Aadland v. Boat Santa Rita II, Inc.

• Decision Date: 28 July 2022
• Docket Number: 20-2073
• Citation: 42 F.4th 34
• Parties: Magnus AADLAND, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. BOAT SANTA RITA II, INC. ; Boat Santa Rita III, Inc. ; Francis A. Patania; Salvatore Patania, Jr., Defendants, Appellees, F/V Linda, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

42 F.4th 34

Magnus AADLAND, Plaintiff, Appellant,

v. BOAT SANTA RITA II, INC. ; Boat Santa Rita III, Inc. ; Francis A. Patania; Salvatore Patania, Jr., Defendants, Appellees,F/V Linda, Defendant.

No. 20-2073

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

July 28, 2022

Scott W. Lang, with whom Catherine Kramer, Lang Xifaras & Bullard, Andrew B. Saunders, and Saunders & Saunders, LLP were on brief, for appellant.

Francis McSweeney, with whom Joseph A. Regan and Regan & Kiely, LLP were on brief, for appellees.

Before Barron, Chief Judge, Thompson and Hawkins,^* Circuit Judges.

BARRON, Chief Judge.

This appeal concerns a suit that Magnus Aadland brought in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts against the owners of a fishing vessel on which he was a seaman. He alleges that the owners breached a federal common law obligation under admiralty law that is known as the duty of cure. He contends that they did so by failing to pay him adequately for the costs of the medical care that he received after he fell ill from an infection that he acquired while working aboard their vessel. He further alleges that, even if the defendants did satisfy their duty of cure through various payments that they made to him and his private health insurer, they so delayed in doing so that he is entitled to compensatory damages for emotional distress, punitive damages, and attorney's fees. The District Court granted judgment to the defendants after a bench trial.

We vacate the grant of judgment with respect to Aadland's claim that the defendants' breached their duty of cure and remand for further proceedings consistent with this decision. Our ruling on that score also leads us to vacate the District Court's grant of judgment to the defendants with respect to Aadland's claims for compensatory damages for emotional distress, punitive damages, and attorney's fees for the defendants' alleged delay in fulfilling the duty of cure. Finally, we reverse the District Court's ruling that Aadland had reached what is known as the "point of maximum medical recovery," which is a bar to any claim for cure based on the costs of recovery past that point in time.

I.

The following facts are not contested on appeal. On July 9, 2014, the F/V Linda, owned by Boat Santa Rita II ("BSR II"), Boat Santa Rita III, Frank Patania, and Salvatore Patania, left New Bedford, Massachusetts on a commercial scalloping trip. Aadland was the vessel's captain.

A few days into the trip, while at sea, Aadland fell ill. His condition continued to worsen, and the F/V Linda reversed course and traveled back to Massachusetts. Upon arrival in New Bedford on July 18, 2014, Aadland was transported to a hospital. He was diagnosed with a group G Streptococcus infection.

Aadland spent the next six months at various inpatient facilities, receiving medical treatment at them from July 18, 2014, to December 29, 2014. He was then discharged and received outpatient treatment until July 9, 2015, when he was again admitted to the hospital due to health complications that stemmed from the infection. Aadland was released from this second period of hospitalization on September 10, 2015. He thereafter received outpatient treatment for symptoms attributable to the infection.

It is a general principle of admiralty law that if "a seaman falls sick[ ] or is wounded[ ] in the service of the ship," "the vessel and her owners are liable ... to the extent of [the seaman's] maintenance and cure." Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 413, 129 S.Ct. 2561, 174 L.Ed.2d 382 (2009) (quoting The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175, 23 S.Ct. 483, 47 L.Ed. 760 (1903) ). The duty of maintenance and cure is often referred to as a single duty, but there are two distinct aspects of it -- "maintenance" and "cure."

"Maintenance" refers to "the provision of, or payment for, food and lodging." LeBlanc v. B.G.T. Corp., 992 F.2d 394, 397 (1st Cir. 1993). "Cure," by contrast, refers to "necessary health-care expenses ... incurred during the period of [the seaman's] recovery from an injury or malady." Id.

The duty of maintenance and cure can be traced back centuries to legal codes of several seafaring nations. See Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 532 n.4, 82 S.Ct. 997, 8 L.Ed.2d 88 (1962) ; see also 1B Erastus Cornelius Benedict, Benedict on Admiralty § 42 (2022) (explaining that a shipowner's duty to provide maintenance and cure can be found in the Laws of Oleron, which date to approximately the year 1200); 2 Robert Force & Martin J. Norris, The Law of Seamen § 26:6 (5th ed. 2021) (same). The Supreme Court of the United States first formally recognized the duty of maintenance and cure, however, in The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 172, 23 S.Ct. 483, 47 L.Ed. 760 (1903).

In doing so, the Court echoed Justice Story's oft-quoted passage in Harden v. Gordon, 11 F. Cas. 480 (C.C.D. Me. 1823). There, he explained that

[s]eamen are by the peculiarity of their lives liable to sudden sickness from change of climate, exposure to perils, and exhausting labour. They are generally poor and friendless .... If some provision be not made for them in sickness at the expense of the ship, they must often in foreign ports suffer the accumulated evils of disease, and poverty, and sometimes perish from the want of suitable nourishment. Their common earnings in many instances are wholly inadequate to provide for the expenses of sickness.

Id. at 483. Justice Story reasoned there that if the "expenses of his [on-ship] sickness [or injury] are a charge upon the ship, the interest of the owner will be immediately connected with that of the seamen" and "[t]he master will watch over their health with vigilance and fidelity[,] ... tak[ing] the best methods ... to prevent diseases, [and] to ensure a speedy recovery from them." Id.

The parties agree that from December 30, 2014 to October 16, 2020, Aadland was paid maintenance of $84 per day by BSR II,¹ which amounted to $175,664 in total. There is no dispute before us regarding whether the defendants satisfied their duty of "maintenance."

The picture is more complicated with respect to whether the defendants satisfied their duty of "cure." That is in part because, for a portion of the period that followed Aadland's on-ship infection, he used private health insurance that he had through his wife's employer to pay for the costs of the healthcare that he received related to that infection. It was not entirely clear at the time that the Tufts health insurance plan furnished by his wife's employer covered the costs of treating his on-ship illness, because it was a work-related illness.²

In addition, after Aadland's wife lost her job, Aadland personally enrolled in the Tufts COBRA plan, at a cost of approximately $2,000 per month.³ For most of the period in which Aadland was enrolled in the Tufts COBRA plan, BSR II paid Aadland an "advance" of $114 per day. Aadland began receiving advance payments six months after he fell ill on the ship.⁴

BSR II referred to the payments when made as "advance" payments. BSR II also made these payments with the disclaimer that "the amount of any settlement, judgment or award" "resulting from [a] claim for personal injuries or illness occurring [in July 2014] while aboard the F/V Linda" "will be reduced by the amount of the advance."

Aadland received a total of $238,374 in advance payments. He used a portion of those payments to pay the premiums for his Tufts COBRA plan, which he in turn relied on to pay for the costs of the treatment that he received for his on-ship illness during this period. There is no indication in the record that Aadland has reimbursed the defendants for any of the funds that he received as "advance payments."

In addition, BSR II reimbursed Aadland for his out-of-pocket medical expenses owing to his on-ship illness. These included expenses such as those he incurred from the co-payments he was required to make under his insurance plan.

Finally, after the commencement of this suit, BSR II paid Aadland's health insurer, Tufts, $400,000 "in full satisfaction of any lien or claim [the insurer, Tufts,] might have against [the] Aadland[s] ... for coverage of Aadland's medical expenses." BSR II made this payment on the eve of trial.

Aadland filed his lawsuit against the F/V Linda, BSR II, BSR III, and their owners on July 7, 2017. Aadland's operative complaint alleges that the defendants breached their duty of cure, which he contends his on-ship illness triggered. His complaint claims that he is entitled to damages in the amount of the total cost of the healthcare that he received to treat his July 2014 infection, as well as compensation for pain and suffering that resulted from the defendants' delay in providing him with the payments for cure that he contends that he is owed. See Hines v. J.A. LAPorte, Inc., 820 F.2d 1187, 1190 (11th Cir. 1987) (affirming an award of compensatory damages for "prolonged ... pain and suffering" that resulted from the defendant's failure in that case to timely provide maintenance and cure); Stevens v. Seacoast Co., 414 F.2d 1032, 1040 (5th Cir. 1969) (noting that if the delay in providing adequate maintenance and cure "contributed in any degree to additional pain or disability or prolonged the recovery period," "resulting damages [from that delay] are due"). Aadland's complaint further alleges that the defendants' failure to provide him with adequate cure payments was willful and thus that he is entitled to punitive damages, attorney's fees, and costs. See Atl. Sounding Co., 557 U.S. at 407-08, 129 S.Ct. 2561 (holding that punitive damages can be awarded if a shipowner's failure to timely pay maintenance and cure was "willful"); Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 530-31, 82 S.Ct. 997, 8 L.Ed.2d 88 (1962) (holding that attorney's fees can be awarded if a seaman proves that a shipowner failed to timely provide maintenance and cure); Robinson v. Pocahontas, Inc., 477 F.2d 1048, 1051 (1st Cir. 1973) (explaining that where a shipowner...