court of appeals held that there were genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment.

The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.

Ronald B. Noga, Columbus, for appellee.

Ronald J. O'Brien, City Atty., and Marvin E. Rothhaar, for appellant.

MIKE FAIN, Judge, Court of Appeals.

The issue we are called upon to decide in this case is whether, when the evidentiary material before the trial court is viewed in a light most favorable to the landowner, there is a genuine issue of material fact.In deciding this issue, it is appropriate for us to consider the proper standard of review for the trial court to use in reviewing the Columbus City Council's determination that the project area was a "blighted area" for purposes of R.C. Chapter 1728.

For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the proper standard of review for the trial court to use in this case is whether the Columbus City Council abused its discretion when it determined that the project area was a "blighted area."When the evidence before the trial court is tested by that standard, we conclude that reasonable minds might reach different conclusions concerning whether the Columbus City Council abused its discretion in making that determination.

I

The city contends that the determination of its city council that the project area was a "blighted area" for purposes of R.C. Chapter 1728 was a legislative determination, and that, as such, it can only be overturned judicially upon a finding that the city council's decision represented "perversity of will, passion, prejudice, partiality, or moral delinquency."In support of its contention, the city cites State, ex rel. Shafer, v. Ohio Turnpike Comm.(1953), 159 Ohio St. 581, 50 O.O. 465, 113 N.E.2d 14, andState, ex rel. Commercial Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc., v. Lancaster(1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 191, 22 OBR 275, 489 N.E.2d 288.

Significantly, both of the cases cited by the city involved applications for writs of mandamus, where the relator must establish his clear entitlement to the relief requested, and neither case involved an assertion of a constitutional right.Both of these cited cases simply involved claims that an administrative agency of the state had acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner, to the detriment of the relator.

In the case before us, the landowner is asserting, as a matter of constitutional right, that the city has no right to take its property through the exercise of its power of eminent domain because for it to do so would be a taking of the landowner's property for other than a public purpose (which in effect would be a violation of both Section 19, Article I of the Ohio Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States).The landowner also contends that the taking of its property for the purposes of this project would violate Sections 6and13, Article VIII of the Ohio Constitution.

At oral argument, the city conceded that its city council's determination that the project was a "blighted area" was an essential predicate to its exercise of the power of eminent domain to take the landowner's property.Thus, in the circumstances of this case, the question whether the taking of the landowner's property would be for a public purpose, as required by both the Ohio and United States Constitutions, is embedded in the question of whether the project area is a "blighted area."If so, then the taking would be for a purpose that has properly been determined to be a public purpose--urban redevelopment.SeeAnnotation(1972), 45 A.L.R.3d 1096.

The authority of the courts to determine whether an action, even a legislative action, violates constitutional provisions has been unquestioned for many years.Indeed, the concept of judicial review of the constitutionality of legislative acts is a distinguishing feature of American jurisprudence.

If we were to accept the city's...