Aasland v. Yankton County

• Decision Date: 28 June 1979
• Docket Number: No. 12569,12569
• Citation: 280 N.W.2d 666
• Parties: Sarah D. AASLAND and Delton W. Aasland, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. The COUNTY OF YANKTON, a public corporation of the State of South Dakota, its agents, servants and employees, Defendants and Respondents.
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Page 666

280 N.W.2d 666

Sarah D. AASLAND and Delton W. Aasland, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. The COUNTY OF YANKTON, a public corporation of the State of South Dakota, its agents, servants and employees Defendants and Respondents.

No. 12569.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

Argued May 11, 1979.

Decided June 28, 1979.

Douglas R. Bleeker, of Shandorf, Bleeker, Boldt & Koch, Mitchell, for plaintiffs and appellants; E. M. Bubak, Tyndall, on brief.

Thomas E. Alberts, of Engel & Alberts, Avon, for defendants and respondents.

DUNN, Justice.

This case involves an action brought by landowners Delton W. Aasland and Sarah D. Aasland (plaintiffs) for a declaratory judgment regarding the public or private status of a road running through their property in Yankton County and for an injunction against Yankton County (defendant). From a judgment dismissing plaintiffs' complaint and enjoining plaintiffs from blocking public access to the road, plaintiffs have appealed. We affirm.

The road that is the subject of this action was conveyed to defendant in a right-of-way grant executed on November 17, 1898, by John W. Schneider. The grant was filed in the office of the register of deeds on February 6, 1899, and a copy was also filed with the Highway Department Office in Yankton, South Dakota. When the register of deeds transcribed the right-of-way grant into the county's record, he left out portions of the correct description. The effect of these omissions in recordation was that the right-of-way was moved one-quarter mile east from the right-of-way grant and the course of the southern portion of the right-of-way was changed somewhat. ^* The road contractor, however, did not rely on the incomplete recorded description to build the road. The road was constructed in accordance with the correct description contained in the original deed. The road was constructed over rough terrain. It followed the lay of the land and contained some backfills, cutbanks, and culverts. The road was built from the northern portion of the property now owned by plaintiffs through the rivers breaks to the Missouri River. People used to live along the southern portion of the road near the river and used the road for ingress and egress. In the 1950s, the United States Corps of Engineers condemned the land along the southern portion of the road to accommodate the rising waters resulting from the Gavins Point Dam coming-on line. In 1936, the property upon which the road is located was sold for nonpayment of 1928 general taxes, and tax deeds were acquired by the Danforth Company. The property remained in the Danforth family until December 6, 1976, when it was deeded to plaintiffs daughter and son-in-law of the grantor. Plaintiff Delton W. Aasland had managed the property for approximately twelve years before he and his wife purchased it. Plaintiffs had been familiar with the property for twenty years and had visited the property and traveled the road numerous times. About five years prior to the time that this lawsuit was filed, plaintiffs placed a gate across the road at its northernmost point. The present action was precipitated by this denial of access by plaintiffs and defendant's interest in using the road to accommodate a rural water system which seeks to place a pumping plant at the southern portion of the road and use the road as access to the station, as well as a right-of-way for a pipeline from the pumping station. The trial court found that the road is currently neglected and in a bad state of disrepair, but further found that the road is passable.

Plaintiffs first contend that defendant should be bound by the right-of-way description recorded in the office of the register of deeds. Since there has never been a road built on the right-of-way which was incompletely described in the register of deeds' record, plaintiffs argue that defendant has abandoned the right-of-way of record and that the road in existence is a private road. The trial court found that it would be "absurd to allow an erroneous recordation to be effective over the correct instrument" especially when the correct instrument was produced at trial and not challenged by plaintiffs. We agree. To accept plaintiffs' contention, we would be sacrificing substance for form, and valid interests in property could be invalidated by a mere mistake in recordation. The recordation of an instrument serves as constructive notice of what the instrument actually contains. SDCL 43-28-15; Shelby v. Bowden, 16 S.D. 531, 94 N.W. 416 (1903). The recordation of the right-of-way grant, although incomplete, was sufficient to put plaintiffs on notice that a right-of-way existed across their land and that the right-of-way instrument should be sought out and investigated.

Plaintiffs next contend that the poor condition of the existing road evidences an intended abandonment by defendant of its right-of-way through nonuse. Plaintiffs refer us particularly to the original release of right-of-way deed which contains the provision that "when said County (defendant) shall cease to use the same for the purpose above mentioned the said land shall revert to said grantors or their assigns." Plaintiffs argue that upon nonuse and abandonment by defendant, the right-of-way reverts back to plainti...