Aaron v. Cooper

• Decision Date: 09 January 1959
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 3113.
• Citation: 169 F. Supp. 325
• Parties: John AARON et al., Plaintiffs, v. William G. COOPER et al., Members of the Board of Directors of the Little Rock, Arkansas, Independent School District, and Virgil Blossom, Superintendent of Schools, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Arkansas

169 F. Supp. 325

John AARON et al., Plaintiffs, v. William G. COOPER et al., Members of the Board of Directors of the Little Rock, Arkansas, Independent School District, and Virgil Blossom, Superintendent of Schools, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 3113.

United States District Court E. D. Arkansas, Western Division.

January 9, 1959.

Thurgood Marshall, New York City, Wiley A. Branton, Pine Bluff, Ark., for plaintiffs.

Osro Cobb, U. S. Atty., Little Rock, Ark., Donald B. MacGuineas, Washington, D. C., for United States as amicus curiae.

Mehaffy, Smith & Williams, Little Rock, Ark., for defendants.

JOHN E. MILLER, District Judge.

On December 8, 1958, this court, by order, fixed January 6, 1959, as the date of a hearing for the purpose of determining and fixing the provisions and terms of the order of this court in accordance with the mandate of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, issued December 2, 1958, and filed herein December 4, 1958, 261 F.2d 97.

The litigation of the questions involved in the instant case stems from the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, May 17, 1954, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873, and May 31, 1955, 349 U.S. 294, 75 S.Ct. 753, 99 L.Ed. 1083.

In the May 17, 1954, decision the Supreme Court, at page 495 of 347 U.S., at page 692 of 74 S.Ct., said:

"We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of `separate but equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment."

In the May 31, 1955, opinion, the Court, at page 298 of 349 U.S., at page 755 of 75 S.Ct., said:

"These cases were decided on May 17, 1954. The opinions of that date, declaring the fundamental principle that racial discrimination in public education is unconstitutional, are incorporated herein by reference. All provisions of federal, state, or local law requiring or permitting such discrimination must yield to this principle."

On page 300 of 349 U.S., on page 756 of 75 S.Ct. the Court emphasized that the vitality of the constitutional principles cannot be allowed to yield simply because of disagreement with them.

United States Constitution, Article 6, Clause 2, states:

"This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."

United States Constitution, Article 3, Section 1, provides:

"The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."

As long ago as 1803, Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for a unanimous Court in the case of Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177, 2 L.Ed. 60, in referring to the Constitution as "the fundamental and paramount law of the nation", said:

"It is, emphatically, the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."

That decision declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the interpretation of the Constitution of the United States, and that principle has ever since been accepted and respected by the people of the United States as an indispensable feature of our constitutional system.

The two Brown decisions, supra, have been severely criticized by many citizens and, on the other hand, have been vehemently applauded by other citizens. Notwithstanding the criticism on one hand and the approval on the other, they stand under our constitutional system as precedents, applicable to and conclusive of the questions in the case in which rendered. Also, they are authoritative guides in other similar cases, and, unless modified by the Supreme Court of the United States, will continue to stand until changed by the states and the citizens in the manner and in accordance with the procedure provided in the Constitution for changing its provisions or interpretations.

This court is not unmindful of the profound effect of the decisions in the Brown cases, supra, upon the mores and traditions of our land. However, this court is one of limited jurisdiction, and is bound by the decisions of the appellate courts. Judicial restraint prevents this court from criticizing or approving the constitutional principles announced by the appellate courts. It is not for this court to reason why nor make reply. Its duty in this case is clearly defined, and its action is commanded and restricted by the former adjudications.

Before outlining the provisions of the order which this court has been commanded to enter, it seems not inappropriate to chronologically review the litigation and decisions of the courts in the instant case on the questions now before this court.

The first decision in this case was announced August 27, 1956, D.C., 143 F. Supp. 855. Involved in that case was the reasonableness of the plan of integration that had been formulated by the Superintendent and the Board of Directors of the Little Rock, Arkansas, Independent School District. The plan had been attacked by the plaintiffs through the NAACP. The only question before the court in that case, as above stated was whether the plan was in conformity with the requirements of the decisions in the Brown cases, supra. The sole objective of the defendants was to faithfully and effectively inaugurate a school system in accordance with the law as declared by the Supreme Court. They were seeking ways and means of effectuating a transition from a segregated to a non-discriminatory system without destroying the fundamental objectives of the system itself. In disposing of the question, the court, at page 866 of 143 F.Supp., said:

"This court is of the opinion that it should not substitute its own judgment for that of the defendants. The plan which has been adopted after thorough and conscientious consideration of the many questions involved is a plan that will lead to an effective and gradual adjustment of the problem, and ultimately bring about a school system not based on color distinctions.

"It would be an abuse of discretion for this court to fail to approve the plan or to interfere with its consummation so long as the defendants move in good faith, as they have done since immediately after the decision of May 17, 1954, to inaugurate and make effective a racially nondiscriminatory school system."

The judgment of this court was entered in accordance with the above declaration.

The case was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, 243 F.2d 361, and on April 26, 1957, that court affirmed the decision of the trial court which, as above stated, approved the plan of defendant Superintendent and Board of Directors. In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals, at page 364 of 243 F.2d, said:

"The schools of Little Rock have been on a completely segregated basis since their creation in 1870. That fact, plus local problems as to facilities, teacher personnel, the creation of teachable groups, the establishment of the proper curriculum in desegregated schools and at the same time the maintenance of standards of quality in an educational program may make the situation at Little Rock, Arkansas, a problem that is entirely different from that in many other places."

According to the provisions of the plan for integration, it was to become partially effective at the beginning of the 1957-1958 school year.

On September 2, 1957, the Governor of the State of Arkansas ordered the Arkansas National Guard to be stationed at the Little Rock Central High School for the announced purpose of maintaining law and order and to prevent violence upon the admission of Negroes to the high school. A petition to enjoin the Governor and the officials of the Arkansas National Guard was filed, and on September 21, 1957, D.C., 156 F.Supp. 220, the court, presided over by Honorable Ronald N. Davies, sitting by assignment, entered an order permanently enjoining the Governor and all other persons subject to the orders of the Governor, and the officers of the Arkansas National Guard acting in concert or participating with them, from obstructing or preventing by means of the Arkansas National Guard, or otherwise, Negro students, eligible under the plan of school integration, from attending the Little Rock Central High School, and from threatening or coercing said students not to attend said school or from obstructing or interfering in any way with the effectuation of the court's orders of August 28, 1956, and Septemebr 3, 1957, or from obstructing or interfering with the constitutional right of the Negro children to attend said school.

The order of September 3, 1957, referred to by Judge Davies was a temporary restraining order entered by him on September 3, 1957, ordering the Board of Directors of the School District and the Superintendent to comply forthwith with the original plan of school integration.

After the entry of the order permanently enjoining the Governor and others from interfering with the carrying out of the plan of integration, the case was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Faubus v. United States, 254 F.2d 797, and on April 28, 1958, that court affirmed the order of this court entered, as above stated, on September 21, 1957. At page 807 of 254 F.2d the Court of Appeals said:

"It is certain that while the state government is functioning, it cannot suppress disorders the object of which is to deprive citizens of their lawful rights, by using its forces to assist

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