Aala Quinio v. Aala

• Decision Date: 03 January 2022
• Docket Number: 19-CV-4686 (PKC) (SJB)
• Parties: MARIA ROSSANA AALA QUINIO, A/K/A, “SUSAN” QUINIO, Plaintiff, v. RUSTICO AALA, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

MARIA ROSSANA AALA QUINIO, A/K/A, “SUSAN” QUINIO, Plaintiff, v. RUSTICO AALA, Defendant.

No. 19-CV-4686 (PKC) (SJB)

United States District Court, E.D. New York

January 3, 2022

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

PAMELA K. CHEN, United States District Judge:

On August 14, 2019, Plaintiff Maria Rossana Aala Quinio, also known as Susan Quinio (“Plaintiff”), filed this action against her older brother, Defendant Rustico Aala (“Defendant”), for one count of battery. (See Complaint (“Compl.”), Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 19-21.) Plaintiff alleges that, in 1986, when Plaintiff was 16 years old and Defendant was 42 years old Defendant raped her. (Id. ¶¶ 8- 9.) Plaintiff brings her action pursuant to the New York Child Victims Act, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214-g, which extended the statute of limitations for civil claims arising from certain enumerated sex crimes. (Id. ¶¶ 16-17.) Diversity jurisdiction allows this state court claim to be brought here. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. (Compl., Dkt. 1, ¶ 2.)

There are currently three motions before the Court. First Plaintiff seeks sanctions against Defendant for an unspecified amount in excess of $50, 000 (Dkt. 26), based on Defendant's denial of the rape allegation. Second Plaintiff has filed objections to a December 14, 2020 Memorandum & Order of the Honorable Sankeet J. Bulsara, U.S.M.J., denying Plaintiff's motion for leave to file an amended complaint. (Dkt. 43.) Third, Plaintiff has filed objections to several discovery rulings issued by Magistrate Judge Bulsara in an April 9, 2021 Order. (Dkt. 59.) For the reasons explained below, (1) Plaintiff's motion for sanctions is denied; (2) the December 14, 2020 Order is overruled, the parties are instructed to submit supplemental briefing, and Plaintiff is granted leave to amend; and (3) the April 9, 2021 Order is affirmed in its entirety.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a 51-year-old resident of Arizona. (See Compl., Dkt. 1, ¶ 5.) Defendant is Plaintiff's older brother and is a 77-year-old resident of New York. (Id. ¶ 6.) Plaintiff alleges that, in August 1986, when Plaintiff was 16 and Defendant was 42, Defendant raped and impregnated her. (Id. ¶¶ 8-10.) As a result, Plaintiff carried and gave birth to a child who was given up for adoption. (Id. ¶¶ 10-11.) In 2009, Plaintiff confronted Defendant about the “family secret” and the two signed an agreement requiring Defendant to pay Plaintiff for the damages caused by the rape. (Id. ¶¶ 12-13; Contract, Quinio v. Aala (“Quinio I”), No. 15-CV-4912 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2019), ECF 156.)

In 2015, Plaintiff filed a prior action against Defendant for allegedly breaching the terms of the 2009 agreement. (Compl., Dkt. 1, ¶ 14.) This Court also handled that case, which proceeded to a trial. See Quinio I, No. 15-CV-4912 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2019). Throughout that litigation, Plaintiff was represented by Richard Pu, the same attorney who represents Plaintiff in this matter; and, during all times relevant to the pending motions, Defendant was represented by the law firm of Lebedin Kofman, the same firm that represents Defendant in this case. See generally Id. Quinio I concluded with a jury finding that the 2009 agreement was void as a matter of public policy because it included a promise to refrain from informing law enforcement about the alleged rape in exchange for a promise of money, property, or assets. (Jury Verdict Sheet, Quinio I, No. 15-CV-49, ECF 159.)

After the New York Legislature passed the New York Child Victims Act, extending the statute of limitations for civil claims arising from certain enumerated sex crimes, Plaintiff filed this action for battery based on the same rape allegations underlying the prior contract action. The procedural history of the present action will be outlined, where relevant, in the discussion on Plaintiff's motions below.

DISCUSSION

I. Motion for Sanctions

Plaintiff's motion for sanctions is based on statements made by Defendant during Quinio I. Plaintiff alleges that, three separate times during the course of litigating Quinio I, Defendant admitted to raping Plaintiff-twice during a deposition and once at trial. The Complaint in this case includes the relevant portions of those transcripts as exhibits. (See Compl., Dkt. 1, Exs., 1, 2, 3; Plaintiff's Moving Brief (“Pl's Sanctions Br.”), Dkt. 26-6, at 1-5.) In Defendant's Answer to the Complaint, however, Defendant denied having raped Plaintiff. (See Answer, Dkt. 19, ¶ 8 (responding to Compl., Dkt. 1, ¶ 8).) Plaintiff contends that defense counsel's filing of an Answer denying allegations that Defendant had previously admitted will “multiply the proceedings” in this case by (1) requiring Plaintiff to prove that Defendant raped her, (2) making it harder to settle the case, and (3) preventing Plaintiff from moving for judgment on the pleadings. (Pl's Sanctions Br., Dkt. 26-6, at 4-5.) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927, Plaintiff seeks an award of attorneys' fees in excess of $50, 000 for the time that will be spent on the additional litigation flowing from Defendant's denial of the alleged rape. (Id.)

28 U.S.C. § 1927 provides that

[a]ny attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.

28 U.S.C. § 1927. Furthermore, an award under § 1927 must be supported by a finding of bad faith on the part of the attorney to be sanctioned. Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1273 (2d Cir. 1986).

Defense counsel, Lebedin Kofman, argues that there was no bad faith in filing Defendant's Answer denying the rape allegation because “there are colorable arguments to be made with respect to Mr. Aala's competency (or lack thereof) at the time of his deposition and the trial of the prior contract action, which is when the admissions relied upon by plaintiff in this action were provided.” (Defendant's Memorandum of Law In Opposition To Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions (“Def's Sanctions Mem.”), Dkt. 28, at 5.)

Plaintiff counters that Lebedin Kofman “effectively admitted that Defendant was not incompetent by withdrawing the contention on the eve[] of trial in the Contract Action, ” referring to a letter filed by defense counsel on February 7, 2019. (Plaintiff's Reply Brief (“Pl's Sanctions Reply”), Dkt. 29-2, at 2 (referring to Quinio I, No. 15-CV-4912, ECF 147)). Plaintiff's theory of defense counsel's bad faith thus proceeds as follows: Defendant admitted to the rape at a deposition and at trial in the previous case; defense counsel withdrew an incompetency defense before trial, therefore “effectively admitting” that Defendant was competent when he made the admissions; and thus defense counsel's filing of an Answer denying that Defendant raped Plaintiff based on an argument that Defendant was incompetent when he made the admissions is evidence of bad faith. Plaintiff's theory is untenable for at least three reasons.

First, the incompetency defense in the contract action necessarily referred to Defendant's competency at the time he signed the contract in 2009, not at the time he was deposed or testified in that action in 2016 and 2019, when Defendant allegedly made the admissions on which Plaintiff relies for her motion. See Ortelere v. Teachers' Ret. Bd. of City of New York, 250 N.E.2d 460, 465 (N.Y. 1969) (discussing standards for competency to contract); (Contract, Quinio I, No. 15-CV-4912, ECF 156 (stating 2009 date); Pl's Sanctions Br., Dkt. 26-6, at 2-3 (stating dates of admissions on which Plaintiff relies)). Accordingly, any “effective[] admi[ssion]” that Defendant was competent contained in Lebedin Kofman's February 7, 2019 letter (withdrawing the incompetency defense) would have referred to Defendant's competency in 2009, and not necessarily to Defendant's competency in 2016 and 2019.

Second, three days after filing the February 7, 2019 letter, defense counsel reversed course, filing a February 10, 2019 letter stating that defense counsel had once again met with Defendant, that it was clear that Defendant had diminished capacity at that time, and that Defendant wished to assert an incompetency defense at trial, covering both the time when the contract was executed and continuing through the litigation of the contract action. (Quinio I, No. 15-CV-4912, ECF 153.) Thus, even if the incompetency defense had referred to the alleged admissions made in 2016 and 2019-the bases for Plaintiff's sanctions motion-defense counsel did not ultimately withdraw that defense and “effectively admit” that Defendant was competent during either period. Furthermore, even if Plaintiff wanted to point to the 2009 agreement as an admission of rape and thus evidence of bad faith for filing the Answer denying the allegation, the February 10, 2019 letter indicates that defense counsel ultimately believed that Defendant may have been incompetent at the time of that admission. While Defendant did testify at trial, notwithstanding his counsel's assertions in the February 10 letter that he was incompetent, as discussed below, Defendant's decision to testify, in itself, does not provide a basis for finding bad faith by the Lebedin Kofman attorneys. Accordingly, there is nothing Plaintiff can point to that would undercut defense counsel's position that it had a good faith basis to believe that Defendant was incompetent at the time of any alleged admission of rape, and thus had a good faith basis to file the Answer denying the allegation of rape in this action.

Finally even if defense counsel had ultimately withdrawn the incompetency defense (which it did not), and even if that defense had referred to Defendant's competency at the...